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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY LITIGATION 
David G. Owen*t 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Manufacturers have a powerful hold over the means for discover-
ing and correcting product hazards.1 Through the processes of 
design, testing, inspection and collection of data on product safety 
performance in the field, the manufacturer has virtually exclusive 
access to much of the information necessary for effective control of 
dangers facing product consumers. Indeed, the strict principles 
of modem products liability law evolved in part to motivate manufac-
turers to use this information to help combat the massive problem 
of product accidents. 2 
@ 1976 by David G. Owen. 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. B.S. 1967; J,D. 
1971, University of Pennsylvania.-Ed. 
t The author is grateful to Frampton Durban, Jean L. Perrin, Robert E. Stepp 
and William L. Todd, students at the University of South Carolina School of Law, for 
their valuable assistance, and to the many lawyers who supplied invaluable informa-
tion on the cases treated in this article. 
1. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL REPORT 3-4 (1970) 
[hereinafter NOPS FINAL REPORT]; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 
756-57 (1956); Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 927 (1967); Noel, 
Comparison of Strict Liability in Products Area and Auto Accident Reparations, in 
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION 79 (U.S. Dept. of 
Transp. 1970). 
2. See, e.g., Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration 
of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REV. 803, 809-10 (1976); 
Morris, Negligence in Tort Law-With Emphasis on Automobile Accidents and Un-
sound Products, 53 VA. L. REv. 899, 908-09 (1967). 
The National Commission on Product Safety estimated in 1970 that 20 million 
Americans are injured in the home each year in product accidents. See NCPS 
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. In addition, it has been estimated that as many 
as seven million workers annually are injured in product accidents on the job. Sec 
Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of Law 
and Technology, 12 DUQUESNE L. REv. 425 (1974), citing PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (May 1972). A recent survey ')f the National 
Center for Health Statistics estimated that over 62 million accidents occurre, /1 this 
countzy in 1974. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 2 (1975). Since 
the estimate of the National Commission on Product Safety excluded accidents from 
foods, drugs, cosmetics, motor vehicles, insecticides, firearms, cigarettes, radiological 
hazards, and certain flammable fabrics, NCPS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 n.*, 
it may be conservatively estimated that the total annual figure for product acci-
dents exceeds 30 million injuries and perhaps is considerably greater. The National 
Safety Council has estimated the national cost of all accidents at $43.3 billion for 
1974. See NATIONAL SAFE1Y COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 4 (1975). Approximating 
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Most manufacturers, both from a desire to avoid liability and 
from a generalized sense of social responsibility, prudently use their 
resources to prevent excessively hazardous products3 from reaching 
or staying on the market. On occasion, however, manufacturers 
abuse their control over safety information and market defective 
products in flagrant disregard of the public safety. One manufac-
turer of color televisions, for example, included in each set a high 
voltage transformer it knew was prone to catch fire and, when 
informed that its sets were causing frequent fires, refused to spend the 
one dollar per unit it knew would eliminate the hazard. 4 In another 
case, a major drug company submitted fabricated test data to the 
Food and Drug Administration to obtain approval for the sale of a 
dangerous new drug. Approval was granted, and approximately 500 
persons developed cataracts as a result. 5 
The strict liability theory of modem product~ liability law explicit-
ly addresses ·the loss distribution problems ,that arise when an injury is 
caused by a defective product marketed by an "innocent" manufac-
turer, since liability is imposed even though the manufacturer has 
exercised due care. 6 But the principles of strict liability are ill-
equipped to deal with problems at the other end of the culpability 
scale where an · injury results when a manufacturer markets its 
products in intentional or reckless disregard for consumer safety. 
Nor has the criminal law filled this void. 7 A legal tool is needed 
that will help to expose this type of gross misconduct, punish those 
the figure for product accidents at one half the total for all accidents, the current 
annual cost of product accidents may exceed $20 billion. 
3. "The most persistent issue in the law of torts is the determination of when 
an actor has imposed excessive risk of harm on another." C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY 
OF VALUES 257 (1970). See 0. HOLMES, THE CoMMON LAW 144-46 (1881). The 
hazards in a product are considered to be "excessive," for the purposes of this article, 
when the product is marketed in a "defective condition." The difficult issue of when 
a product's condition may properly be characterized as defective is beyond the scope 
of the present article. Roughly speaking, in this article, a product is considered to 
contain excessive hazards and thus to be defective if it is marketed in a condition 
that generates more· accident costs than social utility. Stated otherwise, a product 
is defective if the costs of improving its safety are less than the benefits resulting 
from the improvement. See note 169 infra and accompanying text. However, the 
principles of punitive damages developed in this article are of general application 
and are not dependent upon any particular definition of defectiveness. 
4. See Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975); notes 474-80 
i11f ra and accompanying text. 
5. See Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 
398 (1967); notes 336-51 infra and accompanying text; cf. Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). 
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A(2)(a) (1965). 
7. See note 156 infra and accompanying text. 
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manufacturers guilty of such flagrant misbehavior, and deter all 
manufacturers from acting with similar disregard for the public wel-
fare. The punitive damages remedy is such a tool. 
Whether punitive damages may appropriately and usefully be 
awarded in products liability litigation is a question that has remained 
remarkably unexplored by both courts8 and commentators. 0 The 
dearth of judicial analysis in this area can be explained in part 
by the important 1967 Second Circuit decision in Roginsky v. 
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 10 Striking down a punitive damages award 
of $100,000 to a person who had developed cataracts as a result of 
the defendant drug company's fraudulent marketing practices, Judge 
Friendly delivered a characteristically powerful opinion outlining 
three apparent drawbacks to extending the punitive damages remedy 
to products liability litigation: (1) the inequity of punishing the· 
innocent shareholders of a manufacturer for the misdeeds of its low-
level employees; (2) the probability that a manufacturer will in-
sure against the risk of punitive damages assessments, and that the 
deterrent value of the remedy will thus be eviscerated; and (3) the 
risk that a manufacturer may be excessively punished or perhaps 
even bankrupted by punitive damages verdicts in multiple actions for 
marketing a single defective product.11 
8. Only one decision has generally explored the issue. Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). Cf. G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior 
Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975); Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 
38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 466, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 427 (1974). 
9. Other published articles examining this topic are Abramson, Punitive Dam-
ages in Aircraft Accident Cases-A Debate, 11 THE FORUM 50 (1975); DuBois, 
Punitive Damages in Personal Injury, Products Liability and Professional Malpractice 
Cases: Bonanza or Disaster, 43 lNs. COUNSEL J. 344 (1976); Haskell, The Aircraft 
Manufacturer's Liability for Design and Punitive Damages-The Insurance Policy 
and the Public Policy, 40 J. Am. L. & COM. 595 (1974); Tozer, Punitive Damages 
and Products Liability, 39 !NS. COUNSEL J. 300 (1972); Note, Allowance of 
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Claims, 6 GA. L. REV. 613 (1972). Cf. 
Silliman, Punitive Damages Related to Multiple Litigation Against a Corporation, 
16 FED. OF !Ns. COUNSEL Q. 91, No. 3 (1966). See also Nolan,.Punitive Damages-
A Controversial New Area of Products Liability-A Capsule Study, in PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY-LAW, PRACTICE, ScIENCE 6:18 (S. Schreiber & P. Rheingold eds. 1967); 
Annot., 29 AL.R.3d 1021 (1970). 
An unpublished paper on the topic was delivered at the 1975 annual convention 
of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, in Toronto, Canada: Lloyd, Puni-
tive Damages: A Social Imperative-A Survey of Recent Developments in Punitive 
Damages in Product Liability Litigation. An excellent, early treatment is West, 
Some Contemporary Corporate Problems Concerning Punitive Damages, 1967 (un-
published LL.M. seminar paper on file at Michigan Law Review). 
10. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). 
11. 378 F.2d at 838-50. 
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Roginsky appeared for some time to have laid the matter to 
rest. 12 But there are indications that an increasing number of plain-
tiffs in products liability actions are now making claims for punitive 
damages and are sometimes prevailing.13 Juries have recently 
assessed punitive damages verdicts against product manufacturers in 
amounts of $17.25 million, $10.5 million, and $5 million.14 The 
question of the proper use of punitive damages in products liability 
cases is thus of major significance to manufacturers and their liabil-
ity insurers, the general public, and the courts asked to resolve this 
issue.15 
This article will first explore the doctrine of punitive damages 
and its compatibility with the theories of products liability. The 
functions of punitive damages and their applicability in the products 
liability context will then be examined, with particular consideration 
given to the three complicating factors raised by Judge Friendly in 
Roginsky. In the following section attention will focus on the various 
contexts in which manufacturer misconduct has arisen in the reported 
decisions and a number of unreported cases that have involved this 
issue. Finally, guidelines will be developed from these cases for 
determining the appropriateness of punitive damages awards in 
individual products liability cases. The article concludes that puni-
tive damages may be usefully employed in products liability litigation 
to punish and to deter the marketing of defective products in 
flagrant disregard of the public safety. 
12. With the exception of Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 
689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967), handed down only two months after Roginsky, there 
have been only two recent reported cases involving personal injuries in which jury 
awards of punitive damages against product manufacturers have been upheld on ap-
peal: Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975); Moore v. Jew-
ell Tea Co., 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970), affg. 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 
253 N.E.2d 636 (1969). 
13. "[M]anufacturers continue to be faced today with increasing punitive dam-
ages claims at the trial court level .... " Haskell, supra note 9, at 618. See notes 
333, 334 infra. 
14. The cases, respectively, were Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 
3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974); Rosendin v. Avco Lycoming Div., No. 202,715 
(Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, Calif., March 8, 1972) (unpublished opinion, June 
7, 1972), affd., No. 32,999, Cal. App., 1st Dist., Feb. 24, 1976, cert. denied, Sup. 
Ct. Cal. (1976); Hayman v. Arcoa, Inc., Civil No. 70-3226 (20th Jud. Cir. St. 
Clair County, Ill., filed Apr. 30, 1970). The awards were stricken by the trial 
courts in the first two cases and allowed to stand in the third. See notes 333, 334 
infra. -
15. Several cases squarely presenting the issue of the propriety of punitive dam-
ages awards in products liability litigation are presently pending appeal. See note 
334 infra. 
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II. THE DOCTRINE AND FUNCTIONS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
A. The Doctrine of Punitive Damages and Its Compatibility 
with Theories of Products Liability 
1. The Doctrine of Punitive Damages 
The doctrine of punitive damages, 16 with deep roots in ancient 
law17 and in medieval English statutes,18 first received explicit recog-
16. The classic article on punitive damages generally is Professor Morris' Punitive 
Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1173 (1931). Other articles of particular 
note include Friedman, Punitive Damages in Tort, 48 CAN. B. REV. 373 (1970) 
(English and Canadian law); Lambert, The Case for Punitive Damages (Including 
Their Coverage by Liability Insurance), 35 AssN. OF TRIAL LAW. OF AM. L.J. 164 
(1974) (collecting the literature); Morris, Rough Justice and Some Utopian Ideas, 
24 ILL. L. REv. 730 (1930); Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 
21 Omo Sr. L.J. 216 (1960); Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private Consumer Ac-
tions, 55 IOWA L. REV. 307 (1969); Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical 
Analysis: Kink v. Combs, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 369 (1965); Note, Exemplary Damages 
in the Law of Torts, 70 HARv. L. REv. 517 (19S7); Note, The Imposition of Punish-
ment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV, 11S8 
(1966); Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 
U. Cm. L. REV. 408 (1967); Note, The Assessment of Punitive Damages Against 
an Entrepreneur for the Malicious Torts of His Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296 
(1961). See also D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES§ 3.9 (1973); C. McCORMICK, LAW 
OF DAMAGES ch. 10 (1935); 1 T. SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES ch. 16 (9th ed. 
1912). 
17. "Multiple damages are a common feature of early legal systems •••• " D. 
PUGSLEY, THE ROMAN LAW OF PRoPER1Y AND OBLIGATIONS 31 (1972). Since multi-
ple damages are awarded to a plaintiff in an amount equal to a legislatively pre-
scribed multiple of his actual damages, they are plainly a form of punitive damages. 
This. fact has been expressly recognized by some courts, see, e.g., Stovall v. Smith, 
43 Ky. 378 (1844), and commentators, see, e.g., G. DRIVER & J. MILES, THE BABY· 
LONIAN LAWS 500 (1952); W. HOWE, STUDIES IN THE CIVIL LAW 192 (1896); 2 
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 522 (2d ed. 1899). 
It has been overlooked by others, see, e.g., Walther & Plein, supra note 16, at 369 
n.6, and has been generally ignored in the long dispute over the punitive damages 
doctrine. That treble damages under the antitrust laws are in the nature of punitive 
damages and achieve similar objectives has long been recognized. See, e.g., Clark 
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir. 194S); United Copper 
Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 F. 514, 511 (2d Cir. 1916). See Stoll, 
Penal Purposes in the Law of Tort, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 3, 14 (1970). See gener-
ally R. PosNER, EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 360-62 (1972). But cf. Vold, Are 
Threefold Damages Under the Anti-Trust Act Penal or Compensatory?, 28 KY. L.J. 
117 (1940). 
Once it is recognized that multiple damages are merely one statutory form of 
punitive damages, the depth of the historical foundation underlying punitive damages 
becomes astounding. Multiple damages were provided for in Babylonian law nearly 
4000 years ago in the Code of Hammurabi, the earliest known legal code. G. DRIVER 
& J. MILES, supra, at 500-01. They were provided for in the Hittite Laws of about 
1400 B.C., M. BELLI, MODERN DAMAGES 15 (1959), and in the Hebrew Covenant 
Code of Mosaic law of about 1200 B.C., Exodus 22: 1. See R. PFEIFFER, INTRODUC• 
TION TO nm OLD TESTAMENT 210 (1948); J. SMITH, THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF 
HEBREW LAW 16 (1960). The Hindu Code of Manu of about 200 B.C. also provided 
for multiple damages in at least one case. M. BELLI, supra, at 84. 
The very basis of early Roman civil law, beginning with the Twelve Tables of 
450 B.C., was punitive in nature, see W. BUCKLAND & A. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW 
AND COMMON LAW 344-45 (2d rev. Lawson ed. 196S); R. LEAGUE, ROMAN PRIVATE 
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nition by the English common law in 1763.19 The doctrine was 
rapidly transported to America20 and by the middle of the nineteenth 
century had gained substantial acceptance in this country.21 Though 
beset by a history of stormy controversy, 22 the doctrine has become 
LAW 361 (2d ed. 1951); R. LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 377 (4th ed. 1956); 
M. RADIN, ROMAN LAW 127 (1927), and several provisions in classical Roman law 
prescribed double, treble, and quadruple damages, see W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK 
OF ROMAN LAW 581-84 (3d rev. Stein ed. 1966). "Delictual actions were classified 
as penal (ad poenam persequemdam) by contrast with all other actions •.. and 
• . • the essential distinction is to be found in the punitive or vindictive character 
of the penal action . • . . The purpose of the action being punitive, it was irrelevant 
that in this way the victim would be paid several times over." B. NICHOLAS, ROMAN 
LAW 210 (1962). Assertions that punitive damages were unknown to the Roman 
law thus appear to rest upon a dubious foundation. See, e.g., 1 T. SEDGWICK, supra 
note 16, at 701; Walther & Plein, supra note 16, at 369. See also Fay v. Parker, 
53 N.H. 342, 355 (1873); 2 S. GREENLEAF, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 246 n.2 (16th 
ed. 1899). 
18. The first English statutory provision for multiple damages appears to have 
been enacted by Parliament in 1275. "Trespassers against religious persons, shall 
yield double damages." Synopsis of Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1, c. 1, vol. 1, 
in 24 STATUTES AT LARGE 138 (Pickering Index 1761). Including this first statute, 
Parliament enacted a total of sixty-five separate provisions for double, treble, and 
quadruple damages between 1275 and 1753. See id. at 138-41. See also 2 F. POL· 
LOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 17, at 522 (referring to these provisions as "penal 
and exemplary damages"). 
19. Reputedly, the case that first articulated a theory of "exemplary" damages 
in English law is Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205 (K.B. 1763). See also Wilkes v. 
Wood, 1 Lofft 1 (1763 ). It has been suggested that punitive damages were in fact, 
if not in name, awarded by English juries prior to the mid-eighteenth century, but 
that the appellate courts of that period did not take jurisdiction of questions involving 
the excessiveness of jury verdicts and so had no occasion to enunciate rules of ex-
emplary or punitive damages. See T. SEDGWICK, supra note 16, § 347, at 687-89; 
Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, supra note 16, at '.518-19. 
In Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851), the Supreme Court, without 
citing specific authority, stated that the doctrine received support from "repeated ju-
diclal decisions for more than a century." This would indicate the existence of a 
punitive damages decision before 1751, twelve years prior to the decision in Huckle. 
Research has failed to uncover such a decision, and so it is assumed that the Day 
court was simply mistaken. 
20. The first reported punitive damages decision in this country appears to be 
Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C. 3, 1 Bay 6 (1784), in which the plaintiff became ill after 
consuming a glass of wine containing a large quantity of Spanish Fly that the defend-
ant had added as a practical joke. . 
21. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851) (dictum); Linsley v. Bush-
nell, 15 Conn. 225, 235 (1842). For brief historical reviews of the doctrine, see 
1 T. SJ;!DGWICK, supra note 16, § 351; Note, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517, supra note 16. 
22. The first and foremost debate over the doctrine's validity was between Sedg-
wick and Greenleaf. Compare 1 T. SEDGWICK, supra note 16, § 355, with 2 S. 
GREENLEAF, supra note 17, at 240 n.2. See 1 KENT'S COMMENTARIES ON AMERI· 
CAN LAw, Lecture 24(1), at 605-06 (11th ed. Comstock 1867); Walther & Plein, 
supra note 16, at 379-80. 
The early debates were over whether civil damages should or could be awarded 
for other than purely compensatory purposes. Compare Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 
382 (1873) (''The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresay. It is an unsightly 
and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law"), with 
Luther v. Shaw, 15'7 Wis. 234, 238, 147 N.W. 18, 20 (1914) (''The law giving ex-
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firmly established in the common law.28 
emplary damages is an outgrowth of the English love of liberty regulated by law. 
It tends to elevate the jury as a responsible instrument of government, discourages 
private reprisals, restrains the strong, influential and unscrupulous, vindicates the 
right of the weak, and encourages recourse to, and confidence in the courts of law 
by those wronged or oppressed by acts or practices not cognizable in, or not suffi-
ciently punished by the criminal law"). The debate continues. Compare Ghiardi, 
Should Punitive Damages Be Abolished?-A Statement for the Affirmative, ABA 
INS., NEGL. & COMP. LAW SECI10N 282 (1965), with Corboy, Should Punitive Dam-
ages Be Abolished?-A Statement for the Negative, ABA INS., NEGL. & COMP. L. 
SECTION 292 (1965). 
23. By 1935 all states except four, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and 
Washington, had adopted some form of punitive damages. C. McCORMICK, supra 
note 16, at 278-79. 
But the doctrine was rather severely restricted in England by a decision of the 
House of Lords in 1964, Rookes v. Barnard, [1964) A.C. 1129, which Professor 
Fleming called a renunciation of exemplary damages in English law. J. FLEMING, 
THE LAw OF TORTS 522 (4th ed. 1971). The Rookes decision provided that exemp-
lary damages could thereafter be awarded in only three situations: ( 1) cases involv-
ing oppression of citizens by government employees; (2) cases in which the defend-
ant intends to profit by his wrongful act despite the payment of actual damages; 
and (3) situations in which such damages are provided for by statute. See SALMOND 
oN TIIB LAw OF TORTS 546-49 (Heuston 16th ed. 1973). The appellate courts of 
Australia, Canada, Ireland and New Zealand have refused to follow Rookes and have 
insisted that the doctrine be given a wider interpretation. Id. at 547 n.26. See gen-
erally Hodgin & Veitch, Punitive Damages-Reassessed, 21 INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 119 
(1972). The House of Lords, however, reaffirmed the Rookes restriction on punitive 
damages in 1972. Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome, [1972) A.C. 1027 ("aggravated" 
damages should adequately achieve the legitimate objectives of exemplary damages 
in cases falling outside of the three Rookes categories). 
Some scholars believe that the practical effects of the Rookes rule will not be 
too significant since plaintiffs are still permitted to recover "aggravated" damages. 
See J. FLEMING, supra, at 522 (" '[A)ggravated' damages are so difficult to disen• 
tangle from 'exemplary' that the retention of the former without the latter is not 
apt to make much difference in practice"); Friedman, supra note 16, at 387-88 ("Is 
this not exemplary damages under another rubric?"); Stoll, supra note 17, at 3, 5, 14. 
Damages that are "punitive" in nature are provided for by the civil codes of Swit-
zerland, Turkey, Germany, Norway, and Mexico. See F. LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN 
THB CIVIL LAw 209, 212, 218 (1950 corrected ed.). See generally Stoll, supra note 
17. In the United States, several states have statutes providing generally for punitive 
damages awards in appropriate tort cases. See CAL. C1v. CoDB § 3294 (West 1970); 
COLO. RBv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102 (1973); GA. CoDB ANN. § 105-2002 (1968) 
("additional" damages awardable in cases involving "aggravating circumstances"), 
GA .. CODB ANN. § 105-2003 (1968) ("vindictive" damages awardable for injured feel• 
ings), construed in Westview Cemetery, Inc. v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 
776 (1975) (referring to section 105-2002 damages as "exemplary damages"); MoNT. 
REV. CODB ANN. § 17-208 (1947); NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.010 (1975); N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 32-03-07 (1960); 23 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 9 (1955); S.D. COMP. L. 
ANN. § 21-3-2 (1967). 
In addition, several federal and state statutes provide expressly for punitive or 
multiple damages in a variety of specific situations. See, e.g., Clayton Act § 4, 15 
U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (treble damages); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 
(n) (1970) (punitive damages); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c) (Supp. 1975) (wiretapping-punitive damages); Civil 
Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) (punitive damages); CAL. Civ. 
CODE. § 3340 (West 1970) (wrongful injuries to animals-punitive damages); IowA 
CODE. ANN. § 639.14 (1950) (malicious attachment-punitive damages); lowA CODE 
ANN.§ 709.14 (1950) (conversion of logs or lumber-double damages); MASS. GeN, 
LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 93 (i959) (libel and slander-punitive damages); S.C. CoDE 
June 1976] Punitive Damages 1265 
Punitive or exemplary damages2• are assessed in addition to 
compensatory damages to punish the defendant for the commission 
of an aggravated or outrageous act of misconduct and to deter him 
and others from such conduct in the future. 25 A jury in its discre- · 
tion26 may render such an award27 in cases in which the defendant 
injured28 the plaintiff intentionally29 or maliciously,30 or in which the 
ANN. § 66071.13 (Supp. 1974) (unfair or deceptive trade practices-treble damages); 
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 8306, § 5 (1967) (wrongful death of workman-punitive 
damages); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-6-412 (Supp. 1973) (receiving certain stolen prop-
erty-treble damages); VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-650 (1950) (knowingly making unau-
thorized use of another's picture-punitive damages). Punitive damages have also 
been implied into a number of statutes. See, e.g., Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (deprivations of civil rights under color of state law); 
Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970) (wrongful death in admiralty). 
24. The terms "punitive" and "exemplary" damages today are generally used in-
terchangeably. Such damages have also been referred to as "punitory," "penal," "ad-
ditional," "aggravated," "plenary," "imaginary," "presumptive," and sometimes as 
"smart money." See Freifield, The Rationale of Punitive Damages, 1 Omo ST. L.J. 
5 (1935). In the civil-law nations similar damages are referred to as "moral" dam-
ages, "satisfaction," or "private fines." See Stoll, supra note 17. 
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 908(1) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). 
26. See id. § 908, comment d at 81. But see Sample v. Gulf Ref. Co., 183 S.C. 
399, 191 S.E. 209 (1937). 
27. Despite the fact that punitive damages are assessed against a defendant 
largely for purposes of punishment, they are awarded to the plaintiff rather than 
to the state. This has prompted some to criticize such awards as "windfalls" to 
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 409, 179 N.E.2d 497, 501, 
223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 494 (1961) (dissenting opinion). Some commentators suggest 
that such damages should go to the state. See, e.g., Hodgin & Veitch, supra note 
23, at 132. For a discussion of the reasons for allowing the plaintiff to retain a 
windfall, see text at notes 152-203 infra. 
28. Courts are divided on whether punitive damages should be recovered in ac-
tions brought under wrongful death acts. Compare Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 
38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 461-63, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 423-24 (1974) (punitive damages 
not allowable under California wrongful death statute), with Kritser v. Beech Air-
craft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089, 1091 (5th Cir. 1973) (punitive damages allowable under 
Texas wrongful death act). While the majority of jurisdictions formerly prohibited 
recovery, see Annot., 94 A.L.R. 384 (1935), there is now.a growing trend toward 
recovery, see s. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 3:4 (rev. ed. 1975). 
While the advisability of allowing punitive damages in wrongful death actions is gen-
erally beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that a rule disallowing 
such damages in both wrongful death and survival actions would create a major loop-
hole for manufacturers that would frequently contravene the important objectives of 
punitive damages. See Griswold v. The Lange Co., CCH PROD. LIAB.· RPTR. "if 7634, 
at 14,685, 14,691 (D. Colo. 1976) ("Since punitive damages are not recoverable un-
der Colorado's wrongful death statute, preclusion of recovery under the survival stat-
ute as well would lead to the ironical result that a defendant in Colorado was in 
a better position with a dead plaintiff than a maimed one"). 
29. Punitive damages are awarded most frequently in cases of fraud, malicious 
prosecution, false imprisonment, defamation, trespass, conversion, battery, and as-
sault, nearly all of which require a showing of intentional or reckless conduct as 
a part of the plaintifrs cause of action. See note 34 infra. 
30. Some courts distinguish between "actual" or "express" malice and "legal" 
malice, the former evidencing deliberation and hatred, the latter indicating a wanton 
or reckless disregard of the rights of another. See generally H & R Block, Inc. v. 
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defendant's conduct reflected a reckless, wanton or oppressive81 dis-
regard of the rights32 or interests33 of the plaintiff. 34 The amount 
of the award is determined by the jury upon consideration of the 
character of the defendant's misconduct, the nature and extent of 
the plaintiff's injury, and the wealth of the defendant. 35 Punitive 
Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975). Either type of malice generally will 
support a punitive damages award in a tort action, see 275 Md. at -, 338 A.2d 
at 52, but some courts stress the need to establish the moral culpability of the de-
fendant's motive. See Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 404, 179 N.E.2d 497, 498, 
223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 490 (1961) ("Punitive or exemplary damages have been allowed 
in cases where the wrong complained of is morally culpable, or is actuated by evil 
or reprehensible motives ... "). In many jurisdictions malice can be inferred from 
acts of gross negligence that evidence a wanton disregard for the rights of others. 
See, e.g., Adams v. Whitfield, 290 S.2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1974). But some courts require 
that "actual" malice be established. See, e.g., G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct., 
49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975). 
31. The difference between "reckless" and "wanton" conduct is1 in most cases, 
inconsequential, and the terms are frequently used interchangeably. See W. HALB, 
HANDBOOK ON nm LAW OF DAMAGES 210 n.37 (1896). 
For a sampling of the various verbal standards used by courts in claims for puni-
tive damages, see Boehm v. Fox, 473 F.2d 445, 447 (10th Cir. 1973) ("Wantonness 
is characterized by a realization of the imminence of damage to others and a re-
straint from doing what is necessary to prevent the damage because of indifference 
as to whether it occurs"); Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 25 Cal. 
App. 3d 232, 246, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547, 556 (1972) ("'Oppression' .•. means subject-
ing a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of his rights"); Re-
serve Trucking Co. v. Fairchild, 128 Ohio St. 519, 531-32, 191 N.E. 745, 750 (1934) 
(" 'Wanton negligence' . • . implies the failure to exercise any care toward those 
to whom a duty of care is owing when the probability that harm will result from 
such failure is great and such probability is actually known to the defendant"). For 
a thorough examination of verbal standards in the products liability context, see G.D. 
Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cat. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975) and 
text at notes 495-532 infra. 
Although some courts consider "gross negligence" sufficient to support a punitive 
damages award, a majority of jurisdictions require something more. See W. PROSSBR, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 10 (4th ed. 1971). Some courts have held that 
for punitive damages to lie, the defendant's disregard for the rights of others must 
partake of a- criminal character. See, e.g., Northwestern Natl. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 
307 F.2d 432, 442 (5th Cir. 1962). 
32. See, e.g., State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 759, 527 P.2d 
798, 800 (1974). 
33. See, e.g., Sellinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 110 Ariz. 573, 577, 
521 P.2d 1119, 1123 (1974). 
34. See REsTATEMBNT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 908(2) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). 
A review of the approximately 370 punitive damages cases digested in the General 
Digest over the five-year period between 1970 and 1974 indicates that fraud actions 
account for about one sixth of the total reported decisions. Conversion actions were 
the second most frequent type of tort case reported, followed by automobile accident 
cases involving aggravated acts of misconduct. Other types of tort actions that ap-
peared at least five times include, in decreasing order of frequency: malicious prose-
cution, assault and battery, false arrest and false imprisonment,. defamation, interfer-
ence with contractual relations, civil rights violations, wrongful failure to pay insur-
ance claims, trespass, and nuisance. Some 50 of the total cases during the five-
year period involved breaches of contract in which punitive damages were infre-
quently allowed. See text at notes 66-98 infra. 
35. REsTATEMBNT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 908(2) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). 
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damages may be assessed vicariously against a business enterprise 
for the aggravated misconduct of an employee,86 although some juris-
dictions restrict such awards to cases in which a managing officer of 
the enterprise ordered, participated in, or consented to the 
misconduct. 87 
Despite its acknowledged place in the law,88 the punitive dam-
ages doctrine continues to receive substantial criticism. 89 Any 
expansion in its application is therefore certain to meet with vehe-
ment objections40 emphasizing its many supposed flaws41 and 
"anomalous" presence in the law of torts.42 It is thus necessary to 
36. See w. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 12. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OP TORTS § 909 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973); Note, Exemplary Damages Against 
Corporations, 30 GEO. L.J. 294 (1942); Note, 70 YALE L.J. 1296, supra note 16; 
text at notes 205-38 infra. 
37. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 842 (2d Cir. 
1967). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973) 
adopts this version of the rule. See text at notes 205-38 infra. 
38. That the doctrine has been widely accepted on its merits is evidenced by 
its adoption in several recent statutes. See, e.g., Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c) (Supp. 1975); Fair Credit Reporting Act 
15 u.s.c. § 1681(n) (1970); NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.010 (1975) (broadly providing 
for awards of punitive damages in tort cases). 
39. See, e.g., Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argu-
mentative Outline, 11 THE FORUM 57 (1975); Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine 
Which Should Be Abolished, in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE: THE CASE AGAINST 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 4 (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros eds. 1969); Ford, The Constitu-
tionality of Punitive Damages, in id. at 15; Ghiardi, supra note 22. See also 
Note, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158, supra note 16. 
40. See, e.g., Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 406, 179 N.E.2d 497, 500, 223 
N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (1961) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting). See also Roginsky v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); Haskell, supra note 9; Tozer; 
supra note 9; cf. DuBois, supra note 9. 
41. The following are the most frequently cited purported flaws in the doctrine: 
( 1) Because punitive damages are punitive in nature rather than compensatory, they 
are "anomalous" and mar the symmetry of the law, see note 42; text at notes 104-09 
infra; (2) because they are in the nature of a criminal fine, yet are imposed without 
the usual criminal procedural safeguards, they are unfair to the defendant, and per-
haps even unconstitutional, see generally Comment, supra note 16; (3) since they 
are usually considered noncompensatory, they result in an undeserved "windfall" to 
the plaintiff, see text at note 153 infra; (4) the absence of an objective basis to 
guide the determination of their amount invites abuse and often results in an overly 
severe sanction on the defendant, see text at notes 277-99 infra; (5) it has not been 
demonstrated that they do in fact deter undesirable conduct, see text at notes 129-
51 infra. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 16, § 3.9; C. McCORMICK, supra note 
16, § 77; Friedman, supra note 16, at 399-408. As developed in this article, these 
problems are either illusory, outweighed by more important considerations, or capable 
of being minimized through effective control by the trial and appellate courts. 
42. See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 384 (1873); W. PRossER, supra note 
31, at 9. While the punitive damages objectives of punishment and deterrence plainly 
do not predominate in the majority of tort cases, their presence in tort law is hardly 
"anomalous." As early as the thirteenth century, "in a characteristically English 
fashion punishment was to be inflicted in the course of civil actions: it took the 
form of manyfold reparation, ol' penal and exemplary damages." 2 F. POLLOCK & 
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scrutinize the doctrinal and functional soundness of extending the 
punitive damages remedy to the expansive field of products liability 
litigation. 
2. Compatibility of Punitive Damages Doctrine 
with Theories of Products Liability 
Few courts or commentators today challenge the appropriateness 
of including a punitive damages claim in actions brought in negli• 
gence43 or fraud and deceit, 44 even in the area of products liability 
litigation. 45 But questions have been raised concerning the propri• 
ety of such claims in actions brought in strict tort and implied 
warranty, 46 perhaps the principal theories employed today in prod-
ucts liability cases. ' 
a. Strict liability in tort. At least two commentators have 
suggested that the punitive damages doctrine is logically inconsistent 
with the strict tort theory of liability.47 "Strict liability and punitive 
damages," it is asserted, "will not mix. In strict liability the character 
of the defendant's act is of no consequence; in the punitive damages 
claim the character of the act is paramount. "48 The argument is that 
a punitive damages claim based upon allegations of aggravated fault 
is logically incompatible with a strict products liability action in which 
the manufacturer's care, or absence thereof, is not relevant to the 
F. MAITLAND, supra note 17, at 522 (footnote omitted). See note 18 supra. More-
over, rules of proximate causation and certainty of proof of damages are often modi-
fied in a plaintiffs favor in cases of aggravated misconduct. See RESTATEMENT (SEC• 
OND) oF TORTS § ·501(2) (1965); Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting 
Defendant's Liability, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 586 (1933). There now appears to be 
a long overdue resurgence of interest in according punishment and deterrence a re-
spected place in tort theory. See Kelly, The Inner Nature of the Tort Action, 2 
IR. JUR. 279 (N.S. 1967); Veitch & Miers, Assault on the Law of Tort, 38 Moo. 
L. REv. 139 (1975). Cf. Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE 
L.J. 656 (1975). 
43. See, e.g., Koppinger v. Cullen-Schlitz & Associates, 513 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 
1975) (negligence and res ipsa loquitur); Lueck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 111 
Ariz. 560, 535 P.2d 599 (1975) (en bane) (neg1igence per se). 
44. See, e.g., Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 
488 (1961). 
45. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Gunn, 234 Ala. 598, 176 S. 332 (1937) (fraud 
and deceit); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 
398 (1967) (counts of fraud and deceit, breach of express and implied warranties, 
negligence, negligence per se, and strict tort); Ostopowitz v. William S. Merrell Co., 
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1967, at 21, cols. 3-4 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, N.Y.). 
46. See, e.g., Haskell, supra note 9, at 618-20; Tozer, supra note 9; Note, supra 
note 9, at 626-27. 
41. See Haskell, supra note 9, at 618-20; Tozer, supra note 9. Cf. Hoffman v. 
Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 856 n.4 (M.D. Pa. 1974). 
48. Tozer, supra note 9, at 301. 
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determination of liability for compensatory damages. 49 This argu-
ment is based upon the apparent shift of attention in strict 
tort from the manufacturer and its fault to the product and its 
"defectiveness."50 
The incompatibility argument has some superficial appeal, but for 
several reasons does not withstand analysis. First, its primary con-
tention that liability in strict tort precludes consideration of a defend-
ant manufacturer's fault is highly dubious. In fact, rather than dis-
pensing with the notion of fault from products liability law, strict tort 
theory expands it by extending the legal consequences of fault to 
the "innocent" manufacture of defective products51 in a manner 
analogous to negligence per se. 52 Yet even acknowledging that 
strict tort eliminates the requirement of proving a manufacturer's 
fault, this is so only with respect to establishing liability for compen-
satory damages. As a liability doctrine designed to compensate 
product accident victims for their actual losses, strict tort theory has 
never purported to delimit the remedies that might be appropriate 
if a plaintiff's accident is attributable to some aggravated fault of the 
manufacturer. 
Second, the incompatibility argument rests upon the invalid 
assumption that punitive damages claims must be established by facts 
identical to those supporting the underlying claim for compensatory 
damages. This assumption was repudiated over a century ago in 
Fleet v. Hollenkemp,"3 the earliest reported products liability case 
involving punitive damages. Addressing the question of whether 
punitive damages could be awarded in an action brought in case as 
well as in trespass, the court responded: "[W]hether exemplary 
49. See, e.g., Hawes v. General Motors, No. 76 CP 2551 (C.P. Hampton County, 
S.C., filed March 12, 1976), in which the court denied defendant's motion to strike 
punitive damages claim from strict tort cause of action (unpublished order, June 10, 
1976). General Motors argued that since the degree of care exercised by the manu-
facturer is irrelevant under strict tort liability theory, "the punitive damages concept 
is incompatible with the policy goals underlying strict tort liability." Hawes v. Gen-
eral Motors, No. 76 CP 2551, at 6. 
50. See generally Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 
(1965); Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of 
Law a11d·Tech11ology, 12 DUQUESNE L. REV. 425,429 (1974). 
51. Cf. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401 
(1959). 
52. See, e.g., Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. 
L.J. 825, 835 (1972). Professor Wade argues that "[t]he time will probably come 
when courts are ready to declare that one who supplies a product which is unduly 
unsafe is negligent per se. Selling a product which is not duly safe is negligence 
within itself, and no more needs to be proved. Whether this is called negligence 
or strict liability is not really significant." Id. at 850. 
53. 52 Ky. 219 (1852). See note. 333 infra. 
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damages should or should not be given does not depend upon the 
form of action so much as upon the extent and nature of the injury 
done and the manner in which it was inflicted, whether by negli-
gence, wantoness [sic], or with or without malice."54 In another 
early punitive damages case in which the defendant raised the tres-
pass-case distinction, the court remarked that "[s]uch [a] distinction 
would be as arbitrary and unjust, as it is technical."56 Punitive dam-
ages claims have long been deemed compatible with the negligence 
cause of action despite the fact that considerably more, and 
sometimes different, proof is required to establish that a defendant's 
conduct was "willful and wanton" or "malicious" rather than merely 
negligent. 56 The first modem products liability case to address the 
incompatibility argument in the context of an action brought in strict 
tort, Drake v. Wham-O Manufacturing Co., 57 similarly concluded 
as follows: "Where the principal claim is based on strict liability 
in tort and there is an additional claim of wanton disregard of the 
plaintiff's rights, it is a simple matter to allow the plaintiff to make 
a supplementary showing of aggravating conduct for the purpose of 
proving entitlement to punitive damages."58 The Drake court 
reasoned that this was an appropriate approach since "a claim for 
punitive damages is considered a prayer for a specific type of relief 
in Wisconsin, not a part of the claim itself . . . . "59 
Moreover, punitive damages awards have been held appropriate 
in a number of cases involving various other causes of action based 
on strict principles of liability, including nuisance, 60 trespass to land 
and liability for ultra-hazardous activities, 61 negligence per se, 02 
54. 52 Ky. at 225-26. 
55. Merrills v. Tariff Mfg. Co., 10 Conn. 384, 388 (1~35). 
56. See note 31 supra. But cf. LoRocco v. New Jersey Mfrs. Indem. Ins. Co,, 
82 N.J. Super. 323, 197 A.2d 591 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964). 
57. 373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974). 
58. 373 F. Supp. at 611. Accord, Hawes v. General Motors, No. 76 CP 2551 
(C.P. Hampton County, S.C., filed March 12, 1976) (unpublished order denying de-
fendant's motion to strike punitive damages claim from strict tort liability cause of 
action, June 10, 1976). 
59. 373 F. Supp. at 611. See Hawes v. General Motors, No. 76 CP 2551 (C.P, 
Hampton County, S.C., filed March 12, 1976) (unpublished order denying defend-
ant's motion to strike punitive damages claim from strict tort liability cause of action, 
June 10, 1976). 
60. See, e.g., Nevada Cement Co. v. Lemler, 89 Nev. 447,514 P.2d 1180 (1973). 
61. See, e.g., Milford v. Tidwell, 276 Ala. 110, 159 S.2d 621 (1963). Cf. Berg 
v. Reaction Motors Div., 37 N.J. 396, 181 A.2d 487 (1962); Atlas Chem. Indus,, 
Inc. v. Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), affd,, 524 S.W.2d 681 
(Tex. 1975). 
62. See, e.g., Lueck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 111 Ariz. 560, 535 P.2d 599 
(1975); Gamer'v. Maxwell, 50 Tenn. App. 157, 360 S.W.2d 64 (1961). 
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defamation, 63 and implied warranty in the sale of drugs. 64 In light 
of this established use of punitive damages in strict liability cases 
generally, and because -there is no sound reason for not allowing a 
plaintiff seeking punitive damages to show a greater _culpability for 
that purpose than he must for his underlying theory of compensatory 
liability, the incompatibility argument should be rejected. 65 
b. Warranty. Sometimes a plaintiff injured by a defective 
product is able to bring his action only in warranty because other 
claims are blocked by a shorter tort statute of limitations or other 
procedural bar. Such a plaintiff faces a substantial doctrinal obstruc-
tion to the recovery of punitive damages no matter how serious the 
manufacturer's misconduct and despite the likelihood that punitive 
damages would be appropriate were the action framed in negligence 
or strict tort. The obstacle is the rule, mechanically recited by courts 
and commentators over the years, that punitive damages may not be 
awarded in contract actions. 66 Since warranty actions have generally 
been thought to sound in contract rather than tort, 67 the assumption 
that punitive damages will not lie in a products liability action 
brought in warranty has not been questioned. 68 
The rule that punitive damages may not be recovered in contract 
actions does have several closely circumscribed exceptions. Thus, 
63. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), affd., 223 
F.2d 429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955); Rogers v. Florence Printing 
Co., 233 S.C. 567, 106 S.E.2d 258 (1958). 
64. See Fleet v. Hollenkemp, 52 Ky. 219 (1852). 
65. In addition to strict tort, there are, of course, other "strict" theories of prod-
ucts liability in which fault need not be established by the plaintiff to recover com-
pensatory damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B; UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE §§ 2-313 to -315; 1 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 
2-313:16, 2-314:71, 2-315:9 (2d ed. 1970). The reasoning in the textual discussion 
above should apply equally well to these theories of liability. Thus, the strict nature 
of these theories should be no obstacle to the inclusion of punitive damages claims 
in such cases. However, the UCC presents its own unique problems. See text at 
notes 87-98 infra. 
66. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 342 (1932). See generally 5 A. CORBIN, 
CONTRACTS § 1077 (1964); 10 HALSBURY, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Damages § 566, 
at 207 (1909); Simpson, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract, 20 Omo ST. 
L.J. 284 (1959); Note, The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract 
Actions, 8 IND. L. REV. 668 (1975); Note, Exemplary Damages in Contract Cases, 
7 WILLAMETTE L.J. 137 (1971 ). The rule was so clearly established and incontro-
vertable in 1930 that it was not discussed at all when presented to the American 
Law Institute for consideration. See 8 ALI PROCEEDINGS 340 (1929-1930). 
67. See, e.g., Kreb-Stengel Co. v. Gora, 70 York Legal Record 207 (C.P. York 
County, Pa., April 11, 1957); Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability 
to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1127 (1960). 
68. See Note, supra note 9, at 627; Hawes v. General Motors, No. 76 CP 2551 
( ... P. Hampton County, S.C., unpublished order, June 10, 1976) (implied warranty 
01 merchantability); Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, - Ind. App.-,-, 340 
N.E.2d 377, 380-82 (1976) (express warranty); Nolan, supra note 9, at 6:20. 
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punitive damages may be awarded upon proof of the requisite wan-
tonness of behavior in the following types of cases: fraud; breach of 
promise of marriage; breach of contract of service by a public utility 
or common carrier; wrongful failure by a bank to honor a depositor's 
check; breach of contract of employment; breach of fiduciary duty; in-
terference with contractual relations of others; and breach of contract 
amounting to or accompanied by an independent tort. 00 Each pur-
ported exception, however, is ultimately reconcilable with the under-
lying rule that precludes the recovery of punitive damages for breach 
of contract, since each involves conduct apart from the breach itself 
that may amount to an independent tort for which punitive damages 
could be awarded anyway.70 Moreover, several of the exceptions 
may be explained as merely a relaxation of the stricter damages rules 
of contract law in situations in which actual damages are particularly 
difficult to ascertain. 71 Deviations from the rigid application of the 
rule are occasionally reported, 72 but close analysis shows that the 
deviations are illusory and that the rule remains as firmly entrenched 
as ever in the law.78 
69. See generally 5 A. CoRBIN, supra note 66, § 1077; L. SIMPSON, LAW OF CON· 
TRACTS 394 (2d ed. 1965); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 342 (1932). One com-
mentator has suggested that the various exceptions may be generally explained in 
terms of situations involving oppressive abuse of power by the defendant. D. Donns, 
supra note 16, § 3.9, at 207. Professor Dobbs points to the cases that have approved 
punitive damages awards against insurers for failing to pay on insurance policies, 
utilities for terminating services, employers for discharging employees in breach of 
contract, and other defendants such as banks, telegraph companies and public carriers 
who have similarly committed "some serious abuse of a position of privilege or 
power, even without guilty state of mind." Id. at 206. The product manufacturer 
has analogous monopolistic control over the means of gathering information concern-
·ing product hazards, the means of evaluating such hazards, and often the means of 
reducing or eliminating these hazards. One may plausibly conclude from these cases 
that a product manufacturer that flagrantly abuses its position in a manner that re-
sults in injuzy or death to a consumer has committed a breach "not only of the 
contract, but also of a duty imposed by law," id. at 207, and should therefore be 
subject to liability in a contractual warranty action for punitive damages. 
70. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS§ 342, comment cat 562 (1932). See gen-
erally 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 66, § 1077. 
71. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS§ 342, comments a & b (1933). See gen-
erally 5 A. CoRBIN, supra note 66, § 1077. 
72. See, e.g., D. RICE, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 190 (1975) ("A few cases, 
notably in Ohio, hold that exemplary damages may be recovered in an action for 
breach of an express warranty on the ground that formalism in characterization, 
pleading and proof ought not to govern ... "); R. NORDSTROM, SALES § 155, at 
475 (1970) (''[T]here are some cases ... in which there is a sufficient sense of 
indignation and outrage connected with the default so that penal damages will be 
allowed by some states"). 
73. Both of the cases cited by Professor Rice, see note 72 supra, Craig v. Spitzer 
Motors of Columbus, !nc., 109 Ohio App. 376, 160 N.E.2d 537 (1959), and Saberton 
v. Greenwald, 146 Oh10 St. 414, 66 N.E.2d 224 (1946), included claims of fraudulent 
conduct that might have formed the basis for independent actions sounding in tort. 
June 1976] Punitive Damages 1273 
Yet routine application of the rule in cases falling outside the 
established exceptions is difficult to justify when punitive damages 
otherwise appear appropriate. Attention has been given to ap-
proaching the problem from a functional perspective when punitive 
damages are sought in the areas in which tort and contract law over-
lap, 74 such as warranty law in products liability litigation.75 
Although largely absorbed into the law of contracts at a fairly 
early date, warranty law was born in tort76 and has always retained 
much of its original tort character.77 In recent years there has been 
a lively contest between tort and contract for jurisdiction over war-
ranty principles in the products liability field. 78 While it appears that 
at least in cases against manufacturers for personal injuries the law 
of torts will ultimately triumph, 79 strict enterprise liability for defec-
Similarly, the two cases cited by Professor Nordstrom, supra note 72, at 476 n.91, 
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d {i89, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967), 
and Grandi v. LeSage, 74 N.M. 799, 399 P.2d 285 (1965), also involved claims 
of fraudulent conduct in addition to the allegations of breach of warranty. But a 
possibly permanent deviation with potentially far-reaching implications has appeared 
in the general contract-law rule in one or two states. See Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 
54 Hawaii 18, 501 P.2d 368 (1972); Goo v. Continental Cas. Co., 52 Hawaii 235, 
473 P.2d 563 (1970). See also State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 
759, 527 P.2d 798, 800-01 (1974); Bank of New Mexico v. Rice, 78 N.M. 170, 
180, 429 P.2d 368, 378 (1967). 
74. For example, one commentator has stated: 
The classification of wrongs into torts and breaches of contract often leads, 
as in the case of other legal classifications, to an erroneous belief in exactitude 
and certainty. • • • Many cases can be classified in either field; the classifica-
tion adopted will be found to vary with the purpose for which it is adopted. . . . 
A greater flexibility of remedy exists in cases within the zone of overlapping 
because the court is free to choose a rule customarily applied in either field, 
in accordance with the particular combination of facts before it. 
5 A. CORBIN, supra note 66, § 1077, at 440; see M. COHEN & F. COHEN, READINGS 
IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 197 (1951); Simpson, supra note 66, at 
288. 
75. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 634-36; Kessler, supra note 1; 
Wade, ls Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC 
and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REv. 123 (1974). 
76. The origins of warranty have been traced to deceit on the case and, to a 
lesser extent, to trespass on the case. See C. FIFOOT. HISTORY AND SoURCES OF THE 
COMMON LAW 330-40 (1949). See generally Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1888); Prosser, supra note {i7, at 1126; Titus, Restatement 
(Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. 
REV. 713, 728-34 (1970). 
77. See W. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 634-35. See also Prosser, Tlze Implied 
Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 21 MINN. L. REV. 117, 118-22 (1943). 
18. Compare Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 
(1965), with Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 
17 (1965). Compare Dickerson, Was Prosser's Folly Also Traynor's? or Should the 
Judge's Monument Be Moved to a Firmer Site?, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469 (1974), 
with Wade, supra note 75. 
19. See Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975); Vic-
torson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 399, 355 N.E.2d 275, 278, 373 
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tive products can be broadly understood as a synthesis of both tort 
law and the contract law of sales. 80 The strict warranty of product 
quality sprang from this union. It is clearly retrogressive to burden 
this hybrid theory, which only recently broadened the range of manu-
facturer responsibility, 81 with a restrictive contract-law rule of dam-
ages designed long ago under different conditions and for different 
purposes. 
The rule prohibiting punitive damages for breach of contract per-
haps can be explained by the perpetual search for certainty and pre-
dictability in commercial transactions. 82 By limiting the promisor's 
liability for breach to the promisee's foreseeable loss, the law per-
mits the promisor to predict his liability with some certainty and to 
weigh this cost against the benefits of employing his resources else-
where. The rule may be appropriate in the context of a commercial 
transaction involving a mutual exchange of promises and obligations 
in which only economic loss is likely to result from a breach of obli-
gation. 83 
The modern strict warranty of product quality, on the other 
hand, is a response to radical changes in the nature of sales transac-
N.Y.S.2d 39, 43 (1975). See also Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 13S3 
(Okla. 1974); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973); Wade, 
On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 849 (1973 ), 
See generally Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. 
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 87, 94. 
80. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 
440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Markle v. Mulholland Inc., 265 Ore. 2S9, 263-68, 
509 P.2d 529, 531-33 (1973); Kessler, supra note 1, at 898. Fearful that some of the 
more restrictive aspects of warranty law might be incorporated into a combined theory 
of strict products liability, some courts have scrupulously attempted to maintain the 
doctrinal purity of strict tort and warranty. See, e.g., Romano v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Co., - R.J. -, 336 A.2d 555 (1975). Other courts have attempted to blend the 
concepts into a hybrid doctrine of strict products liability. See, e.g., Codling v. Paglia, 
32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973); Kirkland v. General 
Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974). Observing that the warranty action 
"already seems to be fading into the action for strict liability, with the warranty 
terminology and legal complications being elided," Professor Wade predicts that 
"[a]s time goes on and we have more experience with the more recently developed 
theories, they will surely begin to merge together into a single tort action." Wade, 
supra note 79, at 850. Indeed, one contracts-law scholar has suggested that contract 
Jaw generally is being absorbed into the law of torts. See G. GILMORE, THB DBATII 
OF CONTRACTS (1974). For a valiant if futile attempt of another contracts-law 
scholar to forestall the inevitable, see Hill, Breach of Contract as a Tort, 14 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 40 (1974), and Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 679 (1973). 
81. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 
(1960); Kessler, supra note 1. 
82. See 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 66, § 1077, at 440; Simpson, supra note 66, 
at 284. 
83. See 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 66, § 1077, at 438. This hypothesis, however, 
has never been thoroughly demonstrated. 
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tions that have left the modern consumer with little ability either to 
bargain effectively to protect his financial interests or to examine 
products effectively to protect himself from physical injury.84 Since 
tort law to a much greater extent than contract law has developed to 
protect the individual's interest in personal safety,85 "many decisions 
. . . have held, regardless of the form of the action, that the tort as-
pects of warranty call for the application of a tort rather than a con-
tract rule in various respects, such as . . . the more liberal tort rule 
as to damages . . . ."86 This is especially true in warranty cases in 
the field of products liability where the protection of manufacturers' 
ability to predict their potential liability accurately is a less compelling 
goal than the tort law's objective of deterring culpable accident-pro-
ducing behavior. It thus seems reasonable to conclude that the tort law 
doctrine of punitive damages should be available to injured plaintiffs 
in common-law products liability litigation whether the action is 
nominally brought in "tort" or in "warranty." 
The problem of whether punitive damages can be recovered in 
warranty cases, however, is not resolved quite so easily. Warranty 
claims in products liability cases are today controlled largely by the 
Uniform Commercial Code which provides for warranties of quality 
in sections 2-313, 2-314 and 2-315. A serious question concerning 
the availability of punitive damages in actions lying within the pur-
view of the Code is raised by section 1-106(1), which states that 
"[t]he remedies provided by ,this Act shall be liberally administered 
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position 
as if the other party had fully performed but neither consequential 
or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically pro-
vided in this Act or by other rule of law." Official Comment 1 states 
that one purpose of this section is "to make it clear that compensa-
tory damages are limited to compensation. They do not include con-
sequential or special damages, or penal damages .... " The ques-
tion is, simply stated, whether section 1-106 ( 1 ) precludes awards of 
punitive damages in warranty actions brought to enforce rights or 
obligations created by the Code. 87 
84. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467, 150 P.2d 436, 
443 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 
N.J. 358, 390, 161 A.2d 69, 87 (1960). 
85. See generally Wade, supra note 75. 
86. W. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 635. 
87. Put another way, the question is whether the remedies provided for breach 
of warranty in sections 2-714 and 2-715 are exclusive. Cf. Note, Punitive Damages 
for Wrongful Dishonor of a Check, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 360 (1971). For 
a pre-Code case allowing punitive damages for breach of warranty under the Uniform 
Sales Act, see Craig v. Spitzer Motors, 160 N.E.2d 537 (Ct. App. Ohio 1959). 
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The answer is far from clear and deserves a more thorough 
examination than can be given here. The few courts that have con-
sidered the effect of section 1-106(1) on punitive damages claims 
have differed in their approach. Courts in two cases88 involving claims 
of fraud held that the section precludes recovery of punitive dam-
ages, one of them emphasizing that no other rule of law "specifi-
cally" providing for punitive damages in such a case had been 
brought to its attention. 89 Courts in two other cases, 00 similarly 
involving claims of fraud, held that punitive damages may be 
recovered in rescission actions brought under the Code "where the 
breach is accompanied by fraudulent acts which are wanton, mali-
cious and intentional."91 Finally, one court indicated that a punitive 
damages award in an action brought under section 4-402 for wrong-
ful dishonor of a check would not be inconsistent with section 
1-106(1).92 
Since article two of the Code has no specific provision for puni-
tive damages,93 the language of section 1-106(1) and official com-
ment 1 thereto limits punitive damages claims for breach of warranty 
to situations in which such claims are "specifically" provided for "by 
other rule of law." One commentator has suggested that the "other 
rule of law" exception permits courts to continue awarding punitive 
damages in cases in which "the failure to perform a promise (such 
as a warranty of quality) is combined with tortious conduct (such 
as wanton failure to determine whether the goods measured up to 
their warranted quality)."94 Other commentators have suggested 
that the courts "will have to find or make up the 'other rule of law,' 
by extrapolation from the fraud cases."96 In view of warranty's tort 
background and its special role in products liability litigation, a 
liberal extrapolation from the common law appears desirable in per-
sonal injury cases brought under the Code despite the admonition 
88. Bryan Constr. Co. v. Thad Ryan Cadillac, Inc., 300 S.2d 444, 448 (Miss. 
1974); Waters v. Trenckmann, 503 P.2d 1187 (Wyo. 1972). 
89. 503 P.2d at 1191. 
90. Grandi v. LeSage, 78 N.M. 799, 399 P.2d 285 (1965); Z.D. Howard Co. 
v. Cartwright, 537 P.2d 345 (Okla. 1975). In Grandi, the court made no mention 
of section 1-106(1). 
91. 537 P.2d at 348. Accord, Grandi v. LeSage, 74 N.M. 799, 810, 399 P,2d 
285,293. 
92. See Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 315 n.3, 297 A.2d 758, 
761 n.3 (1972) (dictum). See also Note, supra note 87. 
93. See R. NORDSTROM, supra note 72, at 475. Punitive damages are not pro-
vided for elsewhere in the Code. See Note, supra note 87, at 369. 
94. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 72, at 475-76. 
95. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM 
CoMMBRCIAL CODE 133 (1972). 
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that "the other rule of law" must "specifically" provide for punitive 
damages.06 The marketing of a defective product in wanton disre-
gard of its danger to consumers might then be broadly classified as 
"tortious conduct"-sufficiently tortious, at least, to serve as the 
"other rule of law"-and thus provide a rationale for punitive.dam-
ages awards in products liability actions brought solely for breach of 
warranty under the Code.97 This novel interpretation, however, is 
not free of internal weaknesses, and it stretches section 1-106 ( 1) 
further than its drafters probably intended. 98 Yet perhaps the 
product manufacturer guilty of an outrageous disregard for public 
safety should have no standing to complain of a creative method of 
dealing with the serious problem of product safety. 
B. The Functions of Punitive Damages and Their 
Applicability to Products Liability Litigation 
Punitive damages serve a variety of functions for both the 
individual plaintiff and society.00 The primary purposes of the 
doctrine are usually said to be the punishment of the defendant100 
and the deterrence of similar wrongdoing in the future.101 The doc-
trine has been criticized as an intrusion into a domain more properly 
served by the criminal law, 102 which shares these goals.163 The 
96. Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDB §§ 2-318, 2-719(3) (acknowledging the 
need for expansion of the standard commercial law principles in cases involving per-
sonal injuries). 
91. Cf. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 72, at 475-76. 
98. The essential problem is how "restrictive" or "liberal" an interpretation 
should be placed upon section 1-106(1) when personal injuries are involved in the 
products liability context. Compare Dickerson, supra note 78, with Note, supra note 
87. 
99. See generally Lambert, supra note 16, at 167-75; Rice, supra note 16, at 309-
12; Note, Punitive Damages Under Federal Statutes: A Functional Analysis, 60 
CALIF. L. REv. 191 (1972); Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, supra note 16, at 520-
24. 
100. See, e.g., Campbell Estates, Inc. v. Bates, 21 Ariz. App. 162, 517 P.2d 515 
(1973); Schmidt v. Central Hardware Co., 516 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); 
A. WATSON, A TREATISE ON TiiE LAW OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES § 714, 
at 846 (1901). See text at notes 113-28 infra. 
101. See, e.g., Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 708-09, 496 P.2d 939, 945-
46 (1972). See text at notes 129-51 infra. While deterrence is achieved largely 
through the threat of punishment and is itself a principal purpose of punishment, 
it is analytically helpful to use the term "punishment" in a narrower sense and con-
sider separately the purposes of punishment and deterrence. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). 
102. See, e.g., P. JAMBS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF nm LAW OF TORTS 13-15, 402 
(3d ed. 1969). But see, e.g., Veitch, Book Review, 22 N. IR. L.Q. 560, 563 (1971). 
103. "We concede that smart money allowed by a jury, and a fine imposed at 
the suit of the people, depend on the same principle. Both are penal, and intended 
to deter others from the commission of the like crime." Cook v. Ellis, 6 Hill 466, 
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injection of these objectives into the civil law of damages, it is said, 
destroys the majestic "symmetry" of the law.104 This argument, first 
articulated in the nineteenth century, 105 fails to recognize the strong 
historical and functional nexus between tort and crime108 and addi-
tionally betrays a passion for a geometrically balanced legal structure 
that is undeserving of serious consideration.107 No doubt certain 
problems are generated by the straddling of the civil and criminal 
law, 108 but the strength received by the punitive damages doctrine 
from both fields enhances its value as a particularly flexible tool 
in the overall administration of justice.109 
In addition to punishment and deterrence, two less prominent 
functions are served by punitive damages awards. First, they induce 
private persons to enforce the rules of law by rewarding them for 
bringing malefactors to justice.11° Second, such awards further com-
pensate plaintiffs whose actual damages exceed those for which the 
law allows recovery and whose recovery in any event has likely been 
substantially depleted by attorneys' fees.111 These four functions 
have been assigned varying emphasis in different jurisdictions over 
467, 41 Am. Dec. 757, 757-58 (N.Y. 1844). See Demogue, Validity of the Theory 
of Compensatory Damages, 27 YALE L.J. 585, 592 (1918) (referring to acts subject 
to punitive damages assessments as "quasi crimes"). 
104. See Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873); note 22 supra. 
105. See Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873). 
106. See T. PLUCKNETI, A CoNCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 369 (5th 
ed. 1956); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 17, at 448, 449, 511-43; 1 
T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 477-78 (1906); Veitch, supra note 
102, at 563. 
107. Cf. Keeton, ls There a Place for Negligence in Modern Tort Law?, 53 VA, 
L. REV. 886, 897-98 (1967); Montgomery & Owen, supra note 2, at 838-39. 
108. See note 41 supra. See generally Note, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158, supra note 
16; Comment, supra note 16. 
109. See Demogue, supra note 103, at 592-93: ''The idea of punishment finds 
its completest expression in the criminal law, and it might seem that in an ideal 
system of jurisprudence the ideas of punishment and compensation would respectively 
be limited exclusively to the fields of criminal and civil wrong. But the common 
law has never been guilty of the folly of putting theory entirely before practical 
ends, and hence we find that the idea of punishment still holds its ground in the 
administration of civil justice." See also Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 738 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975) ("Punitive damages are allowed because the civil law has long recognized 
that in certain situations deterrence can better be achieved through modification of 
the civil awards than through a requirement of criminal sanctions"); 1 T. STREET, 
supra note 106, at 478; Veitch & Miers, supra note 42, at 139. Cf. Cappelletti, 
Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil Litigation: A 
Comparative Study, 73 MICH. L. REV. 793, 800, 881 (1975). But cf. Hall, Interrela-
tions of Criminal Law and Torts: II, 43 CoLUM. L. REV, 967, 978 (1943) (the 
blending of civil and criminal functions tends to "confuse established distinctions"). 
110. See text at notes 152-84 infra. 
111. See text at notes 185-203 infra. 
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time;112 each merits careful consideration, especially as it pertains 
to the products liability context. 
1. Punishment 
The punishment of a defendant who has intentionally or 
recklessly injured the plaintiff advances several important goals. 
First, it helps restore the plaintiff's emotional equilibrium. When 
the judicial system punishes a defendant, the injured plaintiff 
receives the satisfaction of seeing the defendant suffer.113 It might 
be difficult to rationalize private revenge as the sole justification for 
punishment in a modem legal system, 114 but at least so long as 
punishment achieves some other substantial objective it seems per-
fectly appropriate to allow a person injured by the wanton miscon-
duct of another to vent his outrage by extracting a judicial fine.11° 
112. Although the objectives underlying the punitive damages doctrine are di-
vided in this article into four separate functions, it should be noted that the four 
functions may conceptually be reduced to the two broad goals of punishment and 
compensation. See note 152 infra. 
113. The retributive nature of punitive damages is mentioned in some cases. See 
King v. Towns, 120 Ga. App. 895, 902-03, 118 S.E.2d 121, 128 (1960); Great Atl. 
& Pac. Tea Co. v. Smith, 281 Ky. 583, 600, 136 S.W.2d 759, 768 (1940); Winkler 
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 66 N.J. Super. 22, 29, 168 A.2d 418, 422 (Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1961); Hansley v. Jamesville & W.R.R., 117 N.C. 565, 571, 23 S.E. 
443, 445 (1895) (Clark, J., concurring). 
In ancient law, damages were often statutorily prescribed to make the penalty 
proportionate to the degree of vengeance deemed appropriate for the particular of-
fense. See 1 G. DRIVER & G. MILES, supra note 17, at 500; H. MAINE, ANCIENT 
LAW 365-66 (3d Am. ed. 1888); D. PUGSLEY, THE ROMAN LAW OF PROPERTY AND 
OBLIGATIONS 32 (1972); note 193 infra. Classical retributive theory in fact requires 
that punishment in some fashion "match" the crime. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT 
AND RESPONSIBILITY 231, 233-34 (1968); see G. HEGAL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT pt. 
1, §§ 97-104 (1842); I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW pt. 2, § 29, E (W. Hastie 
transl. 1887). English law has reportedly avoided any such compulsion to maintain 
a parity between crime and punishment. See A. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE 
MORAL LAW 92 (1953). But cf. w. MIDDENDORFF, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUNISH-
MENT 52 (1968). 
114. Some commentators view revenge as patently inappropriate to a "civilized" 
legal system. See, e.g., G. CALABRESr, THE Cos-rs OF ACCIDENTS 298-99 (1970); 
James, Analysis of the Origin and Development of the Negligence Action, in THE 
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION 35, 37 (U.S. Dept. of 
Transp. 1970); K. MENNINGER, THE HUMAN MIND 448 (1945), quoted in Ehren-
zweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence, 41 Nw. U. L. REV. 855, 865-66 (1953) 
("fl1he scheme of punishment is a barbaric system of revenge, by which society 
tries to 'get even' with the criminal"); Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: 
Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774, 793 (1967); Edger-
ton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 833 (1927). 
115. Most modern forms of retributive theory adopt this partial justification ra-
tionale. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 113, at 235-37. Jeremy Bentham urges plain-
tiffs to relish the punishment of defendants from who'm a damages award has been 
extracted: 
Every kind of satisfaction, as it is a punishment to the offender, naturally pro-
duces a pleasure of vengeance to the injured party. 
That pleasure is a gain; it calls to mind Samson's riddle-it is the sweet com-
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Second, punishment serves as a form of revenge for the public 
at large. At an elemental level, society can use judicial punishment 
to maintain the public peace by channeling individual retaliation 
into the courtroom.116 But punishment may also restore the emo-
tional equilibrium of society as a whole. A person who intentionally 
or wantonly injures another generally violates not only some explicit 
tort or criminal law rule of conduct117 but also a basic norm of social 
behavior.118 The failure to punish violations of societal rules weak-
ens the legal and moral fabric of society.11° The imposition of 
punishment by a court expresses society's disapproval of serious mis-
conduct120 and accordingly reaffirms its commitment to maintaining 
ing out of the terrible, it is honey dropping from the lion's mouth. Produced 
without expense, a clear gain resulting from an operation necessary on other 
accounts, it is an enjoyment to be cultivated, like any other; for the pleasure 
of vengence, abstractly considered, is, like every other pleasure, a good in itself. 
J. BENTifAM, THEoRY OF LEGISLATION 309 (1831). See generally L. FULLI!R, 
ANATOMY OF THE LAW 27-30 (1968); o. HOLMES, supra note 3, at 40-41; w. MID-
DENDORFF, supra note 113, at 51-53; L RADzlNOWICZ, IDEOLOGY AND CRIMI!. 115 
(1966); 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81-83 (1883). 
116. See 0. HOLMES, supra note 3, at 41-42 ("If people would gratify the passion 
of revenge outside of the law, if the law did not help them, the law has no choice 
but to satisfy the craving itself, and thus avoid the greater evil of private retribu-
tion"). This function of punitive damages is mentioned with some frequency in early 
cases. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872); Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng, 
Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814) (separate opinion of Heath, J.) (punitive damages serve to 
prevent duelling). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 901(d) (Tent. Draft No. 
19, 1973). Indeed this is said to have originally been the primary function of tort 
law generally. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901, comment a at 56 
(Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973 ). Professor Robert Keeton has suggested that, even when 
only compensatory damages are at stake, negligence law still "appeases" the plaintiff 
who may receive some real satisfaction in knowing that society, through the law, 
approves of his feelings against the defendant, and that this declaration alone may 
be sufficient to allay violent retaliations in some instances. R. KEETON, VENTURINO 
To Do JusTICB 152 (1969). See also Franklin, supra note 114, at 810 n.131. 
In the area of criminal law, this idea has been most recently recognized by the 
Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 44 U.S.L.W. 5230, 5239 (U.S. July 2, 1976) 
("In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at particu-
larly offensive conduct. This function may be unappealing to many, but it is essen-
tial in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than 
self-help to vindicate their wrongs"). 
111. See generally 2 J. STEPHEN, supra note 115, at 75-81. 
118. See Rice, supra note 16, at 311. See generally C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY 
OF VALUES 183-200 (1970); H.L.A. HART, supra note 113, at 137-39; A. LINX>EN, 
CANADIAN NEGLIGENCE LAW 486-89 (1972); Keeton, supra note 107, at 888. 
119. "Justice has always been portrayed as a goddess with scales in her hand. 
A crime makes one of the scales sink, and punishment is designed to restore the 
balance." W. MIDDENDORFF, supra note 113, at 51. The correction of the imbalance 
caused by a crime was extremely important in certain cultures. See E. HoBDBL, 
THB LAW OF PruMmVE MAN 239 (1961) (on the Ashanti of Africa); D. Booon 
& C. MORRIS, LAw IN IMPERIAL CHINA 182 (1967), excerpted in Funk, Interstitial 
Jurisprudence Illustrated in Teaching Criminal Law, 27 J. LEGAL Eo. 53, 64 n.49 
(1975) (describing the view in Manchu China). See generally C. FRIED, supra note 
118, at 121-26; 2 J. STEPHEN, supra note 115, at ch. 17. 
120, See C. FRIED, supra note 118, at 125-26; H.LA. HART, supra note 113, at 
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its moral and legal standards.121 
Finally, punishment serves two objectives tangential to the notion 
of retribution. By punishing the law-breaker, society indirectly 
rewards the law-abider. If law-breakers go unpunished, law-abiders 
consequently must pay a disproportionate share in a system that pur-
ports to require reciprocal sacrifices from each citizen. The punish-
ment of offenders thus reinforces the confidence of the law-abider 
in the basic fairness of the legal system and in the utility of his per-
sonal decision to obey the law.122 Additionally, punishment serves 
as a reformative device to educate the offender to society's legal 
values and to allow him to atone for his misdeed through suffering.123 
One may inquire whether these general objectives of retribution 
and reformation can be served in cases involving serious marketing 
misbehavior by manufacturers. Certainly the outrage incited in the 
public and the injured victim by a defective product differs in both 
manner and degree from that provoked by a spit in the face.124 But 
235; 2 J. STEPHEN, supra note 115, at 81; Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 
23 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 401, 405 (1958). See generally Feinberg, The Expres-
sive Function of Punishment, 49 THE MONIST 397 (1965). 
121. Professor Goodhart summarizes this viewpoint well: "[W]ithout a sense of 
retribution we may lose our sense of wrong. Retribution in punishment is an expres-
sion of the community's disapproval of crime, and if this retribution is not given 
recognition then the disapproval may also disappear. A community which is too 
ready to forgive the wrongdoer may end by condoning the crime." A. GOODHART, 
ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 93 (1953). 
122. C. FRIED, supra note 118, at 121-26 (1970). See H.L.A. HART, THE CON-
CEPT OF LAW 193 (1961). An additional rationale for retribution is that it shifts 
attention 
from the criminal to the honest man. It may seem inhumane and brutal to 
inflict a deliberate hurt on the guilty man simply because he has hurt another. 
But what of the law-abiding man? Is our compassion for the criminal to leave 
the honest citizen with no comparative advantage? Is he to gain nothing by 
being willing to accept the restraints of law? • . . So, . . . it may be said that 
it is necessary to maintain a proper balance of advantage between the criminal 
and the honest man, whether this is done by conferring a reward for law ob-
servance or by imposing a penalty for violation of the law. 
L. FULLER, supra note 115, at 29. See also 10 HALSBURY, supra note 66, at 306. 
Cf. Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 815, 
823 (1967). 
123. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 113, at 24-27 (1968); W. MrnDENDORFF, 
supra note 113, at 68; H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 53-58 
(1968). The theory that punishment provides a means for the wrongdoer to 
atone for his offense rings of early Christian dogma. See Williams, The Aims 
of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 137, 143 (1951) ("[I1he early Court 
of Chancery . . . [theorized] that the conscience of the wrongdoer must be purged 
by making restitution, which was exacted for the benefit of the wrongdoer's soul 
rather than of the victim's pocket"); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 17, 
at 452. However, current support exists for the view that punishment in fact 
achieves certain psychological benefits for both the individual and society. See C. 
FRIED, supra note 118, at 126; L. FULLER, supra note 115, at 27-28. See generally 
Veitch & Miers, supra note 42, at 150-51. 
124. A spit in the plaintiff's face was the basis for a punitive damages recovery 
in Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872). See note 189 infra. 
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this does not mean that there is no place in products liability cases 
for public or private vengeance. 
Because of the elusive nature of the misconduct of a manufac-
turer who markets a defective product and because of the remote-
ness of the misdeed from the product injury, such offenses if dis-
covered at all are apt to appear as mere errors in judgment hardly 
deserving of punishment or condemnation.125 Yet the retribu-
tive needs of the aggrieved individual and of society may be 
substantial in cases in which a manufacturer has marketed a defec-
·tive product knowingly or in reckless disregard of a serious risk of 
injury to consumers. An award of punitive damages in such cases 
should help assuage the victim's feelings of helplessness and frustra-
tion over the apparent futility of holding an anonymous corporation 
accountable for its damaging misdeeds.126 Further, such awards 
would express the public's condemnation of the misconduct and 
remind manufacturers of ·their responsibilities for consumer safety.127 
Finally, the punishment of manufacturers guilty of intentional or 
reckless breaches of their safety obligations should tend to diminish 
whatever unfair competitive advantages such companies might other-
wise have.128 
2. Deterrence 
In its retributive role, punishment satisfies the individual's and 
society's need for vengeance, and thus serves to rectify some of the 
125. Cf. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 844-51 (2d Cir. 
1967). 
126. See generally Heilbroner, Controlling the Corporation, in IN THE NAME OP 
PROFIT 191, 200 (R. Heilbroner ed. 1973) (A "feeling of individual impotence in the 
face of massive organizations" is in part "[w]hat fuels the public protest against 
corporate misbehavior. • . • It is an aspect of a widely shared frustration with re-
spect to all bastions of power that are immense, anonymous and impregnable, and 
yet inextricably bound up with the industrial society that few of us wish to aban-
don"); A. LINDEN, supra note 118, at 487. 
127. Thus, punishment may be of particular importance in the context of business 
offenses to serve "the symbolic function of reinforcing the public sense that there 
are certain acts that are fundamentally wrong, that must not be done." L. FULLER, 
supra note 115, at 28. Although the applicability of the reformative role of punish-
ment to "white-collar'' offenses has been questioned, see Rice, supra note 16, at 312, 
punishment may have a particularly useful role in this area. The line between legal 
and illegal conduct of a business enterprise is often hazy and, partially as a result 
of this phenomenon, even serious misconduct frequently goes unpunished. See 
Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 
56 CAUF. L. REV. 116, 120-21 (1968); Steele, Fraud, Dispute, and the Consumer: 
Responding to Consumer Complaints, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1107, 1108-09 (1975). See 
generally IN TIIE NAME OF PROFIT, supra note 126. 
128. See notes 148-51 infra and accompanying text, indicating the beneficial de-
terrent effect that punitive damages achieve in eliminating the profitability of the 
misconduct. 
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negative effects of prior misconduct. But perhaps the predominant 
purpose of most punishment, including punitive damages, is the 
deterrence of similar misconduct in the future.129 While the practi-
cal effectiveness of punishment in deterring misbehavior is a source 
of constant study and debate, 180 most commentators agree that 
punishment does achieve a measure of deterrence in many cases.131 
The degree of its effectiveness depends upon several recognized fac-
tors. First, the potential wrongdoer must know that the particular 
conduct he is contemplating is both proscribed and punishable.132 
Second, he must be able to alter his conduct to avoid punishment.133 
Finally, he must have the desire to alter his conduct to avoid 
punishment.184 Each of these factors must be considered in the 
products liability context to determine whether punitive damages can 
deter the marketing of defective products. 
The first factor raises the question of whether a general standard 
creating liability for marketing misbehavior in "reckless" or "fla-
grant" disregard of the public safety will give manufacturers a 
sufficiently clear statement of the proscribed conduct to achieve a 
significant deterrent effect.185 The terms may well be vague, but 
129. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Natl. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 
89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 708-09, 496 P.2d 
939, 945-46 (1972); Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S. 
2d 488 (1961); L. FULLER, supra note 115, at 34-35. See generally W. PROSSER, 
supra note 31, at 9; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (Tent. Draft No. 
19, 1973 ). Deterrence has been characterized as a "utilitarian" goal of punishment. 
See H.L.A. HART, supra note 113, at 128-29. See generally A. GOODHART, supra 
note 121, at 93-94; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 18-25 (1973). 
130. See, e.g., W. MIDDENDORFF, supra note 113, at 49, 53-67. So too is the 
morality of general deterrence. See, e.g., Andenaes, The Morality of Deterrence, 
37 U. CHI. L. REv. 649 (1970) (defending its morality). 
The actor's moral inhibitions and fear of censure are additional motivations for 
complying with the law. See Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punish-
ment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949, 961 (1966), reprinted in J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT 
AND DETERRENCE 34, 49-50 (1974). Yet corporate decision-makers often need the 
threat of punishment as well to outweigh the drive for profit maximization. But 
cf. id. at 959-60. 
131. See, e.g., L. FULLER, supra note 115, at 34-35 (1968). 
132. See generally F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 129, at 142-49 (1973); 
Andenaes, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, supra note 130, at 963. 
133. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND TIJE LAW 564-54 
(1970); J. SALMOND, !..Aw OF TORTS 12-13 (6th ed. 1924) in R. HEUSTON, SALMOND 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 20-21 (16th ed. 1973). 
134. See text at notes 148-51 infra. 
135. It must be conceded that any definition of the punishable conduct, such as 
marketing a product in "reckless," "wanton," or "flagrant" disregard of the public 
safety will necessarily be quite vague. Therefore a real risk exists that manufacturers 
will avoid some lawful activity in their attempt to avoid the proscribed conduct. See 
generally P. ATIYAH, supra note 133, at 554; G. CALABRESI, THE CoSTS OF ACCIDENTS 
121-25 (student ed. 1970). However, the gap between "negligent" and "reckless" 
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once several punitive damages verdicts have been levied and a rule 
of responsibility has emerged, most manufacturers will likely be 
informed in fairly short order of at least the general purport of the 
standard and the consequences of its breach. Moreover, most manu-
facturers should have an intuitive sense of the general type of gross 
misconduct proscribed by the rule despite the difficulty of determin-
ing in advance whether any particular conduct is in flagrant disregard 
of the public safety. 
The second factor concerns the manufacturer's ability to make 
the product safer. Since the recovery of punitive damages requires 
a showing of flagrant misconduct, 136 a punitive damages judgment 
would necessarily reflect the factfinder's conclusion that the manu-
facturer had the capability to prevent the accident.137 A manu-
facturer is usually not even liable for actual damages caused by an 
unavoidable defect in its products138 and so a fortiori would not be 
liable for punitive damages in such cases. As a general rule, how-
ever, a manufacturer is able to market a safer product if it so 
desires.139 
behavior is probably wide enough to protect the manufacturer who acts in good faith. 
Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE 53 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). Since many of the manufac-
turers who are aware of the vagueness of the proscription will recognize and rely 
upon the protection of good faith conduct, the chilling effect of the standard's 
vagueness should not be too great. 
Concededly, however, if punitive damages do have the deterrent effect they are 
supposed to have, some products that are in fact "safe enough" under the vague stand-
ard of "defectiveness" will be made even safer by manufacturers anxious to avoid 
being adjudged "reckless" at some future date, and other similar products will not 
be marketed at all. This economic sacrifice, however, should be considerably more 
than offset by the decrease in excessive injuries prevented by the threat of punitive 
damages awards. 
J 36. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text. 
137. In some circumstances even criminal sanctions are imposed for reckless mis-
conduct, and sometimes for negligent and even innocent behavior. See note 175 
infra and accompanying text. The presumption is that even inadvertent conduct can 
be controlled and thus deterred: 
Knowledge that conviction and sentence, not to speak of punishment, may fol• 
low conduct that inadvertently creates improper risk supplies men with an addi-
tional motive to take care before acting, to use their. faculties and draw on their 
experience in gauging the potentialities of contemplated conduct. To some ex-
tent, at least, this motive may promote awareness and thus be effective as a 
measure of control. Certainly legislators act on this assumption in a host of 
situations and it seems to us dogmatic to assert that they are wholly wrong. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment 3, at 126-27 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). See 
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.4, comment 2, at 52-53 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); 
H.L.A. HART, supra note 113, at 132-40. But see Hall, Neg/ige/11 Behavior Slzo11/d 
Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 632 (1963). 
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965), But 
cf. James, The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Ref lee lions on En-
terprise Liability, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1550, 1558 (1966). See generally Montgomery 
& Owen, supra note 2, at 813-14, 827-28. 
139. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS 156-51, 1205-06 (1956); Tune, 
Fault: A Common Name for Different Misdeeds, 49 TuL, L. REV. 279, 294 (1975). 
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The final factor bearing on whether punitive damages will have 
a deterrent effect on marketing misconduct requires a determination 
of the extent to which manufacturers threatened with punishment 
will want to avoid the proscribed conduct. The intensity of such a 
.desire in any particular case will depend upon the manufacturer's per-
ception of the likelihood of his being identified and punished140 as 
well as on the likely severity of punishment.141 The availability of 
punitive damages in products liability cases should make it far more 
likely that offending manufacturers will be exposed and punished since 
the remedy supplies an additional financial incentive to both the vic-
tim and his attorney to uncover and prove the proscribed behavior.142 
Most manufacturers thus would soon ·realize that the availability of 
punitive damages to injured consumers has reduced their ability to 
avoid punishment for the reckless marketing of defective products. 
But as in the case of compensatory damages, a manufacturer will 
have virtually no idea how large the aggregate of punitive damages 
penalties may be143 because it will rarely be possible to predict accu-
rately the number or extent of injuries likely to be caused by marketing 
a product in •a particular condition. Furthermore, the method of 
. measurement used for punitive damages introduces additional im-
ponderables144 that make it virtually impossible for a manufacturer 
to forecast accurately its total liability for punitive damages. Thus, 
depending on such factors as the gravity of wrongdoing, the number 
and seriousness of the resulting injuries, and the financial status of the 
manufacturer, the punitive damages assessments that might flow 
from wantonly marketing a defective product could range from noth-
ing to millions, or even hundreds of millions, of dollars.145 Such 
a manufacturer will probably have a good idea of the potential 
profitability of marketing the defective product but no idea of its 
potential liability. It may well be, then, that in cases of this type, 
no form of potential liability will be likely to influence its behavior 
appreciably.146 Nevertheless, in most cases a manufacturer well-
140. See R. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 77-78 (1972); Andenaes, 114 
U. PA. L. REV. 949, supra note 130, at 949, 963; Calabresi & Melamed, Prop-
erty Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. 
L. REv. 1089, 1124-27 (1972); Ross, Law, Science, and Accidents: The British Road 
Safety Act of 1967, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 1, 67 (1973). 
141. See, e.g., Andenaes, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, supra note 130, at 970; Ehrlich, 
The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL STuorns 259 (1972). 
142. See text at notes 185-203 infra. 
143. See generally DuBois, supra note 9. 
144. See notes 277-99 infra. 
145. See note 278 infra and accompanying text. 
146. The management of the manufacturing enterprise, for example, may be un-
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advised by counsel and acting rationally should be influenced to 
some extent in its decision-making by the possibility of the largely 
open-ended liability of a pu~itive damages verdict.147 
Punitive damages, -therefore, should have the greatest deterrent 
effect in cases in which the marketing of an excessively hazardous 
product is profitable for the manufacturer even after the payment 
of claims for actual damages. 148 The greater the product's profit 
potential and the less the likelihood that individual victims will seek 
recovery, the greater the need for a strong deterrent to reckless mar-
keting decisions.140 Illustrative is the case of a manufacturer who 
aware of the potential for liability. See note 135 supra. It may even be unaware of 
the misconduct. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 842, 843-
44 (2d Cir. 1967). But see Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 
689, 711-12, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 414-15 (1967). 
147. One, of course, may question the hypothesis that all activity within the en-
terprise is rationally directed toward the maximization of profits. See P. 
ATIYAH, supra note 133, at 597; J. GALBRAITIJ, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); 
C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CoRPORATE BEHAVIOR 
(1975). But cf. ATIYAH, supra note 133, at 583. Some juries, however, appar-
ently do assume that a large punitive damages verdict will effectively deter miscon-
duct perceived as particularly dangerous and reprehensible. Thus, a jury in one of 
the MER/29 cases, Ostopowitz v. William S. Merrell Co., N.Y.L.J. Jan. 11, 1967, 
at 21, col. 3 (Super. Ct. N.Y. 1967), assessed $850,000 punitive damages against 
the defendant because, in the words of one juror, "the company 'had to be punished 
not only for what they had done, but also as a warning to all drug companies, that 
they could not do things like this.' Washington Post, Dec. 12, 1966, at 12, col. 
1." Rheingold, supra note 127, at 134 n.46. 
148. Punitive damages are widely considered to be useful in preventing wrong-
doing from being profitable for the malefactor. See, e.g., Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 
Idaho 683, 691, 496 P.2d 682, 690 (1972) ("Clearly in such cases the award of 
punitive damages should aim at making the cost of such repetitive anti-social conduct 
uneconomical"); Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 406, 179 N.E.2d 497, 499, 223 
N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (1961) ("In the calculation of his expected profits, the wrongdoer 
is likely to allow for a certain amount of money which will have to be returned 
to those victims who object too vigorously and he will be perfectly content to bear 
the additional cost of litigation as the price for continuing his illicit business. It 
stands to reason that the chances of deterring him are materially increased by subject-
ing him to the payment of punitive damages"); Funk v. Kerbaugh, 222 Pa. 18, 19, 
70 A. 953, 954 (1908) (punitive damages allowed where defendant conducted blast-
ing operations in a manner likely to shatter plaintiff's buildings "because it was 
cheaper to pay damages ..• then to do the work the usual way"). See Morris, 
44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, supra note 16, at 1185-88 ("While 'compensatory' damages 
provide a financial smart for a defendant who has not gained anything by his wrong, 
they may merely result in the payment of a bargain sale price for an advantage 
when the defendant has acted to further his own interests." Id. at 1185); Stoll, 
supra note 17, at 20 ("The sense of justice which demands extraction of a calculated 
profit is based not only upon the concept of deterrence, but equally upon an appraisal 
of the very deed itself, regardless of whether repetition is likely or not. Justice de-
mands in every instance that violation of the law shall not pay"). Cf. Barth v. 
B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 240-41, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 313 (1968) 
(products liability case). Even England retained an exception for this type of case 
in its judicial restriction of the punitive damages doctrine. See note 23 supra. 
149. A case in point was the marketing of MER/29 by Richardson-Merrell in 
the early 1960s. For a discussion of this case, see text at notes 336-51 infra and 
Rheingold, supra note 127. 
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knowingly markets a product particularly apt to cause minor injuries 
of a type that will be uneconomical for injured consumers to litigate. 
The availability of punitive damages in such cases would make litiga-
tion economically feasible for such persons, and the manufacturer's 
potential liability would accordingly be increased substantially. 
Since the deterrent effect of a penalty is generally thought to vary 
directly with its size, 150 punitive damages should be particularly effec-
tive in these cases.151 
3. Law Enforcement 
Closely tied to the other goals of punitive damages, especially 
deterrence, is a distinct objective which may be termed law enforce-
ment.152 Detractors of the punitive damages doctrine, minimizing 
its role in punishing wrongdoers and deterring misconduct, fre-
quently criticize the doctrine for allowing the plaintiff a "windfall" 
in addition to any compensation for losses he may actually have sus-
tained.153 But this criticism of the doctrine invariably overlooks the 
important fact that this prospective windfall motivates many reluctant 
plaintiffs to press their claims. And as the litigation of such claims 
increases, misconduct is increasingly punished and deterred. 
The use of punitive damages as a law enforcement tool is socially 
beneficial in two respects. First, serving as a kind of bounty, the 
prospect of punitive damages recoveries induces injured plaintiffs to 
150. See, e.g., Andenaes, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949, supra note 130, at 970. 
151. See generally F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 129, at 194-209. "In-
creased penalties are probably more or less significant depending on the size of the 
penalty increase relative to the size of base penalty." Id. at 202. Thus, punitive 
damages should be most effective as a deterrent in cases in which the injuries are 
relatively minor or infrequent, such as some forms of allergic reactions to drugs, 
and should be less effective in cases in which the frequency and severity of injuries 
are expected to be greater. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 
841 (2d Cir. 1967); Childres, Remedies, 1965 AM. SURVEY AM. L. 289, 291 (1966). 
152. It will be recalled that four objectives for the imposition of punitive damages 
have been identified: punishment, deterrence, law enforcement, and compensation. 
See text at notes 100-12 supra. It has also been noted that deterrence is actually 
a sub-goal of punishment. See note 101 supra. Similarly, Jaw enforcement is clearly 
a sub-goal of -deterrence. In so far as law enforcement includes inducing private 
parties to sue for misdeeds, see text at notes 154-57 infra, Jaw enforcement is also 
a sub-goal of compensation. Thus, as has been noted, the objectives of punitive 
damages may be reduced to the two broad categories of punishment and compensa-
tion. See note 112 supra. However, the isolation of Jaw enforcement, as with deter-
rence, clarifies analysis. 
153. See, e.g., Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 409, 179 N.E.2d 497, 501, 
223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 494 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 
65, 80, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (1965). Even some proponents of punitive damages 
suggest that such damages ought properly to go to the state. Hodgin & Veitch, supra 
note 23, at 132; cf. 13 P. JAMES, supra note 102, at 402, 
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act as "private attorneys general"154 and thereby helps to increase 
the number of wrongdoers who are properly "brought to justice. "165 
This assistance is important, for many serious misdeeds deserving of 
punishment are beyond the reach of the criminal law and the public 
prosecutor.156 Thus, a shortcoming in the administration of criminal 
justice is partially remedied, and the "private prosecutor" is re-
warded with a "private fine" "for his public service in bringing the 
wrongdoer to account."157 
Second, punitive damages awards help to implement the various 
154. Until recently the private attorney general concept of encouraging public 
interest litigation through awarding attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs was enjoy-
ing growing acceptance, particularly in the federal courts. See, e.g., Souza v. Travi-
sono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975). See generally Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees In 
Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301 (1973). However, in Alyeska. 
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240 (1975), the Supreme Court se• 
verely restricted this development in holding that attorneys' fees may be awarded 
to a prevailing party only where expressly provided by statute, except "when the 
losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons 
••. .'" 421 U.S. at 258-59. For an application of this exception, see Doe v. Poet-
ker, 515 F.2d 541, 546-49 (8th Cir. 1975). 
This standard of liability for attorneys' fees is remarkably similar to the showing 
that must be made for the recovery of punitive damages, and is based on a similar 
rationale. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5, 15 (1973 ). Thus, despite the Court's 
general disapproval of awarding attorneys' fees in the absence of statutory authoriza-
tion, the Court has acknowledged their appropriateness where the defendant has dis-
played a gross disregard for the rights of the plaintiff. Cf. 412 U.S. at 15. 
155. See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 347 (1873); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAIT• 
LAND, supra note 17, at 522; Morris, 24 ILL. L. REV. 730, supra note 16. 
156. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 16, at 276; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, 
supra note 17, at 522; Freifield, supra note 24, at 7-8; Tune, A Little-Noticed Theory 
in the Law of Torts: Boris Stark's Theory of Guarantee, 121 U. PA. L. REV, 618, 
621 (1973 ). With the possible exception of such limited areas as the food and drug 
industries, legislators and prosecutors have generally avoided any serious attempt to 
punish manufacturers guilty of acts detrimental to the public safety. Cf. Rice, supra 
note 16, at 312 (noting the "public and prosecutorial abhorrence of 'white-collar' 
.•. criminal prosecutions •. .''). The National Commission on Product Safety 
noted the ineffectiveness of existing criminal sanctions in promoting adequate product 
safety. See NCPS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 95. See generally C. STONE, 
WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1972), 
In recent years, the Consumer Product Safety Commission has initiated criminal 
proceedings against both manufacturers and their executive officers for violations of 
the various product safety statutes under its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Current Develop• 
ments, 3 PROD. SAP. & LIA:e. REP. 814 (Aug. 22, 1975). However, there have been 
few such prosecutions, in part because of the Commission's "extensive, unexplained 
and unnecessary delay . . • in developing and forwarding its cases to the prosecu-
tors." In the Matter of a CPSC Recommendation for Criminal Prosecution for Cer-
tain Violations of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act and the Poison Prevention 
Packaging Act, BCMI No. 1862 (concurring opinion of Commissioner Franklin) 
(Jan. 27, 1976); see Current Developments, 4 PROD. SAP. & LIAB. REP. 112 (Feb. 
6, 1976). For a compilation of recent prosecutions under the federal product safety 
statutes, most of which have been brought under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act, see M. BENDER, FED. CONSUMER PROD. SAFElY SERVICE, CURRENT 
DEVELOPMENTS§ 601.l[h]. 
157. Neal v. Newburger Co., 154 Miss. 691, 700, 123 S. 861, 863 (1929). 
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rules of substantive law.158 No doubt few, if any, rules of law are 
obeyed or enforced in all instances.159 Violations are apt to be 
especially prevalent, however, when the unlawful activity is profitable 
for the violator, 160 when violations are difficult to detect161 or to 
prove, 162 when violations are "morally neutral,"163 when the rules are 
vague, 164 when enforcement of the rules is infrequent, 165 or when pun-
158. Many economists have recognized the advantages of private, "victim" en-
forcement of the law. See, e.g., Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, 
and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUDIES 1, 6 (1974). They suggest 
that it is a most, and in some cases the only, effective means of enforcing the law 
of private transactions "precisely because the incentives to the enforcers are as large 
as the incentives to prospective violators." Id. at 13. "The amount of victim en-
forcement would be optimal if successful enforcers were paid the amount they had 
suffered in damages, excluding their enforcement costs, divided by· the probability 
that they are successful." Id. at 14. See R. PosNER, supra note 140, at 360. Posner 
suggests that punitive damages could be used in appropriate cases to achieve the cor-
rect multiple of actual damages for optimal enforcement and deterrence. See id. 
But cf. id. at 78. The law will be obeyed, in other words, only if the sanctions 
for its breach are large enough to make the breach uneconomical. Id. at 320. 
Some commentators have recently rebelled against the extensive intrusion of 
economics into the law of torts. They claim that "the law has 'gone a-whoring after 
False Gods' and that all of the raving about loss absorption has blinded lawyers 
to the obvious concern of tort law with right and wrong . . • [and] the symbolic 
function of tort law." Veitch & Miers, Assault on the Law of Tort, 38 MODERN 
L. REV. 139, 142-43 (1975). See Veitch, Book Review, 22 N. IRE. L.Q. 560, 563 
(1971) (complaining that tort theorists as a group "have been led by the nose by 
economists" too long). See also Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad Law, 60 VA. L. 
REV. 483 (1974); Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominal-
ism, 60 VA. L REV. 451 (1974); Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially De-
fective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 81 HARV. 
L. REV. 1655 (1974). Nevertheless, the economists' ideas on private enforcement 
have some useful implications for damages rules in product liability law. Particularly 
relevant is the conclusion that "rewards" such as punitive damages efficiently enforce 
compliance with the rules of law. For even if the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission accelerates rule promulgation and enforcement in the years ahead, optimal 
achievement of product safety will probably require that the victims of product acci-
dents be encouraged to enforce common-law, and perhaps even statutory, rules of 
product safety. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse 
of Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 COR-
NELL L. REV. 435, 538 & n.104 (1976). The possibility of punitive damages awards 
in products liability litigation should encourage victims to seek enforcement in par-
ticular cases, which in tum should induce manufacturers to comply with the rules 
of product safety. 
159. See, e.g., Becker & Stigler, supra note 158, at 2. 
160. See generally R. POSNER, supra note 140, at 77-78, 357-62. 
161. Id. 
162. See notes 178-80 infra and accompanying text. 
163. "[11here is evidence that the lack of enforcement of penal laws designed 
to regulate behavior in morally neutral fields may rapidly lead to mass infringements. 
• . . The individual's moral reluctance to break fue law is not strong enough to 
secure obedience when fue law comes into conflict with his personal interests." An-
denaes, 114 U. PA. L REV.--949, supra note 130, at 961. See also Hamilton, Cor-
porate Criminal Liability in Texas, 41 TBxAs L. REv. 60, 69 (1968). 
164. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 133, at 554. 
165. See Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting) ("The bite of fue law is in its enforcement"); W. MmDENDORFF, supra note 
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ishment is light.166 By financing the detection, proof and punishment 
of willful and wanton violations of the rules, punitive damages increase 
the likelihood that wrongdoers will be identified in the first instance 
and more severely punished thereafter. To the extent that potential 
wrongdoers perceive this increase in the probability and size of 
penalties167 and the commensurate reduction in the profitability of 
their misconduct, violations should be deterred and enforcement of 
the rules of substantive law improved.168 
Perhaps the most fundamental substantive rule of products 
liability law is that products marketed in a condition generating more 
accident costs than social utility are "defective" and, accordingly, 
that the manufacturer should pay for whatever costs are occasioned 
by the defective condition.169 Since this is a rule of tort rather than 
113, at 50; L. RAl>JINOWICZ, IDEOLOGY AND CRIME 122 (1966); F. ZIMRING & G. 
HAWKINS, supra note 129, at 160-63; Posner, A Theory of Negligence, J. LEGAL Snm-
IES, 29, 41 (1972): "Punishment-an exaction that exceeds the costs to society (here, 
accident costs) imposed by the particular violation being punished-is necessary 
where the violator is frequently not apprehended, because a rational lawbreaker will 
discount the gravity of any legal sanction by the probability that it will be imposed." 
166. See generally, F. ZIMRING & C. HAWKINS, supra note 129, at 194-209. Sev-
eral of these conditions are generally present in products liability cases. Cf. Green 
& Moore, Winter's Discontent: Market Failure and Consumer Welfare, 82 YALE 
L.J. 903, 909-10 (1973 ). 
167. "The decisive factor in creating the deterrent effect is, of course, not the 
objective risk of detection but the risk as it is calculated by the potential 
[offender]." Adenaes, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, supra note 130, at 963. See Cala-
bresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1124-27 (1972). 
168. One detrimental side effect of allowing punitive damages is that their avail-
ability will undoubtedly encourage counsel in some cases to pursue unmeritorious 
claims, and manufacturers will sometimes have to settle such claims in excess of 
their fair value because of the risk, however remote, of large jury awards. See 
DuBois, supra note 9, at 350. This general type of risk, however, inheres in all 
litigation regardless of the type of damages sought. 
169. See note 3 supra. See, e.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.id 
1066, 1071 (4th Cir. 1974); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1274 (5th 
Cir. 1974); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1087 (5th Cir. 
1973); Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (E.D. Pa. 1971), affd., 474 
F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Hall v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 
353,360 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Helicoid Gage Div. of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 
511 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Metal Window Prod. Co. v. Magnusen, 
485 S.W.2d 355, 357-60 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); G. CALABRESI, supra note 135; Kee-
ton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 37-39 
(1973); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 
825, 835-38 (1973); R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE 159 (1969); R. POSNER, 
supra note 140, at 88-92. Some, of course, would argue with this definition of prod-
uct defectiveness for purposes of determining a manufacturer's liability. See, e.g., 
Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 
1055 (1972); Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, 
Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV, 1113 
(1974). But the notion that product manufacturers should internalize the accident 
costs of defective products is generally accepted. See note 177 infra and accompany-
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criminal law, it is cast in terms of post-accident loss distribution rather 
than as an absolute prohibition. This does not mean, however, that 
a manufacturer should be permitted to abuse the rule flagrantly and 
with impunity by treating the payment of accident costs merely as 
a "'license fee for the conduct of an illegitimate business.' "170 Yet 
absent the punitive damages remedy, many manufacturers may be 
tempted to maximize profits by marketing products known to be 
defective and to absorb resulting injury claims as a cost of doing 
business. 171 
Such flagrant breaches of the law exposing others to risks of 
personal injury violate basic principles of fairness and moral-
ity.172 When conduct seriously endangers not merely property but 
human life, special efforts must be made to enforce the rules 
strictly.173 This nation has criminalized many forms of conduct that 
pose particular dangers to the public safety, 174 in some cases even 
ing text. And few would argue with the proposition that such products are "defec-
tive" from a broader, socioeconomic perspective. • 
170. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 282-83 (1943), quoted in 
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 669 (1975). Consumers should have more 
than a naked right to be compensated for injuries caused by defective products. The 
rules of products liability might be profitably construed as establishing a consumer 
right in the first instance not to be injured at all by defective products. In the 
Preamble to the Joint Resolution in 1967 that established the National Commission 
on Product Safety, Congress declared that "the American Consumer has a right to 
be protected against unreasonable risk of bodily harm from products purchased on 
the open market for the use of himself and his family .... " Pub. L. No. 90-146 
(Nov. 20, 1967), reprinted in NCPS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 124. 
171. This tendency on the part of manufacturers led the National Commission 
on Product Safety to propose that consumers injured by "knowing or willful" viola-
tions of safety standards be awarded treble damages and attorneys' fees. See Pro-
posed Consumer Product Safety Act § 30, NCPS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, App. 
at 29 ("Such statutory redress will add powerful private support to public safety 
programs"). Congress omitted this particular proposal from the Consumer Product 
Safety Act enacted in 1972. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (Supp. V 1975). 
172. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, in Is LAw DEAD? 168, 170 (E. Ros-
tow ed. 1971); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. RBv. 
537, 563-64 (1972). See generally C. FRIED, supra note 118, at 66-74. 
173. Cf. P. ATIYAH, supra note 133, at 590. 
174. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 
135a (Supp. 1975) prohibiting sale of "economic poisons" under certain conditions 
including inadequate labeling); Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1192 (1970) 
(prohibiting the manufacture or sale of fabrics failing to meet applicable safety stand-
ards); Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1263 (1970) (prohibiting the 
sale of misbranded or banned hazardous substances); Consumer Product Safety Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 2068 (Supp. II 1973) (proscribing the manufacture or sale of products 
violating applicable safety standards); Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 
U.S.C. § 331 (1970) (prohibiting the sale of adulterated or misbranded foods, drugs, 
devices or cosmetics). There reportedly has been an increase in recent years in the 
criminalization of particular forms of accident-producing behavior. See Calabresi & 
Hirschoff, supra note 169, at 1074-75. 
In addition to federal statutes, there are an "infinite variety" of state statutes 
criminally proscribing various forms of hazardous conduct. Among the more com-
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providing for strict criminal liability without regard to the defendant's 
state of mind or degree of fault or care.170 The enormity of the 
danger to society posed by defective products would thus seem to 
require as a minimum the development of rules designed to improve 
compliance with the common-law rules of product safety. 
But is there any reason to believe that manufacturers knowingly 
or recklessly breach ·the common-law rules of product safety? To 
the extent that the manufacturer acts as a rational economic entity, 
it should recognize that the strict pursuit of profit maximization will 
often dictate that safety be traded for cost reduction substantially 
beyond the point where a product becomes legally "defective" and 
the manufacturer becomes obligated to compensate persons injured 
by the defect. The expectation of future profits is probably strong 
enough in many cases to allay any moral conjunctions the manu-
facturer may feel in breaching some vague common-law rule of 
product safety. 
It may be profitable for a manufacturer to choose to market a 
defective product for at least three reasons. The first two reasons 
derive from the fact that manufacturers are not generally called upon 
to pay for all of the injuries caused by their products. First, in many 
mon are prohibitions against the sale of impure food, the sale of firearms to minors, 
the failure to fence railroads, swimming pools, and other hazardous locations, and 
the failure to guard elevators, machinery, and other dangerous devices. See W. PROS• 
SER, supra note 31, § 36. 
175. In United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), the Supreme Court upheld 
the conviction of the president of the Acme Markets food store chain for causing 
the adulteration of food stored in unsanitary warehouses in violation of the Federal 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The Court in Park reaffirmed its prior construction 
of the Act in United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), which had held 
that the Act "dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct-
awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden 
of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible 
relation to a public danger." 320 U.S. at 281. It should be noted that section 113 · 
of the Consumer Food Act of 1976, S. 641, passed by the Senate on March 18, 
1976, and now pending action by a House Committee, effectively overrules the hold-
ing in Park by amending the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 
333(a), to provide that negligence at a minimum must be established for a criminal 
conviction under the Act. Still, the following observations made by the Court in 
Park have significance for the awarding of punitive damages in products liability 
cases: 
Thus Doettenveich and the cases which have followed reveal that in providing 
sanctions which reach and touch the individuals who execute the corporate mis• 
sion • . . the Act imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy vio-
lations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement measures 
that will insure that violations will not occur. The requirements of foresight 
and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate agents are beyond question de-
manding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public 
has a right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority 
in business enterprises whose services and products affect the health and well• 
being of the public that supports them. 
421 U.S. at 672. 
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cases, the product's "defectiveness" is invisible to the injured con-
sumer who frequently is unaware that his injury may be attributable 
to a violation of law by the manufacturer and who thus may never 
discover, much less assert, his legal right to compensation.176 This 
is especially true when the defect is an inadequate design or warning. 
Manufacturers are thereby relieved of the burden of paying for a large 
proportion of the accident costs that the rules of liability presume they 
will shoulder.177 
Second, even if an injury victim is conscious of his legal rights, 
the assertion of those rights is expensive, largely because of costly 
attorneys' fees.178 The total costs of preparation and litigation tend 
to be especially high in product cases because of the technical and 
complex nature of the issues and the resulting difficulties of dis-
covery and proof. Expert witnesses, such as chemists, metallurgists, 
and toxicologists, are frequently indispensable for establishing liabil-
ity, and their fees for consulting, testing, and testifying add substan-
tially to the total cost of litigation.179 Even in cases in which liability 
176. Whitford, Products Liability, in NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFE-
"IY, 3 SUPPLEMENTAL 8TuDIES-PRODUCT SAFETY LAW & ADMINISTRATION: FEDERAL, 
STATE, LoCAL AND COMMON LAw 221,223 (1970) [hereinafter NCPS SUPPLEMENTAL 
STUDIES]. See NCPS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 74 ("Small wonder that some 
manufacturers do not even respond to letters claiming compensation for injuries; 
they know that more than two-thirds will never pursue the claim"'); Rheingold, supra 
note 127, at 141. But see BUREAU OF DOMESTIC COMMERCE, U.S. DEPT. OF COM-
MERCE, PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCrr-ASSESSMENT OF RELATED PROBLEMS AND 
IssuEs 7, 14, 53, 57, 89 (1976) [hereinafter DOC, PROD. LIAB. INS. STUDY] (finding 
an "increasing consumer awareness of 'legal rights' regarding product liability claims" 
evidenced in part by growing number of lawsuits). 
177. See note 169 supra and accompanying text. A fundamental principle of 
enterprise liability theory is the notion that manufacturers should pay for the costs 
reasonably associated with the manufacture and sale of their products, including the 
costs of accidents caused by any defects the products contain. ·If a manufacturer 
were not to pay for the injuries caused.by its defective product, the product would 
fail to "pay its way" within the economy and would in a sense consume more re-
sources than it generated. Professor James perhaps has summarized it best: ''The 
optimal allocation of resources in a free enterprise system requires each enterprise 
to pay its own costs." James, supra note 138, at 1550, 1551 n.6 (1966). See P. 
ATIYAH, supra note 133, at 565-600; G. CALABRESI, supra note 135, at 68-94 (theoriz-
ing that the general deterrence of market forces helps to optimize safety decisions 
and thus minimizes total accident costs); R. KEETON, supra note 169, at 159; Cala-
bresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 10 YALE L.J. 499 
(1961); Ross, Book Review, 84 HAR.v. L REv. 1322 (1971). See generally 2 F. 
HAR.PER & F. JAMES, supra note 139, at 1375-76, 1385; J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT 
TO INJURY-No-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 76-77, 85 n.26 
(1975); Ehrenzweig, Assurance Oblige-A Comparative Study, 15 LAw & CoNTEMP. 
PROB. 445 (1950); James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability 
Insurance, 51 YALE L.J. 549 (1948); Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial 
Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE LJ. 554, 595 (1961). 
178. See Black, The Mobilization of Law, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 125, 139 (1973). 
179. See NCPS SUPPLEMENTAL.STUDIES, supra note 176, at 229' ("Costs, includ-
ing both filing and witness fees may sometime be a substantial deterrent to initiating 
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is fairly clear, the vagaries of the litigation process insure that some 
valid claims will go completely or partially unpaid.180 An alert 
manufacturer, insensitive to moral arguments for obeying the law, 
may recognize and take advantage of these practical shortcomings 
in the legal system. 
Third, manufacturers may choose to market products known to be 
defective because safety measures often cause a decrease in profit 
margins and sales.181 The addition of safety devices to a product 
will usually increase both the cost to the manufacturer and the price to 
the consumers;182 sales may then decline because of the higher price. 
Sales may also decline because safety measures reduce the product's 
practical utility or its psychological appeal. Thus, while the cost of 
affixing adequate warnings to a product is usually minimal, sales may 
be lost not only because of higher prices but also because consumers 
are frightened away by the warning.183 Similarly, in some cases the 
litigation. In a significant percentage of the cases in this survey, the costs exceeded 
$1,000, and the plaintiff is usually expected to absorb these costs if the litigation 
is unsuccessful"). 
In regard to the unreported case of Scott v. Outboard Marine Corp., No. 71-
1661-Civ-JLK (S.D. Fla., filed Oct. 28, 1971) see notes 484-92 infra and accompany-
ing text, the plaintifrs principal attorney makes the following report concerning the 
expenses of preparation and trial of the case: 
Our out of pocket expenses for such things as despositions, transcripts, pho-
tographs and experts ran to approximately $50,000.00. We took over one hun-
dred and ten depositions; had twenty-two motions to produce and eleven sets 
of interrogatories. The case took thirty days to try; I had anywhere from three 
to five lawyers assisting me and the defense had two local attorneys, plus house 
counsel for OMC, plus their corporate representative, who was also an attorney, 
so they had four attorneys on their side. I have been told that their defense 
bills approached $100,000.00. 
Letter from Jon E. Krupnick to David G. Owen, August 7, 1975, on file at Michigan 
Law Review. Mr. Krupnick reports that he and his associates devoted more than 
3000 hours in preparation and trial. Id. He concludes that it is virtually "impossible 
for a sole practitioner to effectively handle a major products liability case and, need-
less to say, without serious injury or death, the economics make it impossible for 
major products liability cases to be tried." Id. See also Lloyd, supra note 9, at 
1. See generally Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, supra note 50. 
180. Cf. Keeton, supra note 169, at 30. And it is probable that in some substan-
tial proportion of products liability actions, the defendant manufacturers "employ 
a variety of litigative tactics to discourage meritorious claims." Green & Nader, 
Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALB L.J. 
871, 885 (1973). 
181. Indeed, this is an important step in the optimal reduction of accident costs 
within the Calabresian system of general or market deterrence. See note 177 supra. 
182. See Morris, supra note 177, at 585. 
183. See Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 87 (4th Cir. 1962) ("had 
the warning been in a form calculated . . . to convey a conception of the true nature 
of the danger, this mother ... might not have purchased the product at all"). See 
also Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 505-06 (8th Cir. 1968). The 
remarks of the President of Fairchild Hiller Corporation in a letter to the National 
Transportation Safety Board reflect this concern: "I must emphasize here the poten-
tially disastrous consequences to an aircraft manufacturer of a statement by the safety 
board reaching a fatigue failure conclusion-the public image of the plane model 
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cost of redesigning a product to eliminate defects may be inconsequen-
tial as compared with the impact on profits from lost sales caused by 
the consumer's failure to appreciate the need for the safer design184 and 
his frustration with its inconveniences. Faced with situations such as 
these, manufacturers may rationally choose to increase sales by mar-
keting the product in its defective condition and simply t~ absorb 
ensuing injury claims. 
Regardless of what actually motivates a manufacturer to market 
a product known to be defective, such conduct amounts to a con-
scious flaunting of the law. If public confidence in the legal system 
is to be maintained, remedies must be developed that will punish 
and deter flagrant breaches of the rules of behavior. This is particu-
larly so when violations expose consumers to unreasonable risks of 
personal injury and are motivated solely by the manufacturer's desire 
for increased profits. The doctrine of punitive damages well serves 
this purpose in the products liability context. If manufacturers are 
punished for such conduct by punitive damages assessments, compli-
ance with the safety rules should be increased as profits are reduced. 
As manufacturers market safer products to avoid increased penalties, 
managerial determinations of optimal product safety should begin 
more nearly to approximate that determination embodied in the 
common-law rules of products liability. 
4. Compensation 
Although it is frequently said that the purpose of punitive 
damages is to punish the defendant and deter misbehavior, not to 
compensate the plaintiff, 185 punitive damages do indeed play an 
is severely damaged, future sales of the aircraft are hurt, . . • and our relationships 
with existing operators are sorely tried." Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgement at 8, Engebreth v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 
Civil No. A-9-71 (D. Alas., filed Jan. 18, 1971); see text at notes 424-31 infra. 
See generally, Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of 
Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 
CORNELL L. REv. 495, 501-05 (1976). 
184. See NCPS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 69. It is probably quite infre-
quent that the ordinary consumer will be aware of, much less appreciate, the im-
portance of the safety aspects of a particular design. Moreover, "[c]onsumers gen-
erally have no way of knowing how much more they would have to pay to obtain 
a comparable product as serviceable and less hazardous. Even when aware of a 
risk in a product, consumers cannot predict the frequency, severity, or probability 
of injury." Id. 
185. See, e.g., Grefe v. Ross, - Iowa -, 231 N.W.2d 863 (1975); Prince v. 
Peterson, - Utah -, 538 P.2d 1325 (1975). It is for this reason, and on the 
assumption that the plaintiff has already received full recompense for his injury by 
an award of compensatory damages, that many courts say that there is no "right" 
to punitive damages, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, comment d at 81 
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important-even if usually residual-compensatory role.186 Such 
awards to some extent reimburse the plaintiff for losses not ordinarily 
recoverable as compensatory damages, such as actual losses the 
plaintiff is unable to prove or for which the rules of damages do not 
provide relief, including the expenses of bringing suit. 
Many punitive damages cases in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries involved "ungentlemanly" behavior of the defendant that 
was particularly humiliating to the plaintiff .187 Since damage to 
emotional stability was at that time generally damnum absque 
injuria, 188 punitive damages awards assuaged a plaintiffs loss of 
honor resulting from a seduced daughter or a spit in the face.180 
Even today the law for various reasons does not fully protect emo-
tional tranquillity through compensatory damages; requiring defend-
ants guilty of flagrant misconduct to make full compensation for such 
injuries helps to fill this void.190 When one person is injured by the 
malicious actions of another, "the human spirit is bruised by the 
knowledge of another's ill-will or contempt . . . ."1111 The legal 
revenge provided by punitive damages helps restore the plaintiffs 
emotional equilibrium102 and in this way compensates him for the 
psychological harm caused by the defendant's malicious act.193 
(Tent. Draft No. 13, 1973), and that such damages are a windfall. See, e.g., David-
son v. Dixon, 386 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. 1974). 
186. See, e.g., Hicks v. Herring, 246 S.C. 429, 437, 144 S.E.2d 151, 155 (1965); 
Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1963 ), 
In Michigan and New Hampshire, punitive damages are limited to an amount that 
will fully compensate the plaintiff. See Oppenhuizen v. Wennersten, 2 Mich. App. 
288, 139 N.W.2d 165 (1965); Vratsenes v. New Hampshire Auto, Inc., 112 N.H. 71, 
289 A.2d 66 (1972). In Connecticut, punitive damages are limited in amount to 
the plaintiffs litigation expenses. See Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 
154 Conn. 116, 127, 222 A.2d 220, 225 (1966). See also Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 
Idaho, 683, 496 P.2d 682 (1972). 
187. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872) (spitting in plaintiff's face); 
Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. 442, 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814) (shooting at game 
on plaintiffs estate and use of intemperate language); Tullidge v. Wade, 3 Wils. 
K.B. 18, 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (C.P. 1769) (seducing plaintiff's daughter under plaintiff's 
roof after securing confidence of plaintiff's family). 
188. See generally Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of 
Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1033 (1936). 
189. The spit in the face has, in one instance at least, been replaced by a pie 
in the face. The perpetrator settled in the amount of $5,000. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 
1976, at 33, col. 1 (late city ed.). 
190. See Chagnon v. Union Leader Corp., 103 N.H. 426, 442, 174 A.2d 825, 
835-36 (1961). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 31, § 54. 
191. Kelly, supra note 42, at 283. 
192. See notes 113-15 supra and accompanying text. 
193. Thus, the derivation of the phrase "smart money" "as indicating compensa-
tion for the smarts of the injured person, and not, as now [assumed], money re• 
quired by way of punishment, and to make the wrong-doer smart." Fay v. Parker, 
53 N.H. 342, 355 (1873). 
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Punitive damages also help restore the plaintiff to the financial 
position he occupied prior to the injury by providing a. fund for the 
payment of litigation expenses.194 Since at least a third of the plain-
tiff's recovery ordinarily is spent for legal fees, a verdict that does 
not include a sum for attorneys' fees almost always leaves the plain-
tiff substantially worse off financially than he was before the acci-
dent. Yet the severely criticized195 but firmly established "American 
rule" unequivocally prohibits awards of attorneys' fees in the absence 
of statutory authorization.196 In cases of flagrant misconduct, awards 
of punitive damages tend to alleviate, however imprecisely,197 the 
rigors of the American rule.198 Surely this result is desirable, since 
a defendant who has maliciously injured another may fairly be 
required to make the plaintiff truly whole again.199 
Both of these compensatory purposes of punitive damages 
awards are applicable in the products liability context. Plaintiffs 
injured by product defects are as deserving of full compensation 
for their losses as any other class of plaintiffs. It is true that persons 
injured by defective products do not usually suffer the personal 
The practice of matching damages to the amount of vengeance reasonably aroused 
by the defendant's offensive act, and thereby giving the plaintiff both actual and 
legal "satisfaction" for his injuries, is traceable from the Code of Hammurabi, see 
G. DRIVER & J. MILES, supra note 17, at 500, through the law of ancient Rome, 
see note 113 supra, into the early English common law, cf. 2 Blackstone Commentar-
ies 438, and the Prussian Code of 1794, see F. LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN TIIB Civn. 
LAW 184 (1950, corrected ed. 1968), to present day common law,-see Kelly, supra 
note 42, at 279, and civil law, see Stoll, supra note 17, at 3. 
In view of this clearly compensatory aspect of punitive damages, it becomes ap-
parent that characterizing aggravated damages as either exclusively punitive or 
compensatory overlooks their dual nature. See Stoll, supra note 17, at 6-13; cf. 
Kelly, supra note 42, at 287-88. Thus, although the choice of a theory for such 
damages may have implications for some matters including the amount of such ver-
dicts, for most purposes the debate over the legitimacy of punitive damages may 
have been nothing more than a tempest in a teapot. See note 22 supra. 
194. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 16, at 277. See generally J. O'CONNELL, 
THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND TiiB REMEDY OF No-FAULT INSURANCE 37-53 (1971). 
195. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Soci-
ety, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 792 (1966). Criticisms of the rule are noted, and the critical 
literature is collected, in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 270 
n.45 (1975). 
196. Sillinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales; Inc., 110 Ariz. 573, 521 P.2d 119 
(1974) (en bane); REsTATBMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 914 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 
1973). Certain, carefully circumscribed exceptions do exist in the federal version 
of the rule. See note 154 supra. 
191. See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 16, at 277; cf. Peck, Compensation for Pain: 
A Reappraisal in Light of New Medical Evidence, 12 MlcH. L. REv. 1355, 1373-
74 (1974). 
198. See Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 540 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting); 
Schlein v. Smith, 160 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
199. See, e.g., Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225, 235 (1842); C. McCORMICK, 
supra note 16, at 277. 
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humiliation and embarrassment caused by the dignitary torts that 
sparked the punitive damages remedy in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries. 200 "Satisfaction" for malicious, insulting behavior 
simply is not called for. 201 Yet many, perhaps most, personal injury 
victims are inadequately compensated under the present system. It 
has been estimated, for example, that "in big damage cases very few 
victims get as much as twenty-five per cent of their real economic 
loss."202 Further, accident victims often suffer damage to emotional 
tranquillity, family harmony and employment security that is particu-
larly difficult to prove and generally not compensable anyway. 
Moreover, the use of a large portion of the recovery for attorneys' fees 
is probably more burdensome to the personal injury victim, who may 
need the entire verdict to pay for medical, rehabilitation and special 
living expenses,203 than to the victim of a dignitary tort, whose only 
200. StoU, supra note 17, at 15-16. 
201. But see note 126 supra and accompanying text. 
202. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective 
Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774, 780 (1967), citing CONRAD, MORGAN, PRATI, 
VOLTZ & BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS Cosrs AND PAYMENTS 197 (1964), 
and Morris & Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. 
L. REV. 913, 917 (1962). 
203. A substantial portion of the verdict may of course represent compensation 
for pain and suffering, and so in many cases attorneys' fees can be paid from this 
part of the judgment without intruding upon amounts available to the plaintiff for 
his ''hard" expenses. No doubt there are sound doubts concerning the logic and 
expedience of aUowing awards for pain and suffering. See, e.g., I. O'CONNELL, supra 
note 177, at 121-22; Peck, supra note 197. But so long as courts continue to con• 
sider this type of loss worthy of compensation, the ability of a plaintiff to apply 
his pain and suffering award to the payment of his litigation expenses is no remedy 
for the glaring defects in the American rule prohibiting awards of attorneys' fees. 
Jury awards of punitive damages and those for wounded feelings and pain and 
suffering are often difficult to distinguish. Magruder, supra note 188, at 1034 n.4; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, comment c at 81 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 
1973). For this reason and upon the assumption that "[t]he theory of punitive dam-
ages (without the name) is built into the average juror's value system .•• ," Morris, 
supra note 16, at 226, some commentators have speculated that the availability vel non 
of the punitive damages remedy may be of little consequence, since a jury, whether or 
not it is expressly instructed on punitive damages, will always award an amount it 
deems appropriate in light of aU the circumstances of the case. See id.; Note, 70 
HARV. L. REv. 517, supra note 16, at 521 (1957). These commentators point to Bass 
v. Chicago & N.W. R.R., 36 Wis. 450 (1874), 39 Wis. 636 (1876), 42 Wis. 654, 671• 
72 (1877), in which three separate juries awarded an identical sum, $4,500, in three 
separate trials of the same case in different counties, "twice with punitive damages al• 
lowed and once without •.•• " Id. See also Bauer, The Degree of Defendant's Fault 
as Affecting the Administration of the Law of Excessive Compensatory Damages, 82 
U. PA. L. REV. 583 n.* (1934). Yet in most cases, jurors very probably do make a 
sincere effort to foUow the charge of the court, and the presence or absence of a 
punitive damages instruction should often prove to be of substantial importance. For 
example, in Brown v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., No. 13851 (C.P. Dorchester County, 
S.C., Nov. 26, 1974), an action against the bottler of a soft drink for injuries result• 
ing from contamination due to the presence of a rusty nail in the beverage, "the 
jury went out and brought back a question for the Judge as to whether or not they 
June 1976] Punitive Damages 1299 
sacrifice in paying such fees may be to relinquish part of his retaliatory 
"satisfaction." Punitive damages thus can serve a valuable compen-
satory function in products liability cases as they have in more tradi-
tional tort litigation. 
III. COMPLICATING FACTORS IN AcmEVING THE OBJECTIVES OF 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION 
The preceding section examined the utility of extending the 
punitive damages doctrine to products liability litigation and con-
cluded that such an extension is desirable. Present in virtually every 
products liability case involving punitive damages, however, are the 
three complicating factors raised by Judge Friendly in Roginsky v. 
Richardson-Merrell, lnc.204 First, there is the dubious fairness or util-
ity of punishing the innocent shareholders of a product manufacturer 
for the misconduct of individual employees of the company. Second, 
there is the probability that the manufacturer has insured itself against 
the risk of a punitive damages assessment and consequently may be 
neither deterred nor punished by such a verdict. Third, there is the 
difficulty of properly determining and controlling the amount of the 
punitive damages award. Each of these complicating factors is 
intertwined in products liability litigation with the various goals 
served by the punitive damages doctrine, and thus attention must 
focus on each factor to determine whether it impairs the achievement 
of those goals. 
A. Vicarious Liability and the Innocent Shareholder 
/The logic and fairness of assessing punitive damages against a 
corporation for the misconduct of its employees has long been ques-
tioned by both courts and theorists. 205 In the final analysis it is the 
shareholders who feel the sting of a verdict against the corpora-
had to segregate the $10,000.00 they had decided on into X number of dollars actual 
and Y number of dollars punitive." The judge advised the jury that he had stricken 
the plaintifrs claim for punitive damages for insufficient proof of malice; the jury 
retired for another few minutes and returned with a verdict for $3,500 compensatory 
damages. Letter from Reese I. Joye, Jr., to David G. Owen, July 16, 1975 (on file 
at Michigan Law Review). 
204. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). See text at notes 10-11 supra. 
205. See, e.g., Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 147 U.S. 101 (1893); Roginsky v. Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); C. McCORMICK, supra note 16, § 
80; 1 T. SEDGWICK, supra note 16, at 738-43; Collier, Exemplary Damages in Actions 
Against Corporations, 55 CENT. L.J. 105 (1902); Morris, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1173, 
supra note 16, at 1199-205; Morris, 21 Omo ST. L.J. 216, supra note 16; Note, Ex-
emplary Damages Against Corporations, 30 GEo. L.J. 294 (1942); Note, 70 YALE 
L.J. 1296, supra note 16. Cf. Edgerton, Corporate Crfminal Responsibility, 36 YALE 
L.J. 827, 836-40 (1927). . 
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tion, 206 yet in most instances they are not only inn'Ocent of personal 
wrongdoing but also incapable of exerting any effective control over 
the actions of corporate employees. 207 Why then should the share-
holders be punished? This is perhaps the most difficult question 
concerning the appropriateness of punitive damages awards in 
products liability litigation. 
A minority of courts, following the 1893 Supreme Court decision 
in Lake Shore & M.S:R.R. v. Prentice,2°8 has adopted a narrow rule 
of enterprise liability for punitive damages arising out of malicious 
acts of corporate employees. 209 This doctrine, which Professor 
Clarence Morris named the "complicity rule,"210 imposes liability for 
punitive damages upon a corporation only when a superior officer 
is shown to have ordered, participated in, or ratified the miscon-
duct. 211 The rule permits corporate liability on proof of such direct 
206. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir, 
1967). See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1) (c), comment at 148 (Tent. 
Draft No. 4, 1955); Hamilton, supra note 163, at 70-71. Others may also feel the 
bite of a punitive damages judgment against a business enterprise, even if less di-
rectly, including its empolyees, suppliers, customers and creditors. See Morris, supra 
note 177, at 585-87. A particularly heavy punitive damages verdict that results in 
layoffs of employees might well have repercussions throughout the entire community. 
See DuBois, supra note 9, at 349. . 
207. See MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.07(1)(c), comment at 148 (Tent. Draft No. 
4, 1955). 
208. 147 U.S. 101 (1893). 
209. See 10 w. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoRPORATIONS § 4906, at 371 (rev. vol. 
1970); W. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 12; Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, supra note 
16, at 526. But see Note, 70 YALE :t,.J. 1296, supra note 16, at 1300 (asserting 
courts equally divided); C. McCORMICK, supra note 16, at 282 (asserting it 
to be a majority view): 
The narrow rule of enterprise liability has been accepted by the American Law 
Institute: 
§ 909. PUNmVE DAMAGES AGAINST A PRINCIPAL 
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal 
because of an act by an agent if, but only if, 
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or 
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him, or 
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in tho 
scope of employment, or 
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved 
the act. 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). An identical 
section is found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 217 C (1958). Yet even 
the drafters of these sections were unenthusiastic about the rule. In a "Note to Insti-
tute" following section 909, the reporter of the Restatement of Torts indicated 
that "some of the Torts group, on sober second thought, were in doubt whether 
the position taken was the right one .•. " and that the Torts Advisers voted 
9 to 2 to strike the section. The section was retained, however, because of the refer-
ence to section 909 in the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 C, Comment a 
(1958). Apparently neither the tort law nor the agency law scholars wished to take 
credit for the rule. 
210. Morris, 21 Omo ST. L.J. 216, supra note 16, at 221. 
211. Id. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F,2d 832, 842 (2d 
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involvement by a superior officer because "the imposition of punitive 
damages serves as a deterrent to the employment of unfit persons 
in important positions."212 The rationale of courts following this 
narrow rule of responsibility is the supposed inequity of punishing 
a blameless corporation and its shareholders218 whose interests are 
in fact often undermined by malicious acts of low-level employees. 
Another group of courts has adopted the so-called vicarious 
liability rule, 214 which holds a corporation liable for punitive damages 
for the wanton misconduct of all employees acting within the general 
scope of their employment. Supporters of this rule, which appears 
to represent the majority position in this country,215 assume that strict 
enterprise liability for wanton misbehavior of low-level employees 
will encourage care in the selection and supervision of such per-
sonnel. 216 The continuing debate217 between supporters of the com-
plicity and vicarious liability rules of punitive damages is beginning 
to spill over into products liability litigation. 218 
Cir. 1967). Some courts have permitted ratification to be established by a showing 
that the corporation retained the employee after discovery of his misdeed. See Mor-
ris, 44 HARV. L. RE.v. 1173, supra note 16, at 1203-04. But apparently this is no 
longer accepted practice. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C, comment 
b (1958). See Sullivan v. Matt, 130 Cal. App. 2d 134, 278 P.2d 499 (1955). 
212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909, comment a at 86 (Tent. Draft 
No. 19, 1973). It is interesting to note that this is the same justification used to 
support the broader vicarious liability rule. See note 216 infra and accompanying 
text. 
213. See W. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 12; Note, 41 N.Y.U. L. RE.v. 1158, supra 
note 16, at 1166-67; Note, 70 YALE L.J. 1296, supra note 16, at 1306-07. 
214. See Morris, 21 Omo ST. L.J. 216, supra note 16, at 220. 
215. It has been called the "better rule." 10 W. FLETCHER, supra note 209, § 
4906, at 371. 
216. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 16, at 284-85; W. PROSSER, supra note 31, 
at 12. The classic expression of this reasoning was set forth in Goddard v. Grand 
Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 224 (1869): 
[U]nder cover of [the corporate] name and authority, there is in fact as much 
wickedness, and as much that is deserving of punishment, as can be found any-
where else. And since these ideal existences can neither be hung, imprisoned, 
whipped, or put in the stocks . . . the doctrine of exemplary damages is more 
beneficial in its application to them, than in its application to natural persons. 
. . . There is but one vulnerable point about . . . corporations; and that is, 
the pocket of the monied power that is concealed behind them; and if that is 
reached they will wince. When it is thoroughly understood that it is not profit-
able to employ careless and indifferent agents, or reckless and insolent servants, 
better men will take their places, and not before. 
Two other considerations support the broad rule. First, "the practical difficulty of 
proving employer authorization necessitates a presumption conclusive of such con-
duct." Note, 70 YALE L.J. 1296, supra note 16, at 1301. See C. McCORMICK, supra 
note 16, at 285. Second, "the rule of unrestricted corporate liability has the great 
merit of workable simplicity." Id. But see Note, 70 YALE L.J. 1296, supra note 16, 
at 1301-04. 
217. See authorities cited in note 205 supra . . 
218. Compare Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 
1967) ("[A] sufficiently egregious error as to one product can end the business life 
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The law of corporate criminal responsibility raises many of the 
same questions concerning the fairness and utility of punishing share-
holders that are raised in the debate over the appropriate limits of 
corporate punitive damages liability.219 The criminal law generally 
imposes vicarious criminal liability upon a corporation only for 
limited acts of gross misconduct by high managerial personnel. 220 
This limitation on enterprise responsibility closely parallels the com-
plicity rule of punitive damages law. 221 In some instances, however, 
particularly in cases involving certain regulatory and public welfare 
offenses detrimental to the public health, vicarious criminal liability 
is imposed on the corporation without regard to the offending em-
ployee's managerial rank. 222 An understanding of the reasons for 
imposing criminal fines upon corporations, penalties ultimately borne 
by shareholders, should help determine whether the complicity or 
vicarious liability rule of punitive damages should be applied in prod-
ucts liability litigation. 
The principal justification for imposing criminal liability upon a 
corporation is, simply, its deterrent effect. 223 Corporations are just 
of a concern that has wrought much good in the past and might otherwise hnve 
continued to do so in the future, with many innocent stockholders suffering extinc-
tion of their investments for a single management sin"), with Pease v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 466, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 427 (1974) ("No sufficient 
reason appears why shareholders should be seen as captive innocent hostages to the 
inhuman management of a corporate juggernaut"). 
219. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 217C, D (1958) (cor-
porate punitive and criminal liabilities respectively). On the general topic of cor-
porate criminal responsibility, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment at 146-55 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 
1955); Edgerton, supra note 114; Hamilton, supra note 163; Mueller, Mens Rea and 
the Corporation, 19 U. P1rr. L. R.Ev. 21 (1957). 
220. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, comment at 151 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); RESTATE· 
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 217 D, comment d (1958). 
221. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, at 151 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); RESTATE· 
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 217 D, comment d (1958). 
222. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); MODEL 
PENAL CoDE § 2.07, at 147 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF AGENCY § 217 D, comment b (1958). 
223. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.07, at 148 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Hamilton, 
supra note 163, at 69. See also A. GOODHART, supra note 121, at 86 ("Fear of 
criminal prosecution significantly improves the general level of compliance with regu-
latory statutes, and particularly where acquisitive acts . • . are involved, the criminal 
sanction may be absolutely essential if the system is not to break down"). The 
deterrent effect is derived primarily from the prospect of a depletion in corporate 
assets that would result from the imposition of a criminal fine or a punitive damages 
judgment. Deterrence is also achieved in other ways. An adjudication of criminal 
guilt or wanton misbehavior against the corporation may indicate mismanagement 
and accordingly may lead either to a proxy fight or to a stockholder's derivative 
suit against the responsible persons in their individual capacity. Although the risk 
of either is slight, the mere possibility of either should serve as an added incentive 
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as capable as individuals of engaging in conduct intolerably detri-
mental to the public welfare, and their aggregation of resources 
magnifies their potential for inflicting harm. For example, the sale 
of food and drugs involves a significant risk of causing serious injury 
to many persons if those products are impure. Thus, the criminal 
law requires in these situations that the shareholders be punished to 
achieve the greater good of protecting the public health and welfare. 224 
Consumers necessarily rely on the ability and willingness of enter-
prises to market only safe foods and drugs, and the threat of criminal 
penalties for failures that pose a substantial risk of public harm will 
arguably encourage greater care in the operation of such enterprises. 225 
Since many product manufacturers have a degree of control over 
the well-being of the consuming public equivalent to that of food 
and drug producers, the prevention of needle~s injury necessitates 
the use in all products liability litigation of sanctions similar in effect 
to those used in food and drug cases. Food and drugs are not the 
only products whose purity is of fundamental concern to society, for 
thousands of other products must also be consumed on a daily basis. 
It thus seems as important to deter the marketing of insufficiently 
fire-retardant clothes and "uncrashworthy" automobiles as it is to 
hinder the marketing of impure food and drugs. If a broad rule of 
corporate punitive damages liability can indeed avert significant 
numbers of product accidents, 226 perhaps some blameless share-
holders should occasionally have to shoulder the burden of penalties 
resulting from the flagrant misconduct of their corporation's 
employees. 
to management to avoid questionable· conduct. See Hamilton, supra note 163, at 
73-75. 
224. One commentator has argued that 
[t]he only serious harm which [corporate responsibility] can do, consists in 
the injury to those really innocent stockholders who have nothing to do with 
the crime and no real opportunity of preventing it. This injury is regrettable; 
but . • • the balance of advantage seems to require subordinating their interest 
to the general interest. However "innocent" the owners of the corporate enter-
prise may be, the general interest requires that • . • corporate representatives 
be deterred, so far as corporate responsibility can deter them, from conducting 
the business in criminal ways. 
Edgerton, supra note 114, at 836-37. See Note, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158, supra note 
16, at 116. See generally Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoLUM. L. REV. 55 
(1933). 
225. See note 175 supra; cf. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). Simi-
larly, the general compensatory damage mle of vicarious liability of employers for 
the misconduct of their employees arose at an early date because of the confidence 
consumers necessarily repose in their suppliers. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON 
LAW 16 (1881). See generally 10 W. FLETCHER, supra note 209, § 4906, at 371 
(vicarious liability rule for punitive damages is "the only rule compatible with public 
policy and safety"). 
226. See notes 129-51 supra and accompanying text. 
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Yet shareholder liability may be justified on grounds other than 
stark social necessity. It is, of course, the supposed innocence of 
the shareholders that makes the punishment of a corporation seem 
unjust. 227 But this concept of shareholder innocence needs to be 
examined. Certainly the shareholders of a publicly held corporation 
are rarely blameworthy in a moral sense for the misconduct of its 
employees. Punitive damages are consistent with this view, for they 
do not assign blame to shareholders personally, but, as a practical 
matter, merely deplete the corporate treasury. This distinction is 
important, for in most cases the decisions of employees to market 
defective products in flagrant disregard of excessive dangers spring 
from the intensity of the profit motive rather than from animus 
toward consumers. 228 To the extent that such products are exces-
sively dangerous, however, the profits resulting from their sale are 
in a very real sense "excessive profits." 
Thus, the recovery of these excessive profits through punitive 
damages awards can be viewed as the recoupment of an unjust 
enrichment of the corporation and its shareholders rather than as the 
punishment of either the corporation or its shareholders.229 Puni-
tive damages admittedly are an imprecise mechanism for achieving 
227. Of course to the extent that punitive damages are compensatory rather than 
punitive, holding the corporation strictly responsible for them under the vicarious 
liability rule should be acceptable according to traditional notions of respondeat su-
perior and enterprise responsibility. See Edgerton, supra note 114, at 836-37; Lam-
bert, supra note 16, at 179. 
228. See MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.07, Comment at 148-49 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 
1955): 
[I1here are probably cases in which the economic pressures within the corpo-
rate body are sufficiently potent to tempt individuals to hazard personal liability 
for the sake of company gain, especially where the penalties threatened are mod-
erate and where the offense does not involve behavior condemned as highly im-
moral by the individual's associates. This tendency may be particularly strong 
where the individual knows that his guilt may be difficult to prove . • • • 
fl1he violation may have been produced by pressures on the subordinates 
created by corporate managerial officials even though the latter may not have 
intended or desired the criminal behavior and even though the pressures can 
only be sensed rather than demonstrated. 
See also Andenaes, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, supra note· 130, at 959-60. Even some 
commentators who oppose responsibility for punitive damages upon corporations for 
malicious conduct of low-level employees concede that it may be justified in cases 
in which the misbehavior was pursued in furtherance of corporate objectives. See 
Morris, 21 Omo ST. L.J. 216, supra note 16, at 218-19 ("Their superiors might 
secretly applaud their misplaced zeal-if it cost the corporation nothing this time and 
might protect its special interests in the future"); Note, 70 YALE L.J. 1296, supra 
note 16, at 1301 & n.7, 1307-08 n.60, 1310. 
229. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.07, Comment at 150 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); 
Hamilton, supra note 163, at 75. One drawback in relying upon criminal fines to 
accomplish this recoupment is that the economic benefit to the corporation from the 
law violation in many cases will exceed the maximum fine prescribed by statute, 
See id. Punitive damages assessments, however, have a flexibility peculiarly suited 
for effectively achieving a complete recoupment of all "excess" profits, 
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this objective, and shareholders will in fact be penalized when puni-
tive damages awards exceed excessive profits.230 Yet this penalty 
may be viewed as a fair assessment against both the manufactur-
ing entity for its willingness to gamble recklessly with the public 
safety231 and the shareholders for whose benefit the marketing deci-
sion was made. 
The weakening of ·the blameless shareholder argument under-
mines the reasons for adhering to the restrictive complicity rule. 
Moreover, application of the complicity rule in products liability cases 
would largely impede the objectives of punitive damages. Only the 
most extreme forms of manufacturer misconduct would ever be 
punished under the complicity rule, 232 and then only when the manu-
facturer was imprudent enough to create, preserve and relinquish evi-
dence of participation by its upper-level management in some improper 
conduct. 233 Documentary evidence of flagrant misconduct by man-
agerial employees rarely exists and, when it does, it may never be 
located by even the most diligent discovery and investigative proce-
dures. Thus, while upper-level management is probably frequently 
aware, if sometimes only intuitively, of seriously improper safety 
decisions made lower down the corporate ladder, the complicity rule 
230. See Hamilton, supra note 163, at 75; cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, com-
ment at 150 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). 
231. See Hamilton, supra note 163, at 75. Indeed, punishment over and above 
recoupment must, in each case, be proportionate to the probability that the viola-
tion may go undetected, so that a manufacturer will not view the "fine" as a "license 
fee for the conduct of an illegitimate business." See notes 158-71 supra and accom-
panying text. 
232. See Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Lawrence, 74 Miss. 782, 803, 22 S. 53, 58 
(1897) ("If corporations-artificial beings who can act only through agents and 
servants . . .-can never be held liable in punitive damages for the acts of their ser-
vants unless expressly authorized by them, no matter how gross and outrageous the 
wrongful act of the servant, we feel perfectly safe in declaring that no recovery for 
more than mere compensatory damages will ever again be awarded against corpora-
tions"). Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 842-50 (2d Cir. 1967), 
is clear proof that the complicity rule permits manufacturers guilty of the most 
egregious forms of anti-social conduct to escape liability for punitive damages. See 
text at notes 336-51 infra. 
233. In one instance, an incriminating test report "was concealed from plaintiffs 
and the FAA until after plaintiffs discovered the nature of this report from reading 
other reports and specifically demanded its production." Plaintiffs Memorandum 
in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 4, Engebreth v. Fairchild 
Hiller Corp., Civ. No. A-9-71 (D. Alas., filed Jan. 18, 1971 ). See text at notes 424-
31 infra. In another case, Sabich v. Outboard Marine Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 591, 
131 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1976), discussed in text at notes 403-06 infra, counsel for 
the plaintiff reported that the defendants admitted under oath "that between 25 
and 50 rolls of test film (each 50 feet in length) had been destroyed prior to 
the taking of their testimony." Letter from Daniel E. Wilcoxen to David G. 
Owen, July 16, 1975). 
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as a practical matter will often shield even the most culpable manu-
facturers from liability for punitive damages. 234 
-Most product safety decisions are made by middle- and lower-
middle management.235 For example, engineers and scientists make 
frequent decisions on the design, · composition and testing of 
their products, including the ascertaining of acceptable levels of 
product impurity or "defectiveness."236 These employees, or their 
supervisors, also decide how much time they should devote to staying 
abreast of recent developments in their fields. Similarly, produc-
tion managers make crucial decisions on assembly-line procedures, 
and quality control personnel decide both how many "bad" products 
should be· allowed to slip through to consumers and the degree of 
defectiveness required before such products are screened out. 
Marketing managers make decisions, first, on how informed they 
should become on dangers associated with their products and, 
second, on how much of this information should be passed along to 
consumers. Sales personnel decide how much information on 
product failures should be solicited from customers and how much 
should be passed back to the engineering, production, and market-
ing departments. Finally, the engineering, production, and market-
ing personnel receiving such information on failures in the field must 
decide whether and what remedial action may be necessary. 
All of these decisions are largely made by middle management. 
Upper-level management can inject itself however much it wishes 
into this process of product safety decision-making. If high-level 
management learns that one sure way to avoid punitive damages 
judgments is to remain ignorant of product safety problems, the 
message will clearly go down at many organizations that product 
safety is to be the exclusive concern of middle management. Appli-
cation of the complicity rule in products liability litigation thus would 
encourage the creation of an information gap between middle and 
upper management. 
However, a perceptive court or jury in a complicity rule jurisdic-
tion might find that the conduct of corporate officers in shielding 
themselves in this manner from important product safety problems 
234. Members of upper management are in fact implicated on rare occasions. 
See Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 106 (6th Cir. 1975) (president); Toole 
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967) (Direc-
tor of the company's Biological Science Division). 
235. See generally I. GRAY, PRODUCT LIABILilY-A MANAGEMENT RESPONSE ch. 
6 (1975); G. PETERS, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND SAFETY 57-98 (1971). 
236. See Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, supra note 50, at 430-33 n.11, 
447. "Since all products are flawed at some technological level, the decision must 
still be made as to when a flaw emerges as a defect." Id. at 430-31. 
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amounts to a flagrant disregard of the public safety. Alternatively, 
upper management's creation or even toleration of such an informa-
tion gap might be construed as blanket authorization or even ratifi-
cation of all product safety decisions made below, so that the reckless 
safety decisions of middle management could be imputed to the 
manufacturer in any event. 237 Such twisting of legal concepts should 
be avoided, however, since a more direct solution is available. 
Probably the best solution is to reject the complicity rule of puni-
tive damages in products liability litigation altogether and to adopt 
instead the broader rule of vicarious liability.238 Since manufactur-
ers would then be responsible for the reckless activities of employees 
at all levels, the deterrent effect of potential punitive damages 
awards would be considerably increased. Upper-level management 
of well-counselled enterprises could then be expected to respond by 
participating in major product safety decisions at all stages of the 
manufacturing and marketing process. As ultimate responsibility for 
important safety decisions is thereby shifted to upper management, 
many manufacturers would probably adopt improved procedures for 
gathering, transmitting, and using product safety information. Even-
tually, safety would become routinely considered in decisions concern-
ing profit maximization and thus become institutionalized within the 
manufacturing enterprise. 
While competing goals of particular enterprises will undoubtedly 
impede this development in some cases, the vicarious liability rule 
of punitive damages should substantially promote the broad objec-
tives of punitive damages in the products liability context. The 
complicity rule, on the other hand, serves this purpose inadequately. 
237. This could be achieved procedurally by shifting the burden of proof on the 
issue of authorization or ratification to the manufacturer, see Note, 70 YALE L.J. 
1296, supra note 16, at 1301 n.37, or even by creating an irrebuttable presumption 
of corporate approval, cf. id. at 1301, 1307-08 n.60. See generally Cohen, Book 
Review, 62 VA. L. REv. 259, 262 (1976). 
238. It might be desirable to modify the usual "scope ()f employment" test of 
the vicarious liability rule to a somewhat narrower "scope of employment in behalf 
of the corporation" test. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, comment at 147 (Tent. 
Draft No. 4, 1955). See also Western Coach Corp. v. Vaughn, 9 Ariz. App. 336, 
338, 452 P.2d 117, 120 (1969) ("in furtherance of the employer's business and acting 
within the scope of employment"). Thus narrowed, the vicarious liability rule would, 
for example, hold a manufacturer responsible for harm resulting from fabricated test 
results submitted to the FDA by a company scientist but would shield an enterprise 
from punitive damages arising out of the insertion of a razor blade into a bar of 
soap by a psycopathic assembly line employee. The line is easily and logically drawn 
at this point since management could take reasonable steps to prevent the misconduct 
in the first case but probably could do very little to prevent the truly malicious form 
of misbehavior in the second. 
An employee's failure to act appropriately upon receipt of apparently important 
information concerning a product danger presents other problems. See note 495 in-
fra. 
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That blameless shareholders will be punished in some cases is unfor-
tunate, but it is a price that must be paid in the pursuit of optimal 
product safety. 
B. Liability Insurance for Punitive Damages 
Just as the complicity rule frustrates the achievement of punish-
ment and deterrence, so also do rules ·that permit manufacturers to 
insure against the risk of punitive damages liability. It is axiomatic 
that these objectives can be attained only in so far as the wrong-
doers are in fact punished. To the extent that wrongdoers can use 
indemnification agreements to shift punishment to third parties, both 
the retributive and deterrent effects of the punishment will be shifted 
away as well. Thus, if manufacturers are.permitted to insure against 
punitive damages awards, such verdicts will only minimally achieve 
their objectives. 
The adverse effect of liability insurance on the deterrent function 
of tort law in general is well established. 230 Several years ago, a 
study by Professor William Whitford indicated that insurance may 
impede deterrence in the products liability context. 240 He found 
that some manufacturers relied heavily upon their insurance to pro-
tect themselves from liability for compensatory damages resulting 
from inadequate safety decision-making241 and concluded that be-
cause of this, "products liability litigation usually has little direct 
impact on product design or warning decisions."242 Similarly, one 
insurance expert asserted that at least some manufacturers regard 
liability insurance as a cost-saving substitute for product safety 
programs.243 
239. In one commentator's view, 
The deterrent function of the law of torts was severely, perhaps fatally, under-
mined by the advent of liability insurance. • . • The basic assumption of the 
penal theory had always been that the financial impact of an adverse verdict 
would serve to warn the tort-feasor and others against the consequences of sub-
standard conduct. But it could have such an educative effect only so long 
as he would feel that deterrent lash. Liability insurance cushioned him against 
its impact in advance, and thus removed the primary incentive toward the ob-
servance of care . • • . 
Fleming, The Role of Negligence ill Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 815, 823-
24 ( 1967). £ee generally James, supra note 177. 
240. The research, conducted for the National Commission on Product Safety, 
revealed that insurers for a number of manufacturers handled all products liability 
claims. "In some instances, the manufacturers apparently do not even inform them• 
selves of the final resolution of the claims, and for these manufacturers it is obvious 
that a court decision will have no direct effect on product design or warning deci-
sions." NCPS SUPPLEMENT STUDIES, supra note 176, at 228. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. See id. at 264. 
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A recent Department of Commerce study, however, casts 
considerable doubt on the continuing validity of these conclusions. 244 
Noting the dramatic increases in recent years in products liability 
claims, 245 the average loss per claim, 246 insurance premiums, 247 and 
policy cancellations, 248 the study reveals a crisis in the field of prod-
ucts liability insurance that is "extensive and . . . increasing in scope 
and severity at a rapid rate"249 as manufacturers find it more diffi-
cult to obtain adequate and affordable coverage. The study even 
offers the distressing conjecture that "[p]roblems associated with 
product liability are potentially more formidable than in medical 
malpractice insurance. "250 
The contemporary deterrent impact of compensatory and puni-
tive damages awards in products liability litigation must be evaluated 
in light of the specific findings of the Commerce Department study. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, researchers found that many 
manufacturers are attempting to cope with the insurance problem by 
adopting such "risk control techniques" as improving both the design 
of their products and their quality control procedures. 251 Second, 
products liability insurance generally is written on a retrospective or 
"loss-rated" basis in which premiums are calculated primarily on the 
manufacturer's past loss experience. 252 Deductible provisions are 
more frequently being required by insurers, and the amount of such 
deductibles is increasing. 253 Moreover, insurance companies are 
244. See DOC, PROD. LIAB. INs. Snn>Y, supra note 176. 
245. Id. at 8. 
246. Id. (from $11,644 in 1965 to $79,940 in 1973-an increase of 686% in 
eight years versus a 60% increase in the general price index). 
241. Id. at 9, 10, 15, 50, 53, 55, 68, 72. "Increases reported [to the Small Busi-
ness Administration] in 1975 ranged from 100 percent to over 800 percent. ... 
Cumulative increases over the past 7 years have been reported to be in excess of 
5,000 percent." Id. at 72. The liability insurance premium of one mechanical power 
press manufacturer, for example, is reported to have risen from $3000 in 1968 to 
$168,000 in 1975. Id. at 53. 
248. Id. at 10, 47, 68. 
249. Id. at ii. 
250. Id. at 13. 
251. Id. at 9, 11, 35-36, 56. "Many types of risk management approaches are 
being used by companies to deal with product liability. They include both risk con-
trol and risk finance techniques. Risk control involves risk avoidance (e.g., product 
redesign), loss prevention (e.g., quality control), and loss reduction (e.g., product 
recall)." Id. at 9. 
252. Id. at 32-33. To the extent that a manufacturer's insurance rates are based 
upon its prior products liability loss experience, it should indeed feel the punch of 
a damages verdict over time. See NCPS SUPPLEMENTAL Snn>ms, supra note 176, 
at 261. See generally Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The 
Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 560-74 (1961). 
253. DOC, PROD. LIAB. !NS. STUDY, supra note 176, at 37, 47, 55, 73-74. 
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increasingly cancelling the coverage of manufacturers with poor 
records. 254 The study reports that some companies are even oper-
ating with no products liability insurance at all, because of the high 
cost or because insurers have refused to underwrite either the par-
ticular company or the industry as a whole. 255 And some manufac-
turers are simply giving up, by dropping lines of high risk products2u0 
or, in some instances, by going out of business altogether. 267 In 
combination, these developments compel the conclusion that prod-
ucts liability litigation is increasingly forcing manufacturers to im-
prove product safety even when they are insured against claims for 
product injuries. 258 
Yet products liability insurance does to some extent diminish the 
retributive and deterrent effects of damages judgments. This disin-
centive to improve product safety is generally a necessary sacrifice 
that assures compensation for victims of product accidents and per-
mits manufacturers guilty only of inadvertant errors to protect them-
selves against unpredictable future losses. It is an entirely different 
matter, however, when a manufacturer guilty of an aggravated act 
of misconduct has insured against a punitive damages award. The 
accident victim, it may be assumed, has already received substantial 
compensation for his injuries, 259 and so the principal question that 
remains is whether public policy should prevent an insured from 
obtaining indemnity in such cases. 
Faced with this question, usually in cases involving reckless driv-
ing, 260 courts in recent years have split into two opposing camps. 
One line of cases follows Judge Wisdom's 1962 Fifth Circuit decision 
254. Id. at 36, 47, 55, 68. See also NCPS SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 
176, at 261, 263. 
255. DOC, PROD. LIAB. !Ns. STUDY, supra note 176, at 15, 36, 46-47, 55, 68, 72, 
81-85. 
256. Id. at 56. 
257. Id. at 84 (Havir Manufacturing Company in St. Paul, Minnesota). See 
Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972). 
258. An additional factor that diminishes the manufacturer's ability to shield 
itself from liability is a standard provision in the insurance contract itself "which 
requires a corporation, after it becomes aware of its defective product, to take steps 
to correct it or recall it. If the company (insured) doesn't take such reasonable 
steps, the insurance carrier may deny liability on subsequent claims." T. KEATING, 
in CoMPANY PROGRAMS To REDUCE PRODUCTS LIABILTIY HAZARDS: A TRANSCRIPT OF 
A MAP! SEMINAR 103 (June 15-16, 1972). 
259. See note 265 infra. 
260. For a collection of the cases, see Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 343 (1968). See 
generally Gonsoulin, ls an Award of Punitive Damages Covered Under an Automo-
bile or Comprehensive Liability Policy?, 22 Sw. L.J. 433 (1968); Lambert, supra 
note 16, at 180-86, 194 n.72; Long, Insurance Protection Against Punitive Damages, 
32 TENN. L. REv. 573 (1965); Comment, Insurer's Liability for Punitive Damages, 
14 Mo. L. REv. 175 (1949). 
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in Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty,261 which held that 
automobile liability insurance provisions covering punitive damages 
awards262 contravene public policy and thus should not be en-
forced. 263 The McNulty court's reasoning was cogent: "Where a 
person is able to insure himself against punishment he gains a free-
dom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment of sanctions 
against such misconduct."264 Certainly a jury returning a punitive 
damages verdict against a defendant for an aggravated act of miscon-
duct will usually contemplate that the bite of the verdict will be felt 
by the wrongdoer, not by some unknown insurance company that 
may in tum increase its rates and thereby pass the punishment along 
to consumers. Thus, McNulty and its progeny stress the negative 
impact of insurance on the punitive and deterrent purposes of puni-
tive damages awards and accordingly minimize their compensatory 
role.265 
A contrary line of cases, led by the 1964 Tennessee decision in 
Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co.,266 emphasizes 
261. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962). 
262. If the insurance policy does not expressly or impliedly cover punitive dam-
ages losses, the public policy issue of course need not be addressed. See, e.g., D. 
DOBBS, supra note 16, at 216. If the manufacturer's conduct manifests a wilfully 
unlawful exposure of consumers to a known defect, there may even be an express 
exclusion in the insurance contract for compensatozy as well as punitive damages. 
See NCPS SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 176, at 260 ("The products liability 
policy covers only occurrences which are neither 'expected nor intended from the 
standpoint of the insured'"); Note, 70 YALE L.J. 1296, supra note 16, at 1309 n.66. 
See note 258 supra. 
263. 307 F.2d at 434. 
264. The court further reasoned as follows: "It is not disputed that insurance 
against criminal fines or penalties would be void as violative of public policy. The 
same public policy should invalidate any contract of insurance against the civil pun-
ishment that punitive damages represent." 307 F.2d at 440. 
265. See, e.g., Smith v. Merchants Mut. Bonding Co., 211 Kan. 397, 405, 507 
P.2d 189, 196 (1973): 
Where exemplary damages are awarded for purposes of punishment and deter-
rence, as is true in this state, public policy should require that payment rest 
ultimately as well as nominally on the party who committed the wrong; other-
wise they would often serve no useful purpose. The objective to be obtained 
in imposing punitive damages is to make the culprit feel the pecuniazy punch, 
not his guiltless guarantor. Compensatozy damages, we might add, would not 
be affected by such a policy. They stand to be paid as any actual damages 
are cared for. 
Id. See also Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967). 
Tn McNulty, Judge Wisdom noted the paradox of allowing a defendant to pass the 
punishment to his insurance carrier who then, in the form of higher premiums, passes 
it to the public: "Society would then be punishing itself for the wrong committed 
by the insured." 307 F.2d at 441. Professor Morris once made the colorful sugges-
tion that contracts insuring against punitive damages "could be declared illegal and 
put in the same categozy as assistance in a jail break." Morris, 24 ILL. L. REV. 
730, supra note 16, at 560-74. 
266. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964). 
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instead an insurer's usual contractual obligation to compensate the 
insured for "all sums which the insured shall become legally obli-
gated to pay as damages."261 These cases stress the inequity of al-
lowing an insurer to reap a windfall by denying coverage it has not 
expressly excluded from the contract at the expense of the insured 
who expects to be protected against all liability. The courts follow-
ing Lazenby thus seek to protect a presumed contractual right, but 
they have never addressed the anomaly of allowing a defendant to 
insure against the risk of judicial punishment. 268 
In the cases following Lazenby, only the concurring opinion of 
Chief Justice Donaldson of the Idaho supreme court in Abbie 
Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance 
Co.269 has attempted to analyze the functional impact of punitive 
damages insurance. Justice Donaldson recognized the logical diffi-
culty of reconciling the objectives of punishment and deterrence with 
a rule permitting a defendant to insure against punitive damages. 
Nevertheless, he reasoned that insurance coverage of punitive dam-
ages verdicts should not be considered repugnant to public policy 
because it promotes law enforcement by encouraging plaintiffs to sue 
defendants guilty of particularly antisocial conduct. 210 This analysis, 
however, fails to recognize that private enforcement of the law is 
desirable principally because of its punitive and deterrent impact on 
serious misbehavior. Thus encouragement of litigation is not itself 
a primary goal but rather a means of achieving these more funda-
mental goals. 211 From this perspective, •the logical inconsistency of 
Justice Donaldson's argument is readily apparent: A rule allowing 
insurance coverage for punitive damages is adopted· in part because 
it promotes the sub-goal of encouraging litigation of wantonly 
inflicted injury; litigation of these claims is desired to advance the 
primary goals of punishment and deterrence; yet punishment and 
267. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957); Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 
108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972) (en bane); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. 
Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969); Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile 
Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Car-
roway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965). 
268. See notes 264, 265 supra. 
269. 95 Idaho 501, 509, 511 P.2d 783, 79-1 (1973) (special concurring opinion 
of Donaldson, C.J.). 
270. 95 Idaho at 509, 511 P.2d at 791. 
271. It is also a means of achieving the additional goal of compensation. See 
notes 112 & 152 supra. Justice Donaldson himself recognized deterrence as "the 
predominant public policy purpose" supporting the punitive damages doctrine. See 
95 Idaho at 509, 511 P.2d at 731, 
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deterrence are themselves largely defeated by application of the 
rule. 
The punitive damages objectives of punishment and deterrence 
should clearly be permitted -to prevail over the wrongdoer's expecta-
tion of contractual protection against liability for acts of aggravated 
misconduct.272 This is especially true in the products liability field 
for several reasons. First, a rule prohibiting insurance coverage of 
punitive damages is more likely to deter the potential misconduct 
of manufacturers attempting to maximize profits than that of drivers 
whose capabilities are impaired by intoxicants. 273 Second, a busi-
ness enterprise that wantonly endangers hundreds or thousands of 
consumers will usually be beyond the reach of 1:he criminal law, 
whereas an intoxicated driver who causes an accident faces a sub-
stantial risk of criminal punishment. 274 Finally, the expectations of 
the manufacturer who knowingly markets a defective product are 
probably less deserving of protection than the expectations of the 
intoxicated driver. Probably few drivers purchase liability insurance 
deliberately so that they can drive around in an intoxicated condition 
free of financial risk. Yet manufacturers probably quite often view 
insurance as a means of avoiding the burdens of legal safety obliga-
tions.275 Thus, at least in the context of products liability litigation, 
insurance coverage for punitive damages assessments should be pro-
hibited ·as contrary to public policy. 276 
272. See W. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 13; Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, supra 
note 16, at 527; Note, supra note 203, at 1049. 
273. Cf. Northwestern Natl. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 444 (5th Cir. 
1962) (special concurring opinion of Gewin, J.). 
274. Cf. 307 F.2d at 444; Price v. Hartford Accident & lndem. Co., 108 Ariz. 
485, 487, 502 P.2d 522, 524 (1972) (en bane). 
275. See note 243 supra and accompanying text. There is one final reason for 
prohibiting manufacturers from insuring against punitive damages. Such a policy 
would help to moderate the liability insurance cost spiral that is increasingly plaguing 
manufacturers. See notes 244-58 supra and accompanying text. Indeed, the Depart-
ment of Commerce study concluded that one of the causes of the current insurance 
crisis is "[i]ncreasing awards for • • • punitive damages . . . ." DOC, P~oD. LIAR. 
!Ns. STUDY, supra note 176, at 14. 
276. The McNulty rule prohibiting the insurance coverage of punitive damages 
is generally said to except situations in which punitive damages are imposed vicari-
ously upon a defendant. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Reichard, 404 
F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1968); Schwab v. First Appalachian Ins. Co., 58 F.R.D. 615 
(S.D. Fla. 1973); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 261 S.2d 545, 549 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1972); Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969). 
There are only a few decisions on point, however, and the comme.ntators have gen-
erally accepted the proposition uncritically. See, e.g., D. DoBBS, supra note 16, at 
216; W. PRossER, supra note 31, at 13; Gonsoulin, supra note 260, at 436-37; Long, 
Insurance Protection Against Punitive Damages, 32 TENN. L. REV. 573, 577 (1965). 
The courts that developed the exception borrowed the reasoning of the punitive dam-
ages cases espousing the narrow "complicity" rule. See, e.g., Northwestern Natl. Cas. 
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The third major complication in the use of punitive damages in 
products liability litigation is in its administration. There are consid-
erable difficulties in measuring and controlling punitive damages 
awards in all tort cases, but products liability litigation adds a particu-
larly high risk that excessive verdicts will be levied against defendant 
manufacturers. A jury in one recent products liability case, for 
example, rendered a punitive damages assessment against the manu-
facturer of $17,250,000.277 Multiple lawsuits compound the prob-
lem. For example, more than five hundred separate actions, seek-
ping punitive damages totaling more than $200 million, have been 
filed against A. H. Robins Company for its marketing of the Dalkon 
Shield. 278 When the stakes are this high, tools for measuring and 
controlling such awards must be chosen and refined with great care. 
I. Measurement 
Punitive damages have been repeatedly attacked over the years 
on the ground that the standards used to measure them are exces-
Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 n.16 (5th Cir. 1962), relying in part upon Lake 
Shore & Mich. So. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893). Just as the complicity 
rule was seen to subvert the objectives of punitive damages in the general context 
of enterprise responsibility, see text at notes 205-38 supra, so does the application 
of its reasoning to the issue of insurance coverage of punitive damages do violence 
to the goals of punishment and deterrence. Courts would do well, therefore, to pro-
hibit insurance coverage of punitive damages in products liability litigation regardless 
of the vicarious nature of the liability. 
Nevertheless, even if courts should refuse to invalidate punitive damages insur-
ance contracts in product liability cases, punitive damages should still be imposed. 
While insurance will reduce the punitive and deterrent effects of punitive damages, 
these goals will still be realized to some degree. See text at notes 251-58 supra, 
First, the insured manufacturer will eventually feel the effects of a punitive damages 
verdict to the extent that loss experience is reflected in future insurance rates. See 
note 252 supra. Secondly, a manufacturer publicly punished for marketing an ex-
cessively dangerous product will suffer a loss of reputation in excess of the amount 
normally resulting from a plaintifrs verdict in a products liability suit. See Rogin-
sky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967). Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, the publicity given to a punitive damages verdict will alert 
the legal community to the clear defectiveness of the particular product and to a 
fertile source of information on both the product's defectiveness and the manufac-
turer's reckless conduct. · More actions will then be brought and tried against the 
manufacturer, whose total punishment will be multiplied by the number of result-
ing settlements and plaintiffs' verdicts. 
277. Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 2d 450, 133 Cal. Rptr. 416 
(1974). 
278. Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 1976, at 6, col. 2 (midwest ed.); see notes 395-96 infra 
and accompanying text. Punitive damages claims totaling "hundreds of millions" 
of dollars were similarly made against the defendant in the MER/29 litigation. 
Rheingold, supra note 127, at 135; see text at notes 336-51 infra. 
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sively vague. 279 The trier of fact is generally instructed to determine 
a proper amount for such damages upon a consideration of "the char-
acter of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to 
the plaintiff which the defendant caused or intended to cause, and 
the wealth of the defendant."280 These standards are indeed gen-
eral and vague, but the trier of fact is also informed of the principal 
purposes for which punitive damages are assessed-to punish the 
offender and to deter him and others from similarly misbehaving in 
·the future. While this knowledge of the objectives of punitive dam-
ages does little to assure certainty of measurement, it does at least 
give some direction and purpose to the deliberations of the fact-
finder. Yet direction and purpose are not enough; with ·the poten-
tial liability as high as it is, further guidelines must be developed 
to improve the accuracy of measurement and to check the potential 
for abuse. 
A means of improving the accuracy and fairness of punitive 
damages awards is to consider the relevance of the goals of punish-
ment, deterrence, law enforcement, and compensation to the facts 
of any particular case. The difficulty of determining the appropriate 
amount for such awards springs largely from the difficulty of deter-
mining a proper sum to achieve optimally each of these varied objec-
tives. Thus, a consideration of the punitive damages functions in 
the products liability context can aid in the measurement of fair and 
accurate punitive damages awards. 
Our analysis begins in inverted fashion with a consideration of 
the goal of compensation. This approach is inverted because the 
compensation function has traditionally been viewed as the tag-along 
little brother of the "primary" functions of punishment and deter-
rence. 281 However, as discussed earlier,282 compensation should be 
considered a central goal. Once it has been established that a de-
fendant's misconduct was sufficiently flagrant to warrant punitive 
damages liability, the plaintiff should at the very least be reimbursed 
for his costs of litigation. This then should generally represent the 
minimum award.283 In many cases involving serious injury, a puni-
tive damages award equal to the plaintiff's compensatory damages 
279. See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 16, at 296; Morris, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 
supra note Hi, at 1189. 
280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 908(2) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). 
281. Cf. Note, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158, supra note 16, at 1162.,63. But cf. notes 
112, 152 supra. 
282. See text at notes 185-202 supra. 
283. See Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 710, 496 P.2d 939', 947 (1972); 
Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 691-92, 496 P.2d 682, 690-91 (1972). 
1316 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74: 1257 
would at least roughly cover the depletion of the plaintiffs judgment 
from litigation expenses and other noncompensable losses. The 
starting point for the measurement process then, without regard to 
the other functions, should be to make the plaintiff truly whole.284 
The accurate measurement of punitive damages can also be 
promoted by examining the effects of awards of particular amounts 
on the related goals of deterrence and law enforcement. Thus, if 
the plaintiffs injuries are relatively mild, he should be awarded a 
sufficient sum in addition to litigation expenses to encourage him to 
sue. 285 Moreover, as the magnitude of the hazard to the public 
increases, so too does the need to deter such behavior and therefore 
the need to increase the penalty. 286 In addition, and more impor-
tantly in most products liability cases, punitive damages should be 
used to attack directly the profit incentive that generated the market-
ing misconduct. The award should not only extract the profit real-
ized from the particular sale in question, but also the profits from all 
other sales of the product in its dangerous condition. Further, the 
manufacturer's probability of avoiding liability altogether should be 
factored in as well. Thus, the profits from the misconduct should be 
multiplied several times to optimize the deterrent effect. 
Of course any specific evidence bearing on whether the particular 
defendant or other manufacturers might repeat the misbehavior should 
be carefully considered. If, for example, the defendant can demon-
strate that it voluntarily terminated the misbehavior, especially if the 
termination occurred prior to the litigation, the need for specific 
deterrence would be correspondingly diminished. 287 Measures such 
as disciplining or discharging employees responsible for the miscon-
284. See text at notes 185-203 supra. 
285. See also text at notes 154-57 & note 158 supra. 
286. See note 150 supra and accompanying text. The primary consideration will 
be the magnitude of the risk, and to a lesser extent the amount of harm, to which 
the public at large was exposed by the behavior, rather than the extent of harm 
to the particular plaintiff. See notes 291, 530 infra and accompanying text. But 
see Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255, 264 (E.D. Pa. 
1976); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 856-57 (M.D. Pa. 1974). 
In Hoffman, the plaintiff sought to argue to the jury that the amount of punitive 
damages assessed against the defendant should reflect the defendant's wrong to the 
public at large. 374 F. Supp. at 856. The court disagreed: "Applying the plaintiff's 
rationale, each injured consumer of Aralen, using identical evidence regarding testing, 
notice, etc., could individually recover on behalf of society to punish the affront. 
Such a result would be ludicrous. Instead, we view the law to be that each Aralen 
consumer showing a bona fide injury may, if the evidence warrants, collect his rea-
sonable proportion of the punitive _damages the defendant owes 'society.'" 374 F. 
Supp. at 856. 
287. This is particularly true if the voluntary termination was accomplished by 
new management immediately after discovery of the misconduct. See, e.g., Drayton 
v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081, 1098 (N.D. Ohio 1975). 
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duct288 and substantially improving the relevant operating procedures 
might also demonstrate a reformed attitude that would similarly 
reduce the need for specific deterrence. Recalcitrance and cover-
up by the manufacturer, on the other hand, either prior to or during 
the litigation, 289 would indicate an excessive concern with profits and 
reputation200 at the expense of the public safety. In- the latter case, 
the deterrent and law enforcement functions of punitive damages 
require that assessments be tailored to teach the lesson soundly that 
knowingly or recklessly marketing defective products will not pay. 
The punishment function is the final factor to be considered in 
developing a standard for the measurement of punitive damages. 
The defendant manufacturer's attitude toward consumer safety is again 
important but in this context what is crucial is its scienter at the time of 
the misconduct. A manufacturer's punishment should correspond to 
its degree of awareness both of the presence of an excessive risk 
in its product and of the seriousness of the risk of injury presented. 
Thus, the more certain the manufacturer that its product was exces-
sively hazardous, and the more dangerous the particular hazard of 
which it was aware, 291 the more serious its misconduct and the more 
severe should be its punishment. Also bearing on the seriousness 
of the offense and hence on the amount of punishment needed are 
the number and level of employees whose action or conscious 
inaction contributed to the marketing misconduct or its cover-up. 292 
288. Cf. note 211 supra. 
289. 'See note 478 infra and accompanying text. Cf. United States v. General 
Motors Corp., 385 F. SUpp. 598, 602-03 (D.D.C. 1974), revd. on other grounds, 
518 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
290. See note 478 infra and accompanying text: 
291. The amount of harm actually caused the plaintiff as a result of the de-
fendant's misconduct has some minor relevance to the determination of the amount 
of punitive damages properly to be assessed in a given case "by analogy to the doc-
trine of the criminal law by which the seriousness of a crime may depend upon 
the harm done . . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, comment e at 82 
(Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). However, the more relevant considerations are the mag-
nitude of the risk of harm to the public created by the misbehavior and the extent 
of the defendant's awareness that the misbehavior might generate such a risk. See 
Morris, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, supra note 16, at 1181; notes 286 supra, 530 infra 
and accompanying text. 
Many jurisdictions purport to limit punitive damages assessments by a "ratio rule" 
that requires such awards to bear a reasonable relation to the actual damages awarded 
in the case. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 856-57 
(M.D. Pa. 1974); Morris, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1173, supra note lq, at 1180. The rule 
is a poor one since it ties the measure of punitive damages to a factor that is usually 
unrelated to the primary reasons such damages are assessed against the defendant. 
See id. at 1180-81; Note, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158, supra note 16, at 1170-71. 
292. Thus the level of the guilty employees within the corporate hierarchy will 
properly bear upon the amount of punitive damages to assess while not upon the 
prior determination of whether such damages should be awarded at all. See note 
238 supra and accompanying text. 
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Furthermore, since the number of consumers potentially harmed by 
a defect increases with time, a manufacturer's culpability and the 
need for greater punishment commensurately increase as it fails to 
remedy the problem. 293 
The penalty ordinarily should not only match the misconduct20• 
but also should be tailored to the wealth of the particular defendant 
to optimize punishment and deterrence:2911 "The theory is that a 
penalty which would be sufficient to reform a poor man is likely to 
make little impression on a rich one; and therefore the richer the 
defendant is the larger the punitive damages award should be."208 
The financial condition of a manufacturer thus should be ascertained 
293. Cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 385 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D.D.C. 
1914), revd. on other grounds, 518 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
294. See notes 113, 193 supra. 
295. This principle is rooted in logic and justice and is accepted by most courts 
today. See, e.g., Herman v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 524 F.2d 767, 772 (3d 
Cir. 1975); Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389' F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975); RESTATE· 
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) & comment e (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). In 
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Congress made the fol-
lowing provision concerning civil penalties assessed under the Act: "In determining 
the amount of such penalty, or the amount agreed upon in compromise, the appro-
priateness of such penalty to the size of the business of the person charged and the 
gravity of the violation shall be considered .... " U.S.C. § 1398(b) (1970). How-
ever, the rule has been criticized. See Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 
850, 856-57 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (''The plaintiff . . . wishes to admit into evidence 
the defendants' net worth. Accounting problems aside, such a gratuitous gesture by 
the court would be immaterial in a unique case such as this and would mislead the 
juzy"); Morris, 44 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1173, supra note 16, at 1191; note 305 infra and 
accompanying text; cf. Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 690-91, 496 P.2d 682, 689-
90 (1972). 
In the case of a corporation, wealth has generally been considered provable by 
a showing of the institution's net worth. See, e.g., Richards Co. v. Harrison, 262 
S.2d 258, 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Nevada Cement Co. v. Lemler, 89 Nev. 
447, 453, 514 P.2d 1180, 1183 (19-73 ). Other financial data have also been accepted 
as relevant to the determination of wealth. See, e.g., Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 
F. Supp. 1348, 1352 (D. Hawaii 1975) (authorized or stated capital; net worth; gross 
income; and net income); Herman v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 379 F. Supp. 1268, 
1277 (D. St. Croix), affd., 524 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1975) (net worth and net 
income; balance sheet and income statement both admitted into evidence) ; Wisner 
v. S.S. Kresge, 465 S.W.2d 666, 670 (Mo. App. 1971) (gross sales, net income, and 
net worth); Parrott v. Bank of America Natl. Trust & Sav. Assn., 97 Cal. App. 2d 
14, 25, 217 P.2d 89, 96 (1950) (capital surplus and undivided profits). 
Any information concerning the manufacturer's financial affairs that bears on 
the effect a punitive damages award will have on the company's financial standing 
should logically be admissible, see Jones v. Fisher, 42 Wis. 2d 209, 219-20, 166 N.W. 
2d 175, 181 (1969), and discoverable, see Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 
1348, 1352 (D. Hawaii 1975); Holliman v. Redman Dev. Corp., 61 F.R.D. 488 
(D.S.C. 1973); Coy v. Superior Ct., 58 Cal. 2d 210, 222-24, 373 P.2d 457, 463-
64, 23 Cal. Rptr. 393, 399-400 (1962). While such evidence may thus be discovered 
and introduced into evidence, the plaintiff may not have the burden of producing 
it. See, e.g., Tri-Tron Intl. v. Velto; 525 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1975); Rogers 
v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 575-76, 106 S.E.2d 258, 262 (1958). 
296. Morris, 44 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1173, supra note 16, at 1191; see Richards Co. 
v. Harrison, 262 S.2d 258, 263-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). 
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together with the probable impact thereon of a proposed punitive 
damages assessment. 297 
Finally, the punitive damages assessment should reflect other 
"punishment" already imposed, or likely to be imposed, upon the 
manufacturer as a result of its marketing misconduct. This other 
punishment includes compensatory damages awards to the plaintiff 
and other injured consumers, 298 punitive damages awarded to other 
plaintiffs, and any criminal penalties. 299 
In summary, proper measurement of a punitive damages award 
in a products liability case should be furthered by careful considera-
tion of the following factors: 
(1) the amount of the plaintiff's litigation expenses; 
(2) the seriousness of the hazard to the public; 
(3) the profitability of the marketing misconduct (increased by 
an appropriate multiple); 
( 4) the attitude and conduct of the enterprise upon discovery 
of the misconduct; 
(5) the degree of the manufacturer's awareness of the hazard 
and of its excessiveness; 
(6) the number and level of employees involved in causing or 
covering up the marketing misconduct; 
(7) the duration of both the improper marketing behavior and 
its cover-up; 
(8) the financial condition of the enterprise and the probable 
effect thereon of a particular judgment; and 
(9) the total punishment the enterprise will probably receive 
from other sources. 
Precise measurement of a punitive damages award will never be 
possible because of the general nature of the several goals it serves. 
Yet the careful use of these factors in products liability cases should 
help considerably to reduce the risk of capriciously determined 
awards and to assure that awards are more consistent with their 
underlying objectives. 
2. Control 
While the factors developed above should assist a conscientious 
judge or jury in determining the proper punitive damages assessment 
297. See, e.g., Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975). 
298. See Morris, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, supra note 16, at 1188. 
299. See Ostopowitz v. William S. Merrell Co., N.Y.LJ. Jan. 11, 1967, at 21, 
col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, N.Y.); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
908 comment e (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). See also Morris, 44 HARV. L. REV. 
1173, supra note 16, at 1187-88, 1195-98. 
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in any particular case, the factors themselves cannot prevent occa-
sional abuses in the form of excessively large verdicts. Particu-
larly in "mass disaster'' cases such as the MER/29 litigation in the 
196O's300 and the Dalkon Shield litigation now in progress, 301 there 
is a significant risk that a manufacturer will be severely over-punished 
by scores or even hundreds of judgments for both compensatory and 
punitive damages. Indeed, it was within this very context that Judge 
Friendly offered his celebrated critique of punitive damages awards 
in products liability litigation. 302 
a. Judicial control over excessive awards. The best protection 
against excessive punitive damages awards would probably be to shift 
the responsibility for their measurement from the jury to the trial 
judge once the jury has determined that such damages should be 
assessed. 303 This scheme offers several advantages over the tradi-
tional method of allowing the jury to determine such awards. First, 
it would reduce the probability that punitive damages awards might 
be unduly influenced by emotion, since most judges are presumably 
more detached in their deliberation and therefore more likely to render 
objective damages assessments.304 Additionally, evidence of the de-
fendant's wealth that could prejudice the jury on the issue of lia-
bility305 could then be excluded from jury consideration. Further, 
judges would be able to call upon their experience in criminal sen-
tencing, unavailable to jurors, in evaluating the need for punishment 
300. See text at notes 336-51 infra. 
301. See text at note 278 supra & notes 395-96 infra. 
302. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967), 
303. See DuBois, supra note 9, at 352-53; cf. Morris, 44 HARV, L. REV. 1173, 
supra note 16, at 1179-80. 
304. See DuBois, supra note 9. An overlooked twist of irony exists within the 
law of punitive damages. According to traditional learning, the jury cannot award 
such damages unless it concludes that the defendant's conduct was "outrageous." 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 908 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). But 
outrage is undoubtedly an emotion of passion and, therefore, if the jury is outraged 
by the defendant's conduct the verdict will have to be reversed as the product of 
passion. See, e.g., C. McCORMICK, supra note 16, at 296. Thus the basis for 
punitive damages comes perilously close to being the basis for their reversal as 
well. 
305. See Silliman, supra note 9, at 9-2; DuBois, supra note 9, at 351 ("There 
is usually great disparity between the parties' financial status which can create a 
Robin-Hood-like state of mind in the jury room"). But see Thomas v. American 
Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255, 268 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("Properly limited 
instructions . . . we think eliminate the potential for prejudice"); Barth v. B.F. Good-
rich Tire Co., 2'65 Cal. App. 2d 228, 241, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 313 (1968) ("It is 
doubtful whether the admission of evidence of Goodrich's financial condition • • , 
affected the judgment in this case since Goodrich is universally recognized as a large 
and prosperous corporation"). 
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and deterrence in particular cases.306 Finally, trial judges usually 
have a more sophisticated appreciation than jurors of the often far-
reaching effects that punitive damages awards may have on the 
operations of particular corporate defendants. 
Yet even if the responsibility for measurement remains with the 
jury, both trial and appellate judges can exercise considerable control 
over excessive punitive damages verdicts. In the past, judges were 
most reluctant to tamper with punitive damages awards that, by their 
nature, are supposed to reflect the jury's communal outrage over the 
defendant's misbehavior.307 But those were the days when punitive 
damages verdicts of more than a few hundred dollars were rare, 
when verdicts of thirty or forty thousand dollars were "startlingly 
large,"308 and when multi-million dollar verdicts were simply unthink-
able. Today, judicial control has tightened in many jurisdictions, and 
verdicts for punitive damages are generally being scrutinized at least 
as closely as verdicts for compensatory damages.309 Generally, a 
trial judge can attempt to reduce excessive awards by requiring the 
plaintiff to choose between remitting the objectionable portion of the 
verdict or submitting to a new trial, 810 which may be limited solely 
to the issue of damages. Similarly, an appellate court faced with 
a clearly excessive verdict can order remittitur or a new trial. 311 
Despite the limited number of products liability cases to date in 
which juries have awarded punitive damages, there are already solid 
indications that at least the trial bench will closely scrutinize such 
awards.312 
306. See Note, 41 N.Y.U. L. RBv. 1158, supra note 16, 1171; Note, 70 HAR.v. 
L. REV., supra note 16, at 530. 
307. See Note, 70 HARV. L. RBv. 517, supra note 16, at 530. 
308. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 16, at 298. 
309. -See, e.g., Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 496 P.2d 939 (1972). This 
change in attitude concerning the proper scope of review of punitive damages is re-
flected in the differences between the first and second torts Restatements. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, comment d at 81-82 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 
1973 ). 
310. See, e.g., Herman v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 379 F. Supp. 1268 (D. St. Croix), 
affd., 524 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1975); Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 100, 
213 N.W.2d 327, 331 (1973) ("Even in the absence of passion or prejudice, 
the trial court should not hesitate to adjust a verdict where it is felt that the 
evidence does not justify the amount"). 
311. See, e.g., Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 496 P.2d 682 (1~72); Jones 
v. Fisher, 42 Wis. 2d 209, 166 N.W.2d 175 (1969); cf. Lanfranconi v. Tidewater 
Oil Co., 376 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1967). 
312. See Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 
416 (1974) (affirming trial court's order granting new trial on $17,250,000 punitive 
damages verdict); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. 
Rptr. 398 (1967) (affirming trial court's remittitur of punitive damages award from 
$500,000 to $250,000); Rosendin v. Avco Lycoming Div., No. 202,715 (Super. Ct. 
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Although punitive damages verdicts should be closely scruti-
nized, a court must exercise its discretion with particular care and 
disturb such awards only upon clear evidence that the verdict as a 
whole is excessive. Careful use of judicial discretion is important 
because juries not infrequently include some or all of the plaintiff's 
general compensatory damages in the punitive damages award. 313 
Thus, reversal or excessive remittitur may improperly reduce the 
composite award intended by the jury to compensate the plaintiff for 
his actual injury. 
/ b. Control over total punishment in mass disaster litigation. 
One of the most troublesome aspects of punitive damages awards 
in products liability litigation is their potential not only to punish an 
offending enterprise but also to damage its finances severely or even 
to bankrupt it. 314 If a product is dangerously defective because of in-
adequate warnings or design, or because of a recurring flaw in manu-
facture, hundreds or thousands of similar injuries may result from the 
single defect in the product line. Such a result would be a "mass 
disaster" for both the consuming public and the manufacturer. In 
such situations, defendant manufacturers may be overwhelmed by 
the resulting liability for compensatory damages alone; massive addi-
tional awards of punitive damages to each plaintiff315 may virtually 
ensure the manufacturer's bankruptcy. If the purpose of punitive 
damages is to punish a defendant and not to bankrupt him, to sting 
Santa Clara County, Cal., March 8, 1972) (unpublished opinion, June 7, 1972), 
affd., No. 32,999, Cal. App., 1st Dist., Feb. 24, 1976, cert. denied, Sup. Ct. Cat. 
(19-76) (motion for new trial granted on punitive damages verdict of $10.5 million 
in an unpublished opinion, June 7, 1972); Ostopowitz v. William S. Merrell Co., 
N.Y.LJ. Jan. 11, 1967, at 21, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, N.Y.) ($850,000 
punitive damages verdict remitted to $100,000). 
313. See note 203 supra. For example, in Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 
102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976), the trial court ren-
dered a j.n.o.v. setting aside verdicts against the manufacturer of $100,000 in 
punitive damages and $50,000 in attorneys' fees, but left intact a compensatory 
damages verdict of $125,000. Plaintiff had incurred out-of-pocket medical expenses 
to the date of trial amounting to $128,000 and would require medical expenses includ-
ing full-time nursing care for the remainder of her life, costing $13,624 annually, 
523 F.2d at 105. Since there was no real issue on liability in the case, at least 
for compensatory damages, it appears quite likely that the jury arrived at a total 
amount intended to compensate the plaintiff for her actual damages, past and future, 
and then divided this amount between the compensatory and punitive damages awards 
and perhaps the award for attorneys' fees as well. See 523 f .2d at 105 n.2. 
314. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-41 (2d Cir. 
1967). 
315. Moreover, the magnitude of the financial disaster for the manufacturer will 
be multiplied if its products liability insurance carrier denies liability upon finding 
that the manufacturer violated its obligation under the insurance contract to remedy 
known defects. See notes 258, 262 supra, · 
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a wrongdoer but not to kill him, 316 and if the manufacturer indeed 
is punished by substantial liability for compensatory damages, are 
not the punitive and deterrent functions of punitive damages already 
satisfied and the raison d'etre for punitive damages thereby ex-
tinguished? 
While such reasoning may have superficial appeal, there are 
several reasons for awarding punitive damages anyway. The vital 
role played by such awards in augmenting the incomplete reparation 
of compensatory awards was discussed above. 317 Also discussed 
earlier was the fact that compensatory damages alone in cases of 
flagrant misbehavior inadequately satisfy the retributive needs of the 
injured consumer and society.318 
Furthermore, the conclusion that manufacturers will be sufficiently 
punished in every mass disaster case without the payment of punitive 
damages is subject to question. For instance, a manufacturer's liabil-
ity for compensatory damages may be insured, and to this extent the 
punitive and deterrent effects of such verdicts will be at least parti-
ally avoided. 319 Even if the manufacturer's insurance is insufficient 
to cover all potential compensatory claims, it probably will never be 
required to pay ~e bulk of such claims anyway. This is most apt 
to be true when a defective product typically causes relatively slight 
injuries, because of the small number of such cases taken to lawyers 
in the first place, and because few of these can be economically pur-
sued for compensatory damages alone. 320 Even in situations where the 
injuries are usually serious, many potential claims against the manu-
facturer are settled for a fraction of their value, and many are never 
made at all. 321 These are the "forgotten plaintiffs" who are left with-
out redress under a system that only permits compensatory damages. 
These are precisely the plaintiffs helped by punitive damages awards, 
for such awards make litigation of minor claims economical and, as the 
number of substantial recoveries are increasingly publicized, they 
help to inform both injured consumers of their rights and lawyers 
of the desirability of litigating such claims. Thus, even when many 
consumers are injured by a manufacturer's flagrant marketing mis-
316. See, e.g., Hoy v. Poyner, 305 S.2d 306 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Nevada 
Cement Co. v. Lemler, 89 Nev. 447, 452, 514 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1973); Ostopowitz 
v. William S. Merrell Co., N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1967, at 21, col. 3 (Super. Ct. West-
chester County, N.Y.). 
317. See text at notes 178-79, 185-203 supra. 
318. See text at notes 113-28 supra. 
319. See text at notes 239-76 supra. 
320. See text. at notes 148-51 & note 151 supra. 
321. See text at notes 176-80, 202 & note 176 supra. 
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conduct, the manufacturer may escape just punishment if punitive 
damages are not allowed. 
Even in mass disaster litigation, then, punitive damages may play 
a vital role. But the role must be carefully shaped to fit this context. 
The substantial risk of over-punishment in the mass disaster situation 
requires that punitive damages awards be measured and controlled 
with special care as litigation progresses. 
It has been suggested that the ideal solution to the problem 
would be first to litigate all compensatory damages claims arising out 
of a mass disaster, thus fixing the manufacturer's liability in this 
regard, and then to measure and assess a single punitive damages 
award against the manufacturer for equitable distribution among the 
plaintiffs.322 Apart from its obvious impracticability,323 such a plan 
rests upon two dubious premises. 324 The first is that the defendant's 
coffers will quickly be depleted if both compensatory and punitive 
damages are awarded in initial litigation, leaving nothing with which 
to pay later compensatory claims. 325 Yet a contrary conclusion can 
be drawn from the MER/29 litigadon, the only mass disaster 
products liability litigation that has run its course. 326 While some 
1500 claims were filed against the manufacturer ,in that case, only 
eleven were tried to a jury verdict. Out of these, only seven were 
decided for the plaintiff, and only three of these included awards 
of punitive damages, one of which was reversed on appeal. 327 No 
doubt many claims were settled out of court. Yet if this is an 
example of the most crushing punishment that will befall a manu-
facturer guilty of flagrant marketing misbehavior-and it is difficult 
to imagine a more extreme case of such misbehavior than that of 
Richardson-Merrell in marketing MER/29-then the threat of bank-
322. See Roginsky. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 n.11 (2d Cir. 
1967); cf. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 856 (M.D. Pa. 1974). 
323. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-40 n.11 (2d 
Cir. 1967); cf. de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231-32 (10th 
Cir. 1970). 
324. See Vollert v. Summa Corp., 31!9 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (D. Hawaii 1975); 
Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1967). 
325. See, e.g., Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (D, Hawaii 
1975) ("It would appear most inequitable to foreclose effective monetary relief to 
some injured persons because extensive punitive damages were granted to those who 
happened to obtain judgments earlier"). 
326. There has been at least one products liability "mini-disaster" that has run 
its course, involving the drug Aralen marketed by Sterling Drug, Inc. See Hoffman 
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 857 (M.D. Pa. 1974); text at notes 446-51 
infra. 
327. See note 339 infra. 
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rupting a manufacturer with punitive damages awards in mass disas-
ter litigation appears to be more theoretical than real. 
The second questionable premise is the supposed unfairness of 
rewarding the initial plaintiffs to a greater extent than subsequent 
claimants. 328 This conception ignores the enormous diligence, 
imagination, and financial outlay required of initial plaintiffs to 
uncover and to prove the flagrant misconduct of a product manufac-
turer. 329 In fact, subsequent plaintiffs will often ride to favorable 
verdicts and settlements on the coattails of the firstcomers. 
Thus, while courts must be especially vigilant to control the very 
real, but by no means certain, risk of excessive punishment in mass 
disaster cases, the initial plaintiffs in appropriate cases should receive 
punitive damages awards that reward their efforts. Plaintiffs follow-
ing soon thereafter, whose successful prosecutions of punitive dam-
ages claims confirm the first award, should be permitted to recover 
enhanced punitive damages awards for similar reasons. Thereafter, 
however, punitive damages recoveries should probably be limited to 
reasonable costs of litigation. And once the bankruptcy of the 
defendant manufacturer appears to be a real and imminent possibil-
ity, punitive damages should no longer be available at all. This 
approach to controlling punitive damages awards in mass disaster liti-
gation should appropriately balance the various objectives of punish-
ing the guilty manufacturer, rewarding the initial claimants, protect-
ing the latecomers, and minimizing the risk of bankruptcy for the 
defendant. 
The risk that defendants may be excessively punished is very 
real. But so too is the need for the punitive damages remedy in 
certain products liability cases. And the risk of excessive punish-
ment can be reduced to an acceptable level through responsible 
measurement and effective judicial control. On occasion, punitive 
damages awards will unfortunately over-punish a manufacturer. But 
the benefits that will result from the general use of such awards will 
greatly outweigh the total of all such occasional harms. 
IV. DEVELOPING A STANDARD OF LIABILITY FOR THE RECKLESS 
MARKETING OF DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS 
A. Classification of Recurring Forms of Flagrant 
Misconduct of Product Manufacturers 
Sections II and III concluded that punitive damages can serve a 
328. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir. 
1967); cf. Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (D. Hawaii 1975). 
329. See note 179 supra. 
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useful purpose in products liability litigation despite recurring diffi-
culties involving vicarious liability, liability insurance, and measure-
ment and control. The necessary task that remains is to develop an 
analytical framework to assist in identifying cases in which the assess-
ment of punitive damages is appropriate. The standard of punitive 
damages liability to be proposed will center on the extent to which the 
marketing conduct of a manufacturer exhibits a conscious or reckless 
indifference to the risk that its product may be excessively dangerous 
1:o consumers. The problems encountered in developing such a 
standard are considerable, 330 and competing considerations fre-
quently clash. For example, the standard must be defined broadly 
enough to permit flexibility in its application, yet with sufficient 
specificity to provide manufacturers with adequate notice of the type 
of conduct for which they will be subject to quasi-criminal punish-
ment. 331 Indeed, adequate notice is essential if punitive damages 
awards are to be effective in deterring the marketing of excessively 
hazardous products.332 Vague as it necessarily will be, a standard 
must first be developed and articulated that can be refined through 
subsequent judicial experience. 
The first step in designing such a standard involves the identifica-
tion and examination of the various recurring forms of marketing 
misbehavior that judges and juries have considered most deserving 
of punishment. Since there are only a few reported decisions con-
sidering punitive damages in the products liability context,333 and 
330. The difficulty is similar to that encountered in developing a definition for 
the basis of liability for compensatory damages in strict tort for the sale of defective 
products, which includes such imprecise terms as "defective" and "unreasonably dan-
gerous." See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 169, at 31; Montgomery & Owen, supra note 
2; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 82S, 
833 (1973). 
331. ..See note 103 supra and accompanying text. But see Thomas v. American 
Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 25S, 26S (E.D. Pa. 1976), appeal docketed, 
No. 76-1830, 3d Cir., June 21, 1976 ("The allowance of punitive damages does not 
convert a civil action into a quasi-criminal proceeding"). 
332. See notes 132-3S supra and accompanying text. 
333. The first reported products liability case involving punitive damages is ap-
parently Fleet v. Hollenkamp, 52 Ky. 175, 13 B. Mon. 219 (18S2), which involved 
the sale of an adulterated drug. The court upheld the trial court's charge on exemp-
lary damages and affirmed a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Other reported 
decisions involving personal injury claims for punitive damages in a products liability 
context and in which either the trial or appellate court decided in favor of the plain-
tiff include the following: Johnson v. Husky Indus., Inc., - F.2d - (6th Cir. 1976) 
(asphyxiation from fumes emitted by charcoal briquets that were inadequately la-
beled) ($212,500 punitive damages verdict reversed, $212,500 compensatory damages 
verdict affirmed); Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976) (reversing j.n.o.v. and ordering entry of judg-
ment to plaintiff of $100,000 for punitive damages and $50,000 for attorneys' 
fees); Ussery v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH PROD, 
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since some of these cases incompletely report the pertinent facts, the 
following analysis of marketing misbehavior will also draw on several 
LIAB. RPTR. 11 7084 ( 4th Cir. 1973) (punitive damages award, remitted from 
$425,000 to $350,000 by trial court, vacated on other grounds without discussion 
of punitive damages award) (opinion withdrawn, order, filed March 31, 1975); Hoff-
man v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973) (compensatory damages 
verdict affirmed and remanded for trial of punitive damages), on remand, 374 F. 
Supp. 850 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (plaintiff not entitled to argue magnitude of defendant's 
harm to society nor to present evidence of defendant's net worth) (settled after five 
weeks of retrial for $600,000, $163,000 in excess of original compensatory damages 
verdict. 18 AM. TRIAL LAWYERS ASSN. NEWS LETIER 120 (1975) [hereinafter 
A.T.L.A.N.L.]); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 
1967) (reversal of $100,000 verdict for punitive damages); Vollert v. Summa 
Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975) (despite assertions of confiden-
tiality, defendant designer-manufacturer of helicopter that crashed ordered to 
answer interrogatories of financial worth relevant to punitive damages claim); 
Drake v. Wham-0 Mfg. Co., 373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (denial of defend-
ant's motion to dismiss punitive damages claim; settled for $65,000); Sabich v. Out-
board Marine Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 591, 131 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1976) (reversing $1,-
254,000 punitive damages verdict and affirming $600,000 compensatory damages ver-
dict); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 
(1975) (reversal of trial court's overruling of defendant's demurrer to punitive dam-
ages claim); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
306 (1968) (no verdict on punitive damages, but punitive damages charge held 
proper); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 
(1967) (punitive damages award, remitted from $500,000 to $250,000 by trial court, 
affirmed); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 274 S.2d 898 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973 ), 
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974) (reversal of compensatory damages award of 
$70,000 and of punitive damages award of $500,000); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 
Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), affd., 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 
(1970) ($10,000 punitive damages award affirmed without discussion); Ostopowitz 
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1967, at 21, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. West-
chester County, N.Y.) ($850,000 punitive damages verdict remitted to $100,000). 
See also Griswold v. The Lange Co., CCH PROD. LIAB. RPTR. 11 7634 at 14,685 
(D. Colo. 1976) (motion to dismiss punitive damages claim under Colorado survival 
statute denied); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (punitive 
damages recoverable in, and "deadman's" statute inapplicable to, action under Texas 
constitution and wrongful death act). 
Reported products liability decisions involving personal injuries that have dis-
cussed punitive damages, in which all rulings were against the plaintiff include: Krit-
ser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973) (affirming refusal of 
trial court to submit punitive damages issue to jury); Thomas v. American Cysto-
scope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-1830, 
3d Cir., June 21, 1976 (granting defendant's motion for j.n.o.v. on plaintiff's 
$200,000 punitive damages verdict); Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 
1081, 1097-98 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (punitive damages claim disallowed in nonjury 
trial for insufficient evidence of "actual" malice); Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 
38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974) (affirming trial court's order 
granting new trial on $17,250,000 punitive damages verdict). 
Reported products liability decisions involving personal injuries that have, without 
discussion, found the evidence insufficient to support a punitive damages award in-
clude the following: Ollier v. Lake Cent. Airlines, Inc. 423 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1970) 
(directed verdict for defendant on punitive damages claim affirmed); Crews v. Sike-
ston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 240 Mo. App. 993, 99-5, 225 S.W.2d 812, 815 (1949) 
(trial court order granting new trial on punitive damages award of $900 affirmed); 
Hafner v. Guerlain, Inc., 34 App. Div. 2d 162, 310 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Sup. Ct 1970) 
(reversal of $8,000 punitive damages verdict affirmed); Perry v. Kelford Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co., 196 N.C. 690, 146 S.E. 805 (1929) (reversal of punitive damages ver-
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unreported cases384 and additional information gathered on reported 
cases. 
diet). See Oxman v. Hellene Pessl Inc., 279 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (punitive 
damages claim dismissed). Cf. Commercial U. Ins. Co. v. Upjohn Co., 409 F. Supp. 
453 (W.D. La. 1976) (punitive damages claim dismissed as unavailable under Louisi-
ana law). 
In addition, punitive damages awards have been held proper in a number of deceit 
actions based upon the fraudulent sale of "defective" products. These cases have 
involved property and economic losses rather than personal injuries. See, e.g., Boehm 
v. Fox, 473 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1973); Standard Oil Co. v. Gunn, 234 Ala. 598, 
176 S. 332 (1937); Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902,453 P.2d .551 (1969); 
Johnson v. Allen, 448 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Craig v. Spritzer Motors, 
109 Ohio App. 376, 160 N.E.2d 537 (1959). Cf. Fritz v. Warner-Lambert Pharma-
ceutical Co., 349 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
334. In the following unreported products liability cases, punitive damages claims 
have figured prominently: Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., Civil No. 74-462 
(D.S.C., March 18, 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-1920, 4th Cir., Aug. 24, 1976 
(hand injuries from windshield broken by collapse of roof when automobile over-
turned; verdict for $65,000 compensatory and $250,000 punitive damages); Wallace 
v. General Motors Corp., No. WPB-75-65-Civ-CF (S.D. Fla. 1975) (death caused 
by hood of automobile penetrating windshield and striking driver's neck in head-
on collision; manufacturer failed to warn or correct despite knowledge of approxi-
mately 120 "instances of hood penetration through the windshield resulting in decapi-
tation, paralysis, disfigurement, etc.") Letter from plaintiff's attorney, Edward M. 
Ricci, to David G. Owen, March 8, 1976; settled, after trial court denied defendant's 
motion to dismiss punitive damages claim for $400,000, the amount of plaintiff's 
final settlement demand. "It is our firm belief that the punitive damages claim in 
the suit was a substantial factor leading to such a favorable settlement • . . . Gen-
eral Motors paid the full amount without any debate." Letter from Edward M. Ricci 
to David G. Owen, Dec. 16, 1975; Engebreth v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., No. A-9-
71 (D. Alas., filed Jan. 18, 1971) (deaths from plane crash caused by defective wing 
design and insufficient inspection process; settled for $2,070,000 which included 
$750,000-$1,000,000 for "punitive damages question." Letter from plaintiff's attor-
ney, Bernard P. Kelly, to David G. Owen, June 24, 1975; punitive damages claims 
allowed under survival statute and denied under wrongful death statute (unpublished 
opinion, Nov. 20, 1972)); Scott v. Outboard Marine Corp., No. 71-1661 Civ JLK 
(S.D. Fla., filed Oct. 28, 1971) (one death and one loss of leg attributable to failure 
to warn or recall for repairs boat with defective steering; compensatory damages set• 
tlement after trial of $250,000 for death and $650,000 for loss of leg; verdict for de-
fendant on punitive damages); Schaller v. Sterling Drug, Inc., No. W-3792 (D. Kan., 
filed March 5, 1970) (visual impairment from use of Aralen, side effects of which 
bad not been adequately warned of; settled during trial for $315,000 after ruling that 
punitive damages issue would be submitted to jury); Ornelas v. F.H. Langenkamp Co., 
No. 238260 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Cal., filed Aug. 28, 1973) (loss of leg at-
tributable to failure of agricultural machine to have warning or safety devices as re-
quired by state regulations; settled immediately prior to trial for $250,000); Domich v. 
lee's Juvenile Shop, No. 225782 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Cal., filed Aug. 28, 
1972) (burn injuries from flammable article of child's clothing; settled for $458,000, 
reported in Sacramento Bee, Aug. 28, 1975, § B, at 2, col. 3); Rosendin v. Avco Ly-
coming Div., No. 202715 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, Cal., March 8, 1972), 
noted in 15 A.T.L.A.N.L. 103 (1972) and 16 JURY VERDICTS WEEKLY 49 (Feb, 
18, 1972) (deaths of four passengers and serious injuries to another from plane 
crash caused by defectively overhauled engine; motion for new trial granted 
on punitive damages verdict of $10,500,000) (unpublished opinion, June 7, 
1972, affd., No. 32,999, Cal. App., 1st Dist., Feb. 24, 1976, cert. denied, Sup. 
Ct. Cal. (1976)); Hayman v. Arcoa, Inc., Civil No. 70-3226 (20th Jud. Cir. 
St. Clair County, Ill., filed April 30, 1970) (injuries from accident caused by swaying 
of trailer attributable to inadequate hitch; verdict for $225,000 compensatory damages 
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An analysis of these sources reveals five types of manufacturer 
misbehavior recurring with some frequency: (1) fraudulent-type 
misconduct; (2) knowing violations of safety standards; (3) inade-
quate testing and manufacturing procedures; (4) failures to warn of 
known dangers before marketing; and ( 5) post-marketing failures 
to remedy known dangers. Each form of misconduct will be con-
sidered in tum. 
1. Fraudulent-Type Misconduct 
Several products liability cases in which punitive damages were 
recovered have involved attempts by manufacturers to conceal 
known defects from consumers. While in some circumstances the 
mere failure to warn of a known danger could be regarded as fraudu-
lent-type misconduct, the cases discussed in this section all involve 
affirmative conduct by a manufacturer designed to mislead the 
public. The phrase "fraudulent-type" is used to describe a form of 
conduct that is calculated to deceive yet may not be provable fraud 
in some jurisdictions because of the difficulties in establishing all the 
elements of the rather intricate common-law action of fraud and 
deceit.335 
An appropriate starting point is an examination of a trio of 
and $5,000,000 punitive damages, settled-amount not disclosed); Deemer v. A.H. 
Robins Co., No. C-26420 (Dist. Ct. Sedgwick County Kan., fi\ed Oct. 1972, 
appeal filed, No. 48504, Kan. Sup. Ct., Aug. 23, 1976 (defectively designed IUD 
failed to prevent pregnancy and perforated uterine wall requiring surgical removal; 
verdict for $10,000 compensatory and $75,000 punitive damages); Hawes v. General 
Motors Corp., No. 76 CP 1551 (C.P. Hampton County, S.C., filed March 12, 1976) 
(injuries in automobile accident from defective tie rod; denial of defendant's motion 
to strike punitive damages claim from strict tort cause of action) (unpublished Order, 
June 10, 1976); Brown v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., No. 13851 (C.P. Dorchester 
County, S.C., Nov. 26, 1974) (illness from ingesting contaminated beverage; jury 
reduced verdict from $10,000 to $3,500 when instructed that evidence was insufficient 
to support punitive damages verdict); Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 70-9255-L 
(193d Jud. Dist. Ct. Dallas County, Tex., Nov. 26, 1972), noted in 16 A.T.L.A.N.L. 
30 (1970) (deaths and bum injuries to occupants of ''uncrashworthy" private air-
plane; verdict for $374,332, including punitive damages of $180,000); In re Stein, 
File No. 463-718 (Milwaukee County Ct., Wis., Nov. 21, 1973) (failure to recall 
promptly contaminated intravenous fluid that caused death). See also Stumpenhorst 
v. Sterling Drug Co., No. Law 12207 (Cir. Ct. Arlington County, Va., June 16, 
1970), noted in 13 A.T.L.A.N.L. 284-85 (1970) (visual impairment from ingestion 
of Aralen due to inadequate warning of side effects; $175,000 settlement after trial 
judge allowed plaintiff to amend complaint during trial to include punitive damages 
claim). 
335. In some jurisdictions, the plaintiff must establish as many as nine separate 
elements in order to recover upon an action brought in deceit, see, e.g., O'Shields 
v. Southern Foundation Mobil Homes, Inc., 262 S.C. 276, 204 S.E.2d 50 (1974), 
and a mass of technical rules and exceptions surrounds each of these elements, see, 
e.g., Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 706-08, 60 Cal. Rptr. 
398, 410-12 (1967). See generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 139, ch. 7. 
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MER/29 cases, Toole v. Richardson-Merrell lnc.,336 Roginsky v. 
Richardson-Merrell, lnc.337 and Ostopowitz v. William S. Merrell 
Co.338 These were among the more than 1500 actions brought against 
Richardson-Merrell for the manufacture and sale of the drug 
triparanol, marketed under the trade name MER/29, between 
April 1960 and April 1962.330 MER/29 was purported to reduce 
the level of blood cholesterol to aid in the treatment of arterio-
sclerosis and thus reduce the incidence of heart attacks and strokes. 
Regardless of whether the drug actually worked, 340 it did in fact 
cause serious injury to thousands of persons.341 The most serious 
of the drug's side effects was its propensity to cause cataracts, and 
by 1967 some 490 reported cases of this condition had been 
attributed ,to use of MER/29. 342 
Punitive damages were awarded by the juries in these three 
cases because Richardson-Merrell was shown to have acted in a 
manner calculated to deceive the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), the medical profession, and consumers concerning the 
-safety of MER/29. The particularly hazardous nature of the drug 
must have been apparent to the defendant from the outset since in 
the first animal test of MER/29, conducted in 1957, all female rats 
given a high dosage of the drug died. Nevertheless, to obtain FDA 
approval of the drug and to improve its marketability within the 
medical profession, the director of the defendant's Biological Science 
336. 251 Cal. App. '2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). 
337. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967), revg. in part 254 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 
1966). 
338. N.Y.LJ., Jan. 11, 1967, at 21, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, N.Y.). 
339. See Rheingold, supra note 127, at 121. Only 11 of the 1500 MER/29 
claims resulted in jury verdicts, and 7 of the verdicts were rendered in favor of the 
plaintiffs in amounts ranging from $20,000 to $1.2 million. Id. at 133. The 3 cases 
of these 11 in which decisions were published discussing the punitive damages awards 
were Toole, Roginsky and Ostopowitz. The Toole jury awarded the plaintiff 
$175,000 general damages and $500,000 punitive damages. The trial judge remitted 
the punitive damages verdict to $250,000, and the appellate court affirmed. 251 Cal. 
App. 2d at 717, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 418. The jury in Roginsky rendered a compensatory 
damages verdict of $17,500 and punitive damages of $100,000. 254 F. Supp. at 430. 
Judge Friendly, writing for the majority in a 2-1 decision of the Second Circuit, 
affirmed the compensatory damages award but reversed the award of punitive dam-
ages. 378 F.2d at 851. The Ostopowitz jury awarded $350,000 in compensatory 
damages and $850,000 in punitive damages to the injured party and $5000 to her 
husband for loss of services. On a motion to set aside the verdict, the trial judge 
approved the compensatory damages verdict and ordered a reduction in the punitive 
damages award to $100,000. N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1967, at 21, cols. 3-4. 
340. There was some doubt that it did. See 251 Cal. App. 2d at 694, 60 Cal. 
Rptr. at 403. 
341. The trustee of the MER/29 litigation group, Paul D. Rheingold, estimates 
that the drug caused a minimum of 5000 injuries. Rheingold, supra note 127, at 121. 
342. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 701, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 408. 
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Division ordered the falsification of data in a test conducted on 
monkeys in 1959 and. actually fabricated data for a nonexistent 
monkey. In its July 1959 new drug application to the FDA, 
Richardson-Merrell included the falsified monkey data and other sig-
nificant misrepresentations, including a claim that only four of eight 
rats had died in one study when in fact all eight had died. Even 
so, the FDA still concluded that the drug appeared to be excessively 
hazardous and insisted that the manufacturer run additional tests. 
Richardson-Merrell responded with further falsifications of prior tests 
to encourage the FDA to relax its conditions. In January and 
February of 1960 the defendant completed three additional animal 
tests on rats and dogs. Nine of ten rats in one test developed eye 
opacities, as did twenty-five of thirty-six in another, and one of the 
dogs went blind. All of this information was deleted from the reports 
submitted to the FDA. Based upon the false and misleading informa-
tion in its possession, the agency granted the defendant approval to 
market the drug in April 1960.343 
From the initial marketing until sales were terminated in 1962, 
evidence mounted rapidly that MER/29 could cause eye damage 
and other harm to both test animals and humans. Despite its 
knowledge of this increasing evidence of the drug's dangerous side 
effects, Richardson-Merrell continued to advertise its product as "a 
proven drug, remarkably free from side effects, virtually non-toxic 
. . . and completely safe,"344 and assured its salesman that "[t]here 
is no longer any valid question as to its safety or lack of signifi-
cant side effects."345 Moreover, in response to inquiries from doc-
tors concerned that MER/29 might be responsible for the hair 
loss or eye problems of their patients, the company falsely claimed 
to be unaware of such side effects or similar complaints. 346 When 
urged in late 1961 by both the FDA and the British government 
to remove the drug from the market, the defendant stubbornly 
refused. It was only after the FDA seized all of the company's 
animal experiment records during an unannounced visit to Richard-
son-Merrell laboratories in April 1962 that the company finally sus-
pended sales of the drug. Permission to market the drug was for-
mally withdrawn by the FDA in May 1962 on the ground that it was 
unsafe for its intended use. 347 
343. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 695-97, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05. 
344. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 714, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416. 
345. 251 Cal. App. 2d at u99, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 406. 
346. Rheingold, supra note 127, at 119. 
347. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 700-01, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 408. 
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During the two years that 1t was on the market, MER/29 was 
administered to approximately 400,000 persons. Several thousand 
users suffered eye injuries, hair loss, and skin disorders, even though 
most of them had been taking the drug for less than three months. 
There was also evidence that most of the 400,000 users would have 
developed cataracts had they continued taking it. 348 
Had Richardson-Merrell been truthful with the FDA from the 
start, MER/29 might never have been marketed. However, this 
obviously dangerous and defective drug did reach the market and 
stay there long enough to do substantial harm because its manu-
facturer actively deceived the public. Undoubtedly Richardson-
. Merrell acted so irresponsibly because the drug promised to be 
especially profitable.349 The juries in Toole, Roginsky and Ostopowitz 
determined that this fradulent-type behavior needed to be punished 
and discouraged and so awarded large verdicts of punitive dam-
ages, 350 thus initiating the era of such awards in modem products 
liability litigation. 351 
In E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney,302 a drug company was 
again alleged to have engaged in fraudulent-type misconduct in 
order to market a product of potentially great profitability.303 The 
product in this case, "Boplant," a bone grafting material made of calf 
bone and marketed for use in humans, was used by an orthopedic 
surgeon in a grafting operation on the plaintiffs injured spine in 
1966. The plaintiffs graft ultimately failed because of an antigen-
antibody response to the implanted material that caused it to be 
encircled by fibrous membrane and "practically eaten away," thus 
necessitating its removal in 1969.354 Discouraged by many similar 
failures, the defendant had discontinued the sale of Boplant in 1966, 
shortly after the plaintiff's initial operation. A jury found the prod-
uct defective and the defendant's related promotional activities 
fraudulent, and awarded. the plaintiff $70,000 in compensatory 
348. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 701, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 408. 
349. "In its first year at large it contributed $7,000,000 to appellant's gross 
sales." 251 Cal. App. 2d at 701, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 408. "Vice President Woodward 
declared that MER/29 was ' .•. the biggest and most important drug in Merrell his-
tory .•. .'" 251 Cal. App. 2d at 700, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 407. 
350. See Rheingold, supra note 127, at 132-34 n.46. 
351. The only previous reported products liability case in which a punitive dam-
ages award had been upheld in a case involving personal injuries was Fleet v. Hollen• 
kemp, 52 Ky. 115, 13 B. Mon. 219 (1852); see note 333 supra. 
352. 274 S.2d 898 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974). 
353. Plaintifrs counsel estimated the potential market at $15 million per year, 
Appellee's Petition to Vacate Appellate Decision at 67 (1st Dist. Fla. Ct. App., filed 
Aug. 1974) [hereinafter Petition to Vacate]. 
354. 274 S.2d at 900. 
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damages and $500,000 in punitive damages, upon which judgment 
was entered.355 The appellate court reversed, however, ruling that 
the product was not defective356 and that the defendant's conduct 
was neither fraudulent nor even grossly negligent.357 
The plaintiff's evidence in Stickney358 revealed certain details of 
the defendant's conduct not mentioned in the appellate decision that 
help to account for and justify the jury's large punitive damages 
award. For example, Squibb had advertised to the medical com-
munity that "[n]o evidence of an immune response or inflammatory 
reaction was reported in any animal studies";359 that the product had 
experienced an eighty-five per cent success rate in a four-year clini-
cal study involving 452 human operations;369 that there had been "no 
clinical evidence of foreign body reaction, sensitivity or an undesir-
able immunologic response in the entire 452 operations";361 and that 
Boplant was as satisfactory as autogenous bone taken from other 
areas of a patient's body.3112 The plaintiff's evidence persuasively 
demonstrated, however, that these representations were based upon 
grossly manipulated test procedures and interpretations. For ex-
ample, an experimenter for Squibb testified he had "rigged" the 
company's transplant studies· on dogs so that "he would have gotten 
'success' even if he ·had used nothing at all, or even if he used plaster 
of paris instead of Boplant."363 Further evidence contrary to 
Squibb's representations revealed that patients in many of the 452 
operations studied experienced substantial adverse reactions to the 
implanted material, 3114 and that the results in only nineteen per cent 
of the operations justified claims that Boplant had been successfully 
grafted to the patient's bone.8611 • 
355. 274 S.2d at 900. 
356. 274 S.2d at 906-07. 
357. 274 S.2d at 907. 
358. The representations concerning the plaintifrs evidence are based upon the 
Petition to Vacate. The facts in this case and in many of the cases that follow 
are stated as they have been represented by plaintifrs counsel, either in pleadings 
and briefs filed with a court or in letters sent and questionnaires returned to the 
author. 
359. Petition to Vacate at 7. 
360. Id. at 8-9. However, the court refers to a clinical success rate in excess 
of 90 per cent in a study involving 400 patients. 274 S.2d at 901. 
361. Petition to Vacate at 9. 
362. 274 S.2d at 906. The defendant also represented in both the Physician's 
Desk Reference and the drug data package insert that "no sensitization reactions 
have been reported in its use." Petition to Vacate at 40. 
363. Petition to Vacate at 8. 
364. Petition to Vacate at 37 (reactions including drop in blood pressure, shock, 
cardiac collapse, swelling at graft site and unexplained disappearance of graft itself). 
365. Id. 
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Furthermore, after Squibb's initial study, independent research 
by the United States Navy Bone Bank, the Naval Medical Research 
Laboratories, and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology concluded 
that "50% of the Boplant specimens demonstrated unacceptable 
reaction .... "366 In addition, a team of four orthopedic physicians 
from one medical school published a study indicating that Boplant 
was the least satisfactory of all nine substitute bone graft materials 
they had tested, that failures were experienced in ninety per cent 
of the cases in which Boplant was used, and "that its performance 
approximated [that of] their controls where nothing was used in the 
empty bone gaps."367 The plaintiff further demonstrated that 
Squibb had been informed by a leading bone transplant specialist 
at the beginning of the Boplant project that its testing methods and 
criteria were unreliable.368 Finally, the plaintiff proved that by the 
time the product was removed from the market in 1966, Squibb had 
received more than 1000 complaints from physicians around the 
country.369 It was upon this evidence of manufactured animal test 
results and seriously misleading human test interpretations that the 
jury awarded punitive damages. 
The MER/29 cases, Stickney, and other products liability cases 
involving fraudulent-type misconduct by manufacturers all reveal a 
particularly serious form of misbehavior: a conscious and active 
effort to conceal a product danger that the manufacturer knows 
presents a substantial risk of injury. Consumers are entitled to 
assume that they are not being intentionally decieved by manufac-
turers concerning the safety of their products. When a plaintiff can 
attribute his injury to a manufacturer's intentionally deceptive prac-
tices, an award of punitive damages is highly appropriate. 
Institutional "fraud" of this type, however, will often be particu-
larly difficult for a plaintiff to uncover and to prove.370 The jury 
must therefore be given considerable latitude in determining 
366. Id. at 69. 
367. Id. at 65-66. "In essence, Boplant was found by them to be worth-
less . . . ." Id. at 66. 
368. Id. at 71. 
369. Id. at 69. This evidence contradicted the finding in the appellate decision 
that Squibb received a total of approximately 150 complaints. See 274 S.2d at 902. 
370. The difficulty in proving this type of institutional "fraud" is mitigated some-
what, however, by the fact that the manufacturer's conduct in such cases will often 
reflect in addition a reckless failure to test, redesign, warn, or recall. This type 
of misconduct will usually be easier to prove and may also support a punitive dam-
ages award. For example, prior to its fraudulent-type activities, Richardson-Merrell's 
initial misconduct concerning MER/29 was its failure to run additional tests to dis-
cover the nature and severity of the hazard once early tests had revealed adverse 
reactions produced by the drug. 
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whether a manufacturer's marketing conduct, when viewed as a 
whole, demonstrates a conscious attempt to conceal a product's 
dangers from consumers. Punitive damages have long been 
awarded in cases in which a defendant's fraudulent misbehavior has 
caused financial loss to the plaintiff. 371 Surely cases in which a 
manufacturer causes personal injury to consumers ought to be treated 
similarly. 
2. Knowing Violations of Safety Standards 
Thousands of standards prescribing minimally acceptable safety 
characteristics for many types of products have been issued by vari-
ous legislatures, regulatory agencies and private organizations.372 
Sometimes a plaintiff is able to establish that he was injured by a 
product marketed in violation of such a standard and that his injury 
might have been averted had the standard been followed. 373 If the 
plaintiff can further demonstrate that the manufacturer knew that its 
product failed to meet the requirements of a particular safety stand-
ard, yet marketed it anyway, an inference may be raised that the 
manufacturer acted in conscious disregard of the product's defective 
condition. In this way a manufacturer's knowing violation of a safety 
standard has figured prominently in several cases in which juries have 
assessed punitive damages verdicts. 
One case involving a breach of a safety regulation promulgated 
by a federal agency is Rosendin v. Avco Lycoming Div.,374 a consoli-
371. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Gunn, 234 Ala. 598, 176 S. 332 (1937); Mc-
Aroy v. Wright, 25 Ind. 22 (1865); Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 
497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1961 ). 
372. The federal government and every state with the possible exception of Utah 
have statutes regulating product safety. See E. ScHWARTZ, HAZARDOUS PRODUCTS 
LITIGATION § 2:6 (1973); 1974 U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION .ANN. 
REP. 53-56. Thousands of product safety standards have been promulgated by vari-
ous federal agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Many product safety 
standards have also been issued under the authority of various state commissions. 
Private standards-making organizations, coordinated by the American Nationai 
Standards Institute (ANSI), are responsible for many thousands of additional stand-
ards. See generally 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5.04 
(1975); D. ROBB, H. PmLO & R. GOODMAN, LAWYERS DESK REFERENCE-TEcHNICAL 
SOURCES FOR CoNDUCTING A PERSONAL INQumy ACTION chs. 17 & 18 (5th ed. 1975); 
Philo, Use of Safety Standards, Codes and Practices in Tort Litigation, 41 NOTRE 
DAME LAw. l (1965); Note, Products Liability Based upon Violation of Statutory 
Standards, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1388 (1966). 
373. See, e.g., McComish v. DeSoi, 42 NJ. 274,200 A.2d 116 (1_964). 
374. No. 202,715 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, Cal., March 8, 1972), noted 
in 15 A.T.L.A.N.L. 103 (1972), and 16 JURY VERDICTS WEEKLY 49 (Feb. 18, 1972), 
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dated action for the deaths of four persons and injuries to a fifth 
caused by the crash of an executive jet due to engine failure in 1967. 
The airplane's engine was first manufactured by the defendant in 
1957 and then "remanufactured" and resold by the defendant in 
1960 and again in 1963. On each occasion that the "remanufac-
tured" engine was resold it was ostensibly "zero timed"; the new 
owner was given a new warranty and a certificate stating that the 
engine complied with "all Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] 
regulations concerning zero timing engines."376 Strict federal regula-
tions governed the quality -of zero-timed engines represented to 
be "rebuilt"; apparently only the defendant called its reworked 
engines "remanufactured." Nevertheless, the defendant's service 
manager conceded that the 1963 resale violated existing FAA regula-
tions because the company had "remanufactured" its engines with 
secondhand parts that met only the lower tolerances permitted by 
the FAA for "overhauled" engines rather than the safer tolerances 
required for genuinely "rebuilt" zero-timed engines. The testimony 
also indicated that the defendant had ignored the regulations gov-
erning "rebuilt" engines because it considered them too stringent 
and too expensive, and that it may even have used the term 
"remanufactured" to deceive purchasers that their engines had in 
fact been "rebuilt" while avoiding the more expensive reconditioning 
required by the FAA for engines so represented. 376 Upon this evi-
dence of an intentional breach of a regulatory safety standard, 
together with some evidence of a fraudulent-type effort to mislead 
consumers, the jury awarded substantial compensatory damages to 
each plaintiff and $10.5 million in punitive damages to the sole 
survivor.377 
affd., Civil No. 32,999, Cal. Ct. App., 1st App. Dist., June 23, 1976, cert. denied, 
Sup. Ct. Cal. (1976). 
375. Brief for Plaintiffs at 11-13, Rosendin v. Avco Lycoming Div., cited note 
374 supra. "In effect, the certificate said that the engine had been remanufactured 
or rebuilt, that it could be treated as a zero-timed engine and could have a new 
record without previous operating history as provided in the [FAA] regulations." 
Id. at 13. Plaintiffs further argued that "owners and mechanics rely on these log 
book entries when an engine is rebuilt . . . and it is important whether an engine 
is zero-timed or whether it has a previous history." Id. at 14-1S. 
376. Id. at 10-12. "Lycoming adopted a semantics scheme to avoid compliance 
in a manner which constituted a fraud on the public." Id. at 5. 
377. The jury awarded approximately $2.8 million compensatory damages to-the 
representatives of the pilot and three passengers killed in the crash and approximately 
$1.1 million compensatory damages in addition to the punitive damages to the per-
manently disabled survivor. In an unpublished opinion dated June 7, 1972, the trial 
court denied the defendant's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and 
for a new trial on compensatory damages but granted its motion for a new trial 
on punitive damages, ruling that the verdict was excessive and that the plaintiffs 
had failed to establish their reliance upon the defendant's fraudulent conduct. The 
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In other cases, manufacturers have admitted intentionally ignor-
ing safety standards promulgated by private organizations. In one 
case brought against U-Haul Company and a related affiliate, the jury 
awarded $5 million in punitive damages to the plaintiff who was 
injured when her U-Haul trailer swayed into another automobile.378 
Contending that the accident was caused by the manufacturer's use 
of an inadequate trailer hitch, the plaintiff introduced evidence that 
the trailer's design precluded use with the hitch recommended for 
safe towing by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) and the 
major automobile manufacturers.379 In defense, U-Haul asserted 
that it had intentionally disregarded the SAE recommendations 
because it did not agree with them.380 Similarly, in a case involving 
an automobile that crashed when a defective tire blew out,381 Gen-
eral Motors representatives testified that their company had inten-
tionally disregarded the maximum carrying capacity standards of the 
Tire and Rim Association because they considered the standards too 
stringent. 882 
Evidence demonstrating that a manufacturer knowingly mar-
keted a product in violation of a safety standard is clearly pertinent 
to whether the factfinder should award punitive damages. How-
ever, whether such a defendant further ought to be liable for 
punitive damages as a matter of law is another question. 383 There 
is substantial initial appeal to reasoning that an intentional violation 
of a product safety standard, especially one promulgated by a legis-
lative body, that injures a consumer is ipso facto an intentional viola-
tion of the consumer's rights protected by the standard, and that 
therefore the manufacturer should automatically be liable for puni-
tive damages. This reasoning is similar to that used to justify a strict 
application of the negligence per se rule in some jurisdictions. 384 
Furthermore, a "malice per se" rule for punitive damages is to some 
decisions were affirmed on appeal. Rosendin v. Avco Lycoming Div., cited note 
314supra. 
378. Hayman v. Arcoa, Inc., Civ. No. 70-3226 (20th Jud. Cir. St. Clair County, 
III., filed April 30, 1970). 
379. Brief for Plaintiff at 20, Hayman v. Arcoa, Inc., cited note 378 supra. 
380. Id. at 11. 
381. Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 
(1968). 
382. 261 Cal. App. 2d at 238, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 311. 
383. A rule of punitive damages liability as a matter of law would conflict with 
the oft-repeated rule followed in most jurisdictions that punitive damages are always 
awarded in the jury's discretion and are never a matter of right. See note 26 supra 
and accompanying text. 
384. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 139, at § 17.6; W. PROSSER, supra 
note 31, at§ 36. 
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extent even more compelling than the negligence per se doctrine 
since liability for compensatory damages may result under the latter 
rule in a case in which the breach of the safety standard was not 
itself a negligent act, 385 whereas liability for punitive damages under 
the malice per se test would result only on proof the manufacturer 
consciously or recklessly breached a product safety standard. 
The analogy between the negligence per se rule and a malice 
per se rule weakens, however, upon closer analysis. Violation of 
a; criminal safety statute is generally considered negligence as a 
matter of law because enactment of the statute, establishing both the 
standard of conduct and criminal penalties for its violation, is in most 
cases clear evidence that the community considers the proscribed 
conduct unreasonably dangerous to some class of persons. A 
defendant's breach of such a statute can thus be viewed as a viola-
tion of an important societal standard of responsibility that may fairly 
give rise to an obligation to compensate persons injured by the 
breach. That is, liability flows from proof of the defendant's breach 
of the statute; proof that the defendant acted negligently or with due 
care is thus unnecessary and irrelevant.386 Similarly, under the 
malice per se rule postulated above, proof that a manufacturer know-
ingly breached a safety statute would be determinative of its liability 
for punitive as well as compensatory damages. Yet a manufacturer's 
decision to violate a product safety standard may be far less culpable 
than a decision to expose consumers to an unreasonable risk of harm. 
A rule imposing strict liability for punitive damages thus would be 
palpably unfair, for a manufacturer should always be permitted to 
show that its actions were innocent or at most inadvertent. 
In some cases, for example, the safety standard may be more 
stringent than is actually required for the public safety. Both U-Haul 
and General Motors made this argument in the cases discussed 
earlier.387 In other cases, a particular safety standard may be essen-
tially worthless or may even create more hazards than it elimi-
nates. 388 Punishment, and perhaps deterrence as well, seems singu-
larly inappropriate in these situations, especially if the standard was 
formulated by a private organization not authorized to act on the pub-
lic's behalf. Moreover, in many such cases, punishment and deter-
rence are achieved anyway by judgments for compensatory damages 
for which manufacturers are generally strictly liable. Although the 
385. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 139, § 17.6, at 999, 1008-09. 
386. See id. at 1009-10. But see W. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 198-99. 
387 . .See notes 378-82 supra and accompanying text. 
388. Cf. W. PRossER, supra note 31, at 200. 
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harshness of a malice per se rule could be tempered by allowing the 
defenses of justification or excuse, as in the context of negligence 
per se, the seriousness of imposing judicial punishment on a manu-
facturer in addition to compensatory damages suggests that a per se 
rule for punitive damages is inadvisable. 889 
Instead, a jury should be permitted to consider proof of an inten-
tional breach of a safety standard as evidence that the manufacturer 
marketed the product in flagrant disregard of the rights or interests 
of consumers. A number of factors should be considered in deter-
mining the weight given to such evidence in particular cases: the 
authoritativeness and expertise of the body promulgating the stand-
ard; the clarity of the standard; the defendant's certainty that the 
product as marketed violated the standard; the nature of the danger 
the standard seeks to prevent; its apparent effectiveness in averting 
such dangers; the degree of increased danger resulting from its viola-
tion; the economic and practical feasibility of complying with the 
standard; and, finally, any possible benefits that may have accrued 
to consumers from its violation. 
In Rosendin, for example, the breached federal standard was 
designed to control the quality of rebuilt aircraft engines and thus 
to prevent serious hazards to aircraft users. A breach of such a regu-
lation for the purpose of increasing the profitability of the company's 
engine overhaul operations clearly is conduct deserving of a punitive 
damages award. On the other hand, whether a jury could reasonably 
conclude that the refusal of U-Haul and General Motors to adhere 
to privately established trailer hitch recommendations and maximum 
capacity standards demonstrated a conscious disregard of the public 
safety would depend upon a closer evaluation of all the evidence. 
Proof that a manufacturer marketed a defective product knowing 
it to be violative of a product safety standard should always be highly 
relevant in determining whether the manufacturer acted in flagrant 
disregard of consumer safety. This approach is reasonable since the 
standard puts the manufacturer on notice that the particular product 
falls below a safety norm and thus may be excessively hazardous. 
If a defendant chooses to ignore this notice at the expense of 
the public safety, a punitive damages assessment may well be 
appropriate. 
3. Inadequate Testing or Quality Control 
When negligence was the predominant theory of liability for 
389. See id. at 197-201. 
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defective products, injured plaintiffs frequently claimed that the manu-
facturer failed to conduct adequate tests or inspections.300 MacPherson 
v. Buick Motor Co.391 firmly established a manufacturer's duty of 
ordinary care to consumers to search for and to remedy whatever 
unreasonable dangers might be hidden in its products. Ordinary 
care requires that the diligence of the search reflect the product's 
potential for harm. 392 The rationale behind such searches, of 
course, is that defects uncovered by tests and inspections will be 
remedied by the manufacturer prior to the marketing of the product 
so consumers will not be used as unsuspecting subjects for market-
place safety test programs.393 
The formulation of strict products liability principles for compen-
satory damages, however, shifted the crucial determination from 
whether a manufacturer had diligently searched for concealed 
defects to whether the product ·itself was marketed in a defective 
condition.394 The analysis: or punitive damages claims requires that 
attention be shifted back once again to the manufacturer's diligence 
in searching for defects in its products. The inquiry here is whether 
the manufacturer's testing and examination procedures were so 
inadequate as to manifest a flagrant indifference to the possibility 
that the product might expose consumers to unreasonable risks of 
harm. 
In Deemer v. A.H. Robins Co.,395 for example, the jury awarded 
$10,000 in compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages 
for injuries sustained when the defendant's intrauterine contracep-
tive device (IUD), the Dalkon Shield, both failed to prevent the 
390. See generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965); 1 L. FRU• 
MER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 372, at § 6.01; Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence 
of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 11 YALE L.J. 816 (1962). 
391. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
392. 217 N.Y. at 395, 111 N.E. at 1055. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 395, Comment e (1965). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, Com-
ment m (1965); 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
§ 2:14 (2d ed. 1974). 
393. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 52 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing); text at note 422 infra; Morris, Negligence in Tort Law-With Emphasis on 
Automobile Accidents and Unsound Products, 53 VA. L. REV. 899, 909 (1967) ("Per-
nicious products should be scrapped in the factory rather than dodged in the home"). 
394. But cf. Montgomery & Owen, supra note 2 at 808-09, 839. 
395. No. C-26420 (Dist. Ct. Sedgwick County, Kan., filed Oct. 1972), appeal 
filed, No. 48,504, Kan. Sup. Ct., Aug. 23, 1976. This is the first action against A.H. 
Robins for the marketing of the Dalkon Shield to go to judgment. No doubt it 
will not be the last. As of February 1976, 547 such actions had been filed against 
the company. Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 1976, at 2, col. 3. The Dalkon Shield litigation 
is thus destined to become the next MER/29-type mass disaster products liability 
litigation. 
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plaintiff's pregnancy and perforated her uterine wall, thereby re., 
quiring the device's surgical removal. The complaint alleged inad~-
quate testing and fraudulent promotion and advertising. Testi-
mony before a congressional committee investigating the cause 
of the many injuries and deaths from IUD's revealed that A. H. Robins 
had marketed the Dalkon Shield after clinically testing the product 
for a "pathetic" average insertion time of only 5.5 months.396 Con-
sidering the delicacy and importance of the human organ into which 
the device was to be inserted for extended periods, such evidence 
seems sufficient to demonstrate a flagrant disregard for consumer 
safety.a01 
Despite significant authority to the contrary, a majority of 
courts considering the issue have held manufacturers liable for 
aggravated harm resulting from a failure to design their products in 
a manner reasonably calculated to minimize likely injuries from 
foreseeable accidents.398 In Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,390 for 
example, the jury rendered a substantial punitive damages award 
against the manufacturer of a private airplane400 upon a finding 
that the defendant had been grossly negligent in failing to test the 
fuel system for "crashworthiness." The pilot had aborted a take-off 
after one of the airplane's doors· popped open, and the plane crashed 
through a fence at the end of the runway at a speed of twenty-five 
to thirty miles per hour.401 While no one was injured in the crash 
itself, the fire that soon erupted, fed by a steady stream of fuel pour- . 
ing into the cabin, burned three passengers to death and seriously 
396. Hearings on Regulation of Medical Devices (Intrauterine Contraceptive 
Devices) Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Governmental Operations 
61, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1973) (testimony of Russell J. Thomsen, M.D.). In 
addition to the inadequate testing, the company had engaged in a fraudulent-type 
promotional campaign based upon the results of the deficient tests. "rrlhe Dalkon 
Shield and its promotion provide the classic example of the misuse of statistics to 
market an item." Id. See Note, The Intrauterine Device: A Criticism of Govern-
mental Compliance and an Analysis of Manufacturer and Physician Liability, 24 
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 247, 287-90 (1975). See generally M. DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT 
LIABILITY§ 11.43 (1975). 
397. Similarly, in the MER/29 cases, Richardson-Merrell clearly had been put 
on notice that further pre-marketing testing was absolutely necessary when the results 
of its animal tests revealed that the drug might well cause damage to the user's eyes. 
398. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); 
Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N:E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973); 
Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 522 P.2d 829 (1974). 
See generally 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 372, at§ 7.01(3); Montgom-
ery & Owen, supra note 2, at 833-36. 
399. No. 70-9255-L (193d Jud. Dist. Ct. Dallas County, Tex., Nov. 26, 1972), 
noted in 16 A.T.L.A.N.L. 30 (1973). 
400. The jury awarded approximately $200,000 in compensatory and $180,000 
in punitive damages. See 16 A.T.L.A.N.L. 30 (1973). 
401. Id. 
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injured a fourth}02 Cessna was properly held liable in this case 
for compensatory damages for failing to design a "crashworthy" air-
plane. However, the jury's punitive damages award perhaps can 
be better explained by the tragic circumstances of the accident than 
by any sound determination that Cessna had flagrantly disregarded 
passenger safety. The costs and dangers of thoroughly crash-testing 
all Cessna airplanes, some models costing millions of dollars, would 
most certainly be prohibitive. Thus, the company's decision to 
rely instead upon drawing-board engineering estimates of safety per-
formance and rigorous flight-testing short of actual crashes seems 
reasonable, and, absent other evidence of disregard for passenger 
safety, does not warrant punishment beyond liability for compensatory 
damages. 
On the other hand, when a particular product can be economi-
cally crash-tested, the .manufacturer's failure to do so may well · 
demonstrate a flagrant disregard for public safety. Thus, in Sabich 
v. Outboard Marine Corp.,408 a passenger on a "trackster" snow 
vehicle manufactured by the defendant was seriously injured when 
the vehicle traversed a rock and rolled over while descending a slope 
varying in grade from twenty-four to thirty-eight degrees. Despite 
promotional representations that the vehicle could be operated on 
slopes of up to forty-five degrees and that it would run smoothly over 
rocks and stones, the manufacturer admitted that it had never tested 
the trackster on inclines to determine the point at which the vehicle 
would overturn. 404 Accordingly, the jury awarded large compensa-
tory damages and more than $1 million in punitive damages. 4011 The 
punitive damages award in this case appears appropriate in view of 
the manufacturer's reckless failure to subject its potentially lethal yet 
relatively inexpensive product to simple crash-testing, and its mis-
representations of the vehicle's performance capabilities-represen-
402. See Second Amended Original Petition of Joyce Smith at 2-3, Smith v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., cited note 399 supra. 
403. 60 Cal. App. 3d 591, 131 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1976). 
404. Letter from plaintiff's attorney, Daniel E. Wilcoxen, to David G. Owen, 
July 16, 1975. 
405. The jury returned a verdict for $600,000 compensatory and $1,254,000 puni-
tive damages. 60 Cal. App. 3d at -, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 705. On appeal, the court 
emphasized that the defendant had knowlngly designed the vehicle to climb slopes 
steeper than those that it could descend, as well as the defendant's failure to warn 
consumers adequately of this hazard. 60 Cal. App. 3d at-, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 707-
09. The court nevertheless reversed the punitive damages award because of the trial 
court's erroneous instruction on the burden of proof required to sustain the underly-
ing fraud cause of action. 60 Cal. App. 3d at-, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 709-11. See note 
443 infra. 
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tations calculated to deceive consumers who would naturally assume 
there was a reasonable basis to support them. 406 
In another recent case, settled prior to trial, the four-year-old plain-
tiff was seriously injured when her nightgown caught fire and burned 
quickly and intensely. Tlie -defendant manufacturer of children's 
clothing admitted that, despite its knowledge of a large number of 
similar injuries and deaths occasioned by flammable fabrics, 407 it had 
nevertheless selected and used the fabrics in the nightgown without 
regard to flammability408 and had further failed to subject them to 
any meaningful tests. 409 A punitive damages verdict might have 
been appropriate in this case because of the manufacturer's appar-
ently flagrant indifference to consumer safety.410 
Besides the hidden dangers in a product's design that may be 
discovered by testing prototypes, physical flaws in individual products 
may crop up at various points in the manufacturing process. 411 The 
effectiveness of a manufacturer's quality control procedures will 
determine both the type and number of flaws permitted to remain 
in a product line.412 A manufacturer may make an erroneous risk-
benefit judgment by spending too little for quality control in view 
of the injuries likely to result. The manufacturer would then be 
liable in negligence for any actual injuries to consumers resulting from 
its erroneous decision.413 On occasion, however, a manufacturer may 
fail to establish adequate quality control procedures in flagrant dis-
regard of the possibility that consumers may be excessively injured as a 
406. Domich v. Jee's Juvenile Shop, No. 225782 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, 
Cal., filed Aug. 28, 1972). The case was settled prior to trial for $458,500. See 
Sacramento Bee, Aug. 28, 1975, § B, at 2, col. 3. 
407. Brief for Plaintiff at 10, Domich v. Jee's Juvenile Shop, cited note 406 supra. 
408. Id. at 2, 11. 
409. See id. at 5°6, 11-13. 
410. In this section, it is assumed that the excessive hazard present in the product, 
which resulted either from defective design or production processes, is in fact 
hidden from the manufacturer. In some cases, however, the manufacturer will design 
a product in a manner that it knows will expose consumers to an excessive risk of 
harm. For example, in Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976), discussed in notes 474-80 infra and accom-
panying text, the Project Manager "admitted at trial that at the time that he 
designed the transformer he had anticipated that it might catch fire in customers' 
homes." 523 F.2d at 105. The conduct in this type of case may be characterized 
as the design of a product in conscious disregard of a serious risk to consumers. 
This of course is substantially more culpable than a manufacturer's reckless failure 
to discover a product hazard, the more typical form of misbehavior that may also 
appropriately support a punitive damages judgment. 
411. See G. PETERS, supra note 235, at 59-60. 
412. See Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, supra note 50, at 447; note 236 
supra and accompanying text. 
413. See generally 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 372, at§ 6.01[1]. 
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result.414 If a consumer is injured as a consequence of this sort of 
quality control misbehavior, punitive damages would be in order. 
Juries have awarded punitive damages in several reported cases 
involving impure drugs, food, and beverages that were marketed as a 
result of inadequate quality control, but these have all been overturned 
by the trial or appellate court for inadequate evidence of reckless 
or intentional misconduct.415 In one unreported case of this type,416 
the jury tentatively decided417 to assess a local Pepsi-Cola bottling 
company $6,500 in punitive damages when the plaintiff became ill 
after drinking from a bottle of Pepsi-Cola that contained a rusty nail. 
The jury had heard evidence on the frequency with which the bottle-
cleaning solution and brushes were changed, and the manager of the 
bottling plant had admitted that an electronic scanning device, equip-
ment the defendant did not own, would have detected the.rusty nail. 
The trial judge, however, instructed the jury that punitive damages 
could not be awarded because the plaintiff had not shown that the 
defendant knew the nail was in the bottle or had intended to harm 
the plaintiff. 418 This instruction reflects a very narrow view of the 
conduct for which punitive damages may be awarded. Instead, the 
jury should probably have been allowed to determine from all the 
evidence whether the manufacturer's purity control procedures 
demonstrated a reckless disregard of consumer safety.410 Particu-
larly compelling evidence under this standard would be the manufac-
turer's failure to make relatively inexpensive quality control improve-
ments after learning that existing procedures were inadequately 
detecting impure products that were causing consumers substantial 
harm.420 
The manufacturer alone has the ability to screen out many 
product hazar~s that are hidden from the consumer.421 A plaintiff 
414. For example, to cut costs, a manufacturer may choose to omit a finishing 
process and then structure its "quality" control procedure to let such "unfinished" 
products through. Costs will indeed be cut; so too may be the fingers and hands 
of thousands of consumers whose injuries will rarely be serious enough to make liti-
gation economically feasible unless punitive damages are recoverable. 
415. See, e.g., Perry v. Kelford Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 196 N.C. 690, 146 S.E. 
805 (1929); Crews v. Sikeston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 240 Mo. App. 993, 225 S,E, 
2d 812 (1949). 
416. Brown v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., No. 13,851 (C.P., Dorchester County, 
S.C., Nov. 26, 1974). 
417. See note 203 supra and accompanying text. 
418. Letter from Reese I. Joye, Jr., to David G. Owen, July 16, 1975. 
419. See notes 29-34 supra and accompanying text. 
420. See notes 458-94 infra and accompanying text. 
421. See note 1 supra and accompanying text. 
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who can successfully attribute his injuries to prototype testing or 
quality control procedures so grossly inadequate in view of the 
known risks as to constitute a reckless indifference to the public 
safety should be permitted to recover punitive damages. 
4. Failure to Warn of Known Dangers 
The assumption underlying the requirement that a manufacturer 
test the design of its products is that the manufacturer will take what-
ever steps are reasonably necessary to correct or to minimize hazards 
discovered by such tests. For example, if initial tests identify a 
potential defect, further tests may be required to determine the 
nature and extent of the danger presented.422 Ideally, such tests 
would reveal whether the product needs to be redesigned or merely 
labelled with a suitable warning to help reduce the particular risk. 423 
In a fairly large proportion of the cases studied, punitive damages 
claims were based at least in part on a theory that the manufacturer 
had recklessly failed to warn consumers adequately of a known and 
serious hazard in its product. 
Consumers themselves can often most efficiently monitor the 
safety performance of products inclined to develop dangerous weak-
nesses during their useful lives, and manufacturers of such products 
thus should be allowed to shift this responsibility to them. However, 
when a manufacturer delegates this responsibility, it should also 
inform users of the procedures necessary to test the product for 
developing failures. This is particularly true when the product is 
as complex and potentially dangerous as an airplane. In Engebreth 
v. Fairchild Hiller Corp.,424 for example, the defendant manufacturer 
of the F-27 aircraft had been informed by its designer of tests in 
which fatigue cracking of the outer wing had caused catastrophic 
wing failures. 425 Claims for compensatory and punitive damages 
were brought against the defendant for the wrongful deaths of four 
persons killed when a~ in-flight wing failure of this type resulted in 
a crash. Perhaps the most serious allegation of misconduct was Fair-
child's failure to provide information and assistance necessary to 
enable owners properly to inspect wing surfaces periodically for 
422. See note 393 supra and accompanying text. 
423. See generally Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse 
of Warnings in Product Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 COR-
NELL L. REV. 495 (1976). 
424. No. A-9-71 (D. Alas., filed Jan. 18, 1971). 
425. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judg-
ment 2-4, Engebreth v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., cited note 424 supra. 
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developing fatigue cracks. The defendant admitted that an owner-
inspection process was necessary to help prevent catastrophic wing 
failure; that accordingly it had assured the FAA that Fairchild would 
instruct and assist F-27 owners in establishing proper X-ray structural 
inspection programs; and that the aircraft's owner had specifically 
informed Fairchild that his employees were "not very experienced 
at reading X-rays."426 Nevertheless, Fairchild failed to so instruct 
owners until after the accident, 427 and there was even some evidence 
that Fairchild had used a particular X-ray technique because it tended 
to conceal the full extent of fatigue cracking in the wing. 428 In fact, 
the revised inspection program ordered by the FAA after the crash 
revealed serious fatigue cracking in the wings of at least nine of 
the first sixty-five F-27s sold.420 Most of this evidence was admitted 
by the defendant and, after the trial judge had ruled that the punitive 
damages claim was proper, 430 the case was settled prior to trial for 
more than $2 million. This large settlement probably reflected the 
likelihood of a large punitive damages award. 431 
In several cases that have proceeded to trial, juries have returned 
punitive damages verdicts for a manufacturer's reckless failure to 
warn adequately of a serious known defect in the product. One such 
case, Johnson v. Husky Industries, lnc.,4a2 was an action for the 
wrongful death of a family of four by asphyxiation from carbon 
monoxide fumes emitted by charcoal briquets that the defendant had 
manufactured and packaged. The only warning on the bag of 
briquets stated: "CAUTION-FOR INDO,OR USE-COOK ONLY 
IN PROPERLY VENTILATED AREAS." The plaintiffs con-
tended that before the bag of briquets at issue was marketed, Husky 
had learned that its product could be lethal when used indoors with-
out sufficient ventilation. 433 Finding that the failure to provide an 
426. Id. at 7. 
427. Id. at 8. 
428. Id. at 9. 
429. Id. 
430. Unpublished Memorandum and Order, Engebreth v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 
cited note 424 supra, Nov. 20, 1972. 
431. One plaintiff recovered $760,000, two recovered $600,000 apiece, and the 
fourth recovered $110,000 for a total settlement of $2,070,000. Id. The plaintiffs' 
lawyer speculated that the case would have been settled for "at least $750,000 to 
$1,000,000 less had it not been for the punitive damages question or the case might 
have gone to trial." Letter from Bernard P. Kelly, attorney for plaintiffs, to David 
G. Owen, June 24, 1975. 
432. - F.2d - (6th Cir. 1976). See note 445 infra for another case against 
Husky on similar facts. 
433. An officer of the defendant testified that he knew of the general risk prior 
to the accident. On appeal, however, the court ruled that the evidence was insuffi-
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adequate warning was grossly negligent under these circumstances, 
the jury found for the plaintiffs on both compensatory and punitive 
damages claims. 484 
A comparison of two unrelated wrongful death actions against 
Beech Aircraft Corporation, 485 both involving claims that the manu-
facturer had recklessly failed to warn of a known danger, may further 
assist in determining when a failure to warn warrants a punitive dam-
ages award. In both cases the persons were killed or injured when 
a Beech Baron aircraft crashed after engine failure caused by fuel 
starvation. Beech Aircraft knew from a March 13, 1968, test report 
that a defect in the aircraft's fuel system design would cause fuel 
starvation ("unporting")486 if the aircraft engaged in certain maneu-
vers when its fuel level was low.487 The plane involved in Pease 
v. Beech Aircraft Corp.488 crashed on June 25, 1968, before its 
owner had been warned of the defect. The plaintiffs brought their 
action in fraud, and the jury awarded them substantial compensatory 
and punitive damages.439 The plane in Kritser v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp.440 crashed on October 25, 1968, after the defendant had 
added the following warning to its flight manual: "Flight Operation 
'CAUTION' To prevent fuel flow interruption, avoid prolonged 
operation in a slip or skid attitude under low fuel conditions."441 The 
jury awarded compensatory damages after finding that the warning 
was inadequate to protect the plaintiff pilot who had unsuccessfully 
cient to establish the requisite culpability for punitive damages, due in part to the 
weakness of the plaintiff's proof of earlier successful lawsuits against the defendant 
based on the same hazard. - F.2d ,at -. See note 445 infra. 
434. The total verdict was for $'425,000, which was divided equally between com-
pensatory and punitive damages. 'The trial ·court's denial of the defendant's motion 
for j.n.o.v. or for a new trial was reversed by the Sixth Circuit as to punitive damages 
and affirmed as to compensatory damages. - F.2d at -. 
435. Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973 ), and Pease 
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974). 
436. 38 Cat. App. 3d at 459, 113 Cat. Rptr. at 421. See also 419 F.2d at 1091. 
437. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 458, 113 Cat. Rptr. at 421-22. 
438. 38 Cat. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974). 
439. The trial judge, however, subsequently ordered a new trial on the punitive 
damages issue on grounds unrelated to the conduct of the defendant. The court held, 
first, that the representatives of the four persons killed in the crash could not recover 
punitive damages because the legislative history behind California's· wrongful death 
act precluded awards in such cases. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 459-62, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 
422-24. Secondly, the court upheld the trial court's order granting a new trial on 
the jury award of $3,450,000 in punitive damages made to the owner of the airplane, 
also a plaintiff in the action against Beech, because of an erroneous jury instruction 
on the elements required to sustain an action in fraud. Specifically, the element 
of reliance was omitted from the charge. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 462-65, 113 Cal. Rptr. 
424-26. See note 443 infra. 
440. 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973). 
441. 479 F.2d at 1094. 
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attempted to heed it. The trial judge, however, held that there was 
no evidence of gross negligence and thus withdrew the punitive dam-
ages claim from the jury.442 
The fact situations in Pease, Kritser and Johnson all pose the 
same fundamental question: did the defendant's failure to warn con-
sumers exhibit such a flagrant disregard for their safety that punitive 
damages should be assessed? Had the plaintiffs in Pease relied on 
a general theory of reckless failure to warn of a known danger, 
instead of on fraud, the jury would have been required to determine 
whether Beech's failure to warn owners more promptly of a defect 
in its aircraft amounted to a flagrant disregard for their safety.448 In 
442. In affirming, the circuit court reasoned: 
[I1he jury determined that Beech Aircraft gave Kritser notice of fuel displace-
ment under some circumstances and warned him against prolonged slips. The 
fact that the company took such steps to inform Kritser of potential danger 
absolved Beech Aircraft of liability only for punitive but not compensatory dam-
ages. The defendant did not exhibit the conscious indifference toward the pub-
lic which generally typifies gross negligence, . . . and there is no evidence that 
it committed any wilful act or omission. 
479 F.2d at 1097 (footnote omitted). 
443. In most cases in which the plaintiff can establish a fraudulent attempt by 
the manufacturer to mislead the public concerning a material product hazard, the 
plaintiff should also be in a position to establish that the defendant failed to warn 
the public in reckless disregard of the presence of the hazard in the product. The 
plaintiffs in Pease were somewhat restricted, however, by the language of the Califor-
nia statute that permits punitive damages awards only "where the defendant has been 
guilty of oppression, fraud or malice •.. .'' CAL. C1v. CODE ANN. § 3294 (1970). 
Some courts have construed the statutory words "oppression" and "malice" narrowly 
to exclude "reckless" or ''wanton" misconduct. See, e.g., G.D. Searle & Co, v. Supe• 
rior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975); note 505 infra. But see 
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967), 
The plaintiffs in Pease thus may have felt compelled to base their punitive damages 
claim upon an allegation of fraud. This was rather unfortunate for the airplane 
owner in Pease, since the judge neglected to charge the jury on the element of reli-
ance. See also Sabich v. Outboard Marine Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 590, 131 Cal. 
Rptr. 703 (1976). 
A general requirement in products liability litigation that would restrict punitive 
damages awards to cases in which there has been provable fraud not only would 
be doctrinally unsound but also would give rise to significant and unnecessary diffi-
culties. In some cases, a plaintiff will be able to trace his injury to a defect in 
a product that was kept on the market in a defective condition only because of the 
manufacturer's success in misleading the public concerning the product's safety. 
Many such plaintiffs, however, will be unable to point to any specific act of fraudu-
lent-type behavior on which they relied to their detriment and thus will fail if they 
base their claims upon the traditional theory of fraud and deceit. If, on the other 
hand, these plaintiffs were allowed to proceed on a theory of reckless failure to warn, 
they would be entitled under modem principles to a presumption that they would 
have read and heeded the warning. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 
1264, 1281-82 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Nissen Trampo• 
line Co. v. Terre Haute First Natl. Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826-27 (Ind. App. 1975), 
This is the better result. While the manufacturer in this type of case may not intend 
to mislead specific consumers by its fraudulent-type conduct, the deceitful conduct 
very probably is intended to mislead some persons in order to keep the product on 
the market in a condition that it knows will expose all consumers to an excessive 
risk of harm. Cf. Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 534 P.2d 577, 120 Cal. Rptr. 
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Kritser and Johnson, on the other hand, scrutiny should properly 
have focused on whether the inadequacy of the warning actually 
given exhibited such a disregard for consumer safety. Assuming the 
evidence in Johnson was sufficient for the jury to find that Husky 
knew of the risk of asphyxiation, H 4 the trial court was probably cor-
rect in allowing the jury to find as reckless, if not conscious, miscon-
duct the defendant's failure to convey in its warning any notion of 
the actual extent or nature of the danger presented.445 Kritser, how-
ever, is a more difficult case. The warning did indicate in general 
terms the true nature of the risk, but the conditions of operation that 
would trigger a failure were described so vaguely that some pilots 
might be unable to put the information to practical use. While it 
could be argued that the warning was so vague as to show a reckless 
indifference to the safety of aircraft owners, it could also be argued 
that the manufacturer expected the warning to be read by experi-
enced pilots who would appreciate the nature and seriousness of the 
danger. It thus may have appeared to the trial judge that the 
defendant showed at least the rudiments of a good faith attempt to 
warn consumers adequately, and from this perspective the court was 
probably correct in withdrawing the punitive damages claim from the 
jury. 
Warnings may be inadequate not only in substance but also in 
the manner in which they are communicated. Even -the best of 
warnings will be worthless unless certain conditions are met: first, 
the warning must be likely to reach the consumer or someone who 
will act on his behalf; second, it must be transmitted in a way likely 
to attract his attention; and, third, it must be in a form that he is likely 
to understand. 
681 (1975); Phillips, Product Misrepresentation and the Doctrine of Causation, 2 
HOFSTRA L. RBv. 561, 563-65 (1974). Perhaps the reliance of some can fairly be 
imputed to all. Alternatively, all consumers could be said to rely upon an implicit 
representation of product manufacturers that all necessary warnings have been sup-
plied and that when product defects are discovered they will not be deceitfully cov-
ered up. Cf. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 
(1969); Shapo, supra note 169, at 1367-68. See also R. NORDSTROM, LAw OF SALES 
209 (1970) ("The court's task is to determine whether that injury was caused by 
a defect in the product, and any statements made by the seller designed to induce 
the public to buy his product are relevant in making this determination. . . . The 
'basis of the bargain' is also the item purchased, and a part of that bargain includes 
the statements which the seller made about what he sold"). 
444. See note 433 supra. 
445. See Hill v. Husky Briquetting, Inc., 54 Mich. App. 17, 220 N.W.2d 137, 
affd., 393 Mich. 136, 223 N.W.2d 290 (1974) (reversing a directed verdict for the 
defendant in a similar case involving a death and an injury claimed to have been 
attributable to the inadequacy of the warning provided by Husky on its bags of char-
coal briquettes). 
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Illustrative is Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, lnc.,448 in which an 
action was brought against a drug manufacturer for eye injuries 
attributable to the use of chloroquine phosphate, a prescription drug 
marketed under the trade name "Aralen." The plaintif rs claim for 
punitive damages was based on allegations that the manufacturer had 
inadequately warned the FDA and the medical profession that the 
drug could cause retinal damage. 447 Sterling Drug showed in 
defense that once it learned of the danger its salespersons warned 
physicians by mailing or personally delivering product cards and pro-
motional brochures containing the necessary warning. Nevertheless, 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the district court's 
refusal to submit the punitive damages claim to the jury and 
remanded on that issue, 448 holding that the manufacturer's duty "was 
to warn of retinal damage in a manner which could be expected to 
alert the medical profession."449 Pointing to evidence that many 
physicians pay little attention to comments of drug company salesper-
sons or to promotional literature received in the mail, the court stated 
that a drug manufacturer "must be charged with knowledge of the 
workings of the distribution system" it selects to convey its warnings 
to the medical community.450 The court concluded that on these 
facts a jury could properly find that Sterling's "failure to take action 
reasonably calculated to warn physicians of a risk of great magnitude 
446. 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973 ). 
447. 485 F.2d at 144-45 n.41. 
448. 485 F.2d at 147. 
449. 485 F.2d at 146-47. 
450. 485 F.2d at 146. The court suggested by way of example that in this case 
an adequate warning should have been included at an earlier date in the Physician's 
Desk Reference or in "Drug Precaution" letters individually sent to physicians. 485 
F.2d at 147. It is noteworthy that the court "charges" the defendant with knowledge 
that may be used in partial support of a punitive damages award. There are some 
undeniable overtones of strict accountability in this phraseology, and the thrust of 
the statement may be that the failure of a manufacturer to have knowledge of the 
workings of its distribution system will automatically be deemed to be a reckless 
omission when the proper operation of the system is necessary to prevent the public 
from being exposed to a hazard known to exist in the product. 
Despite the novelty of "charging" a defendant with knowledge of its business 
in the punitive damages context, and it may indeed be proper in this context, the 
principle is an accepted one in products liability law involving claims for compensa-
tory damages. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1277 (5th 
Cir. 1974); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 139, at 1541; Noel, supra note 
390, at 847-55. This principle was noted in the first reported products liability case 
awarding punitive damages. Fleet v. Hollenkemp, 52 Ky. 115, 182, 13 B. Mon. 219, 
228 (1852). Rather than "charging" a defendant with knowledge of his business, 
perhaps the same result could be achieved more comfortably in punitive damages 
litigation by utilizing an evidentiary presumption that product manufacturers under-
stand the nature of their particular callings. 
June 1976] Punitive Damages 1351 
was in reckless disregard of the public's health" and that a jury thus 
would have grounds for a punitive damages award.451 
Finally,_ there are cases in which a substantively adequate warn-
ing is properly conveyed to a consumer who comprehends the risk 
but is nevertheless incapable of taking practical steps to reduce it. 
Judicial opinions in such cases often discuss the sufficiency of the 
warning; however, these cases are more properly analyzed by focus-
ing on the adequacy of the product's design. The latter approach 
is more appropriate because the obligation to warn arises only when 
a warning could in some way help to reduce the risk of harm. Thus, 
if a warning cannot adequately protect consumers, and if a product 
can reasonably be redesigned to reduce the risk, •the warning no 
matter how complete is hardly "adequate" to remedy an unreason-
able risk of harm. 452 
In Moore v. Jewell Tea Co.,458 for example, the plaintiff 
sustained eye injuries when a can of "Drano" drain-cleaner exploded 
on the counter as she was preparing to use it. The court upheld 
a jury award of punitive damages against the manufacturer primarily 
on the ground that it had failed to warn consumers of a known and 
serious risk of harm. 454 Yet the defendant's failure to warn consumers 
should have been irrelevant to a determination of liability for either 
punitive or compensatory damages. Perhaps the plaintiff could have 
worn goggles to protect herself had she in fact been warned, but clearly 
it would be unreasonable to expect her to do so. Since even a com-
plete warning in this case would have been inadequate to protect 
the plaintiff, the inquiry for both compensatory and punitive damages 
liability should have focused exclusively on the adequacy of the 
design and testing of the Drano container.455 
It is axiomatic that a manufacturer owes a duty to consumers to 
451. 485 F.2d at 147. After five weeks of retrial the case was settled for 
$600,000, see 18 A.T.L.A.N.L. 120 (1975), $163,000 in excess of the original verdict 
for compensatory damages. See 485 F.2d at 135. Several pretrial matters on the 
remand of the case are reported in 374 F. Supp. 850 (M.D. Pa. 1974). 
452. See generally Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 423, at 
501-05, 517-21. 
453. 116 III. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), affd., 46 III. 2d 288, 263 
N.E.2d 103 (1970) (no discussion of punitive damages issue in Supreme Court opin-
ion). 
454. 116 III. App. 2d at 136-37, 253 N.E.2d at 649 (jury award of $920,000 in 
compensatory damages to plaintiff and her husband and $10,000" in punitive damages 
to plaintiff). 
455. In fact, in addition to the failure of the manufacturer to warn of the dan• 
ger, an important basis for the court's decision sustaining the punitive damages ver-
dict was the defendant's failure to test the container to determine whether it could 
safely contain the cleaning substance that it knew to be potentially explosive. 116 
III. App. 2d at 136, 253 N.E.2d at 649. 
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warn them adequately of hidden dangers in its products.460 H the 
manufacturer knows of a danger and is able to convey this informa-
tion effectively to consumers at reasonable expense, the failure to 
take such action may evidence a flagrant indifference to public 
safety. Punitive damages may then be appropriate. Moreover, if 
a manufacturer consciously withholds information of a substantial 
hazard from consumers to protect its general reputation and its 
marketing of the product, 457 a punitive damages assessment would 
appear necessary both to punish the defendant and to make it clear 
that such behavior will be neither tolerated by society nor profitable 
for the manufacturer. 
5. Post-Marketing Failures to Remedy Known Dangers 
The discussion to this point has primarily considered whether it 
is proper to characterize as flagrant misconduct a manufacturer's 
decision to market a product it knows is likely to be excessively 
dangerous.458 Occasionally, however, a manufacturer learns that its 
product is likely to be defective only after the product has reached 
consumers. TJ:iese cases raise two questions: first, whether the 
manufacturer is under any legal duty to remedy defects in its 
products that are already in use; and, second, if there is such a duty, 
under what circumstances its breach should give rise to a claim for 
punitive damages. 
Although a manufacturer's post-sale responsibilities to consumers 
have yet to be clearly defined, several courts have enunciated a rule 
requiring manufacturers to take "all reasonable means" to remedy 
defects discovered in products already marketed. 4119 This rule was 
456. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ _388, 402A, comment j 
(1965); 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 372, at § 8; Dillard & Hart, Prod-
uct Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty To Warn, 41 VA. L. REV. 145 (1955); 
Kidwell, The Duty to Warn: A Description of the Model of Decision, 53 TEXAS 
L. REv. 1375 (1975); Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions 
or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 264-67 (1969); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Pieh-
ler, supra note 423. 
451. See notes 181-84 supra and accompanying text; notes 478, 489-90 infra and 
accompanying text. 
458. Alternatively, the manufacturer's marketing decision might reflect a con-
scious disregard for consumer safety where the manufacturer simply has no knowl-
edge of whether the product might be unduly hazardous due to the gross inadequacies 
in its testing or inspection procedures. See notes 390-421 supra and accompanying 
text. 
459. Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959), 
is apparently the progenitor of the rule. Accord, Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtis-
Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969); Noel v. 
United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1965). See also Balido v. Improved 
Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 2d 644, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973); Patterson, Products 
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applied in Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,460 which 
involved a claim against the manufacturer of an aircraft engine for 
compensatory damages resulting from a crash that occurred when 
overheating caused a cylinder to fail and to separate from the engine. 
The plaintiffs claimed the defendant learned of the design defect 
nearly eight months before the crash yet had failed to take effective 
remedial action. In reversing the trial court's directed verdict for 
the defendant on the negligence claims, the Second Circuit articu-
lated the nature of a manufacturer's post-sale duties to consumers: 
"It is clear that after such a product has been sold and dangerous 
defects in design have come to the manufacturer's attention, the · 
manufacturer has a duty either to remedy these or, if complete 
remedy is not feasible, at least to give users adequate warnings and 
instructions concerning methods for minimizing the danger."461 
Defining liability for compeµsatory damages in these terms raises 
a problem in determining what additional culpability is needed to 
support a claim for punitive damages in a post-marketing case. That 
is, according to the Braniff Airways test, the misconduct that must 
be proved to recover compensatory damages-failing to remedy a 
known and reasonably curable defect-is very similar to the kind of 
misconduct usually sufficient for punitive damages in the pre-sale 
cases. 462 The primary problem, then, is whether there is any differ-
ence in post-sale cases between the standard of liability for compensa-
tory damages and that for punitive damages. A corollary problem 
is whether punitive damages may be awarded at all in such cases. 
A solution is to assume that the Braniff Airways court simply 
articulated a test for compensatory damages liability in terms that 
reflected the facts of the case and did not even consider whether 
punitive damages may in fact have been appropriate. The court 
most likely was neither attempting to exclude manufacturers less cul-
pable than the defendant from post-sale liability for compensatory 
damages nor to rule out liability for punitive damages in all post-
sale cases. This interpretation would be the most desirable since 
it would permit a manufacturer to be held answerable in negligence 
for compensatory damages if it did not know, but should have known, 
that its marketed product contained a defect requiring remedial 
Liability: The Manufacturers Continuing Duty To Improve His Product or Warn 
of Defects After Sale, in P. RHEINGOLD & S. BIRNBAUM, PRonucr LIABILITY: LAW, 
PRACI1CE, SCIENCE (2d ed. 1975). 
460. 411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969). 
461. 411 F.2d at 453. 
462. See notes 422-57 supra and accompanying text. 
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action. 468 If the manufacturer were then shown to have learned of 
a probable defect in its marketed product, its failure to warn con-
sumers or to recall the product might justify a punitive damages 
award as well. 
The failure of a manufacturer to remedy a known defect in an 
already marketed product has been important in several products 
liability cases in which punitive damages claims have been made. 
For example, a basis for the punitive damages claim in Hoffman v. 
Sterling Drug, Inc. was the defendant's failure to warn consumers 
promptly once it learned from users of its drug that it contained a 
risk of serious side effects.464 In Deemer v. A. H. Robins Co.,40G 
the plaintiff based her punitive damages claim in part on the IUD 
manufacturer's failure to mail remedial "Dear Doctor" letters once 
it learned of the seriousness of the dangers in using the device. 400 
In Rosendin v. Avco Lycoming Div.,467 the large size of the punitive 
damages award468 can be partly explained by evidence that the com-
pany knew of similar fatigue failures in its engines yet neglected to 
recall the defective engines or even to warn owners of the danger. 400 
The plaintiffs evidence also indicated that until 1962 the defendant's 
service department had no procedure for retaining, much less analyz-
ing, complaints of engine failures;470 that the company had made no 
463. Cf. Lorenz, Some Comparative Aspects of the European Uni/ ication of the 
Law of Products Liability, 60 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 1005, 1015 (1975) ("[1be con-
sumer] may expect a manufacturer to constantly observe his products after having 
put them into the stream of commerce. In other words, the manufacturer is under 
a duty of product observation ... "). 
464. 485 F.2d 132, 145-47 (3d Cir. 1973). 
465. No. C-26420 (Dist. Ct., Sedgwick County, Kan., filed Oct. 1972), appeal 
filed, No. 48,504, Kan. Sup. Ct., Aug. 23, 1976. 
466. Pretrial Order at 4, Deemer v. A.H. Robins Co., cited note 465 supra. 
467. No. 202715 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, Cal., March 8, 1972), affd., 
No. 32,999, Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., Feb. 24, 1976, cert. denied, Sup. Ct, Cal. 
(1976). 
468. The amount of punitive damages assessed by the jury against the defendant 
was $10,500,000. 
469. See Brief for Plaintiffs at 46-52, Rosendin v. Avco Lycoming Div., cited 
note 467 supra. 
470. Id. at 46-47. The failure of manufacturers of products that are likely 
to be particularly hazardous if defective to maintain any system for receiving and 
considering product failure information from the field may well indicate a conscious 
or reckless disregard for consumer safety. The Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion proposed a rule pursuant to section 16(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 
15 U.S.C. ,§ 2065(b) (Supp. IV 1974), that would require product manufacturers 
to maintain files of consumer complaints: ''The proposal under consideration would 
require records of all consumer product safety complaints to be maintained in an 
accessible location for a period of at least five years from receipt." 39 Fed. Reg. 
31,916 (1975). "Although the proposed rule may have an effect on private products 
liability litigation, the Commission believes that the proposed rule is within its au-
thority and it believes that the benefit to be obtained from the ability to monitor 
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effort to solicit information on engine failures from its customers; and 
that the company even had an unwritten policy of not taking correc-
tive action until it was notified of a failure rate of between one and 
two per cent.471 Finally, in Johnson v. Huskey Industries, lnc.,412 
in an opinion denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, 
the trial judge held that the jury could reasonably find the defendant 
grossly negligent for failing to add an adequate warning to its unsold 
bags of charcoal briquets, after earlier claims had been made against 
the company for deaths purportedly caused by the product. 473 
A consideration of three recent cases will further help to clarify 
the type of post-marketing conduct that may support a punitive dam-
ages claim. Gillham v. Admiral Corp.474 was an action brought 
against the manufacturer of color television sets by a seventy-five-
year-old woman who was severely burned when her set caught fire. 
The jury awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages, punitive 
damages and attorneys' fees, but the district court vacated the awards 
of punitive damages and attorneys' fees upon motion of the defend-
ant. 475 The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, however, ordering 
that judgment be entered upon the verdict.476 The evidence indi-
cated that the fire had been caused by a defectively designed high 
voltage transformer; that the defendant knew of at least ninety-one 
similar fires, some of which had likewise burned homes and caused 
personal injuries, over the four-year period preceding the failure of 
the plaintiff's set; that two years before the plaintiff's injury, all six-
teen transformers tested by one of the defendant's own engineers 
consumer product safety complaints requires that the rule proposed be issued." Id. 
Violation of the rule could subject the manufacturer to civil or criminal penalties 
under the Act. Id. The proposed rule, however, has not yet been adopted. See 
note 531 infra. 
471. Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 469, at 47; see Order of Court at 3, Rosendin 
v. Avco Lycoming Div., cited note 467 supra (unpublished opinion of trial court 
granting motion for new trial on punitive damages, June 7, 1972). As the Brief 
for Plaintiffs explained, 
Any failures at all are intolerable . • . . In view of the serious consequences 
of a failure of an aircraft part, failures are not allowable in the industry, and 
every effort should be made to prevent them. . . • While you are waiting for 
the data to build up to a predetermined level of one, one and a half per cent 
or whatever per cent is established, the only way you get data is through acci-
dents. 
Brief for Plaintiffs at 51. 
472. - F.2d- (6th Cir. 1976). 
473. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 5, Johnson v. Huskey Indus., Inc., 
Civil No. 3008 (E.D. Tenn. May 29, 1975). The punitive damages verdict was 
reversed on appeal. See notes 432-34 supra and accompanying text. 
474. 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976). 
475. ''The jury awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages of $125,000, puni-
tive damages of $100,000, and attorneys' fees of $50,000.00." 523 F.2d at 104. 
476. 523 F.2d at 109. 
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had caught fire;477 and that the manufacturer not only failed to recall 
the sets or even to warn consumers of the hazard, but also systemati-
cally attempted through its complaint manager, 478 and even its 
477. 523 F.2d at 105-06. 
478. 523 F.2d at 106-07. The pattern of deliberate frustration of consumer 
complaints in Gillham is startling: 
[W]hen a motel owner who had 20 Admiral sets in his motel inquired as to 
whether there was a defect after one set burned in a motel room, Admiral wrote 
him a letter telling him to place a claim with his insurance company, but not 
answering his question. Numerous individuals who inquired about the risk of 
fire in their sets received similar treatment. In April, 1970, a customer asked 
about the safety of color TV sets after her high voltage transformer had burned 
from what Admiral called a "normal transformer failure." I.F. Johnson, who 
was in charge of receiving and processing fire complaints, did not answer her 
question. He did tell her that she should go to her own insurance company, 
and he did write to an Admiral Service Manager saying, "We prefer not to an-
swer some of the customer's questions in a letter .... " In another fire case 
in March, 1971, Johnson wrote to an Admiral representative, saying the custo• 
mer would be given a new transformer free, if necessary, because the customer 
" ... asked some very pointed questions relative to fires, and I would like to 
see him satisfied . • . ." Other customers received no answers or evasive an-
swers when they inquired as to the hazard after experiencing a fire in an Ad-
miral color TV set. 
Brief for Plaintiff at 28-29, Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975). 
The company also practiced outright deceit. On May 4, 1970, with reports of more 
than 150 fires in its records, Admiral falsely reassured two customers: "It would 
seem evident from the information contained in your letter that it may be the high 
voltage transformer has developed an electrical defect. This would cause some smoke 
and an odor but not any flame that could damage your set or property." Id. at 
31. Similarly, a few months later, I.F. Johnson sent the following answer to a cus-
tomer who reported a fire in his Admiral color television that damaged his house: 
''The damage to your set could occur from improper service such as the incorrect 
setting of the high voltage by a technician, using an incorrect part or using a part 
not recommended by the Admiral Corporation. The fact that the set did operate 
for a period of five years indicates that it was basically designed in accordance with 
the technique and parts available at the time of manufacture." Id. at 31. Admiral 
failed to tell this customer that the engineer who designed the transformer "antici-
pated that it might catch fire in customers' homes." 523 F.2d at 108. Nor was 
the customer informed that the net addition to the production cost of installing safe 
transformers in some models, as other manufacturers had done for years, was only 
sixty cents. 523 F.2d at 107-08 n.3. 
Admiral even deceived its own insurance company. In 1971, when the insurance 
company inquired whether Admiral had knowledge of any fires caused by television 
sets similar to one that had burned down the house of one claimant, I.F. Johnson 
had eleven fire reports on the same model in his file. He received the last report 
on the day that he informed Admiral's insurer that Admiral had not had any fires 
in the model. Brief for Plaintiff, supra, at 33. 
An attorneys' fee award to the plaintiff, at least, appears appropriate in this con• 
text. One of the narrow situations in which the Supreme Court has held that attor-
neys' fees may be granted in federal equity cases in the absence of statutory authority 
occurs when the defendant has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons .... " Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 
240, 258-59 (1975), citing F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 
129 (1974); see note 154 supra. The Court has applied this standard and awarded 
attorneys' fees in a case in which the defendant shipowner ignored the plaintiff sea-
man's attempts to secure from the defendant illness compensation to which he was 
clearly entitled under the law of maintenance and cure: 
In the instant case respondents were callous in their attitude, making no in-
vestigation of libellant's claim and by their silence neither admitting nor denying 
it. As a result of that recalcitrance, libellant was forced to hire a lawyer and 
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counsel, 470 to conceal the defect from consumers and to frustrate 
inquiries about the danger. When a manufacturer fails to take any 
steps whatsoever to remedy a hazard as serious as that in Gillham, 
even though it clearly knows of both the specific defect and the 
seriousness of the risk to consumers, a punitive damages assessment 
is particularly appropriate.480 • 
A second recent. case in which the jury awarded both compensa-
tory and punitive damages against a manufacturer for breaching its 
pos_t-marketing obligations is Thomas v. American Cystoscope Mak-
ers, Inc.481 In this case the plaintiff physician burned an eye when 
electricity discharged from the metallic end of the eyepiece of a 
resectoscope (a surgical telescope) he was using. The jury assessed 
go to a court to get what was plainly owed him under laws that are centuries 
old. The default was willfull and persistent. It is difficult to imagine a clearer 
case of damages suffered for failure to pay maintenance than this one. 
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962). While the dissent expressed 
the view that counsel fees were an improper element of compensatory damages, it 
did state that a punitive damages award would be appropriate under the circumstances 
if the refusal to pay were shown to have "stemmed from a wanton and intentional 
disregard of the legal rights of the seaman .... " 369 U.S. at 540 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). 
The Gillham situation is clearly analogous to Vaughan. It is probable that the 
motivation of a manufacturer, like Admiral, in frustrating inquiries from consumers 
who have suffered losses from product failures is to avoid revealing to the public 
that its product is indeed defective. A manufacturer might seek to conceal the defec-
tiveness of its product both to protect its general reputation and to reduce the number 
of consumers learning that their legal rights may have been violated by the manu-
facturer in order to avoid compensating for such injuries. See note 490 infra and 
accompanying text; notes 176-77, 457 supra and accompanying text. In short, a 
manufacturer's motivation for intentionally frustrating inquiries from injured consum-
ers may "stem from a wanton and intentional disregard of the legal rights" of the 
inquiring consumers. 
479. On April 11, 1973, a memorandum was sent by one of Admiral's in-house 
legal counsel to the official in charge of "product safety" asking whether Admiral 
"could keep claimants under better 'control' in cases such as this by informing the 
claimant that the matter has been referred to [the company's] insurance company 
who will contact them shortly. Alternatively, [the company] could inform them 
that a representative of National Service will make contact. • • • [S]o informed, 
claimant would be less inclined to get a lawyer involved." Brief for Plaintiff, supra 
note 478, at 34. 
480. Plaintif rs counsel in Gillham argued cogently on appeal: 
Considering Admiral's certain knowledge that its color TV sets were fire 
hazardous and its knowledge of the frequency with which such Admiral sets 
were igniting in customers' homes, and considering the extreme danger to which 
this exposed plaintiff and others, Admiral's failure to eliminate the hazard, or 
to warn plaintiff and others of the hazard, constitutes legal malice which justifies 
and even demands that Admiral be punished by the imposition of punitive dam-
ages. The only inferrable motive for Admiral's conduct is that Admiral con-
sciously decided to perpetuate the hazard, because to eliminate it might have 
been costly, and to warn its customers might have adversely affected sales. Thus, 
solely for financial gain, Admiral deliberately exposed Mrs. Gillham to the fire 
hazard which, as was forseeable [sic], caused a fire, burned her severely, and 
permanently ruined her life. 
Brief for Plaintiff at 45, Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th qr. 1975). 
481. 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
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$475,000 compensatory and $200,000 punitive damages against the 
manufacturer. The court upheld the compensatory damages award, 
but granted the defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. on the puni-
tive damages award, holding that the evidence was "insufficient as 
a matter of law to demonstrate that type of 'outrageous conduct' on 
which an award of punitive damages must depend." A "somewhat 
obscure reference in the medical literature" had indicated as early 
as 1959 that injuries to the cornea could result from electrical arcing 
on the uninsulated eyepiece. Although the particular eyepiece 
model that injured the plaintiff was designed to be used only with 
a camera, the defendant had known at least since 1969 that physicians 
were using the camera model eyepiece with the naked eye; yet it 
neglected until 1973 either to warn of the danger or to recall the 
camera model eyepieces for proper insulation. 482 In the seventeen 
years that the resectoscope had been on the market before the plain-
tiff's injury, however, the defendant had received only one report 
of a similar accident, and the user in that case suffered only a burned 
eyebrow.483 
Such a long history of safe use suggests that the risk of injury 
from the product was very small. On the other hand, it probably 
would not have been too costly for the manufacturer to warn all 
known owners of this specialty instrument since the number was 
probably quite small and the defendant or its sales agents probably 
had records of their names and addresses. The jury in awarding 
punitive damages must have been convinced that the defendant 
knew of the danger by 1969 at the latest; that the danger plainly 
outweighed the cost of warning users of the product; and that conse-
quently the defendant's failure to warn manifested a reckless disre-
gard for the safety of users uninformed as to the risk. Nevertheless, 
in ·the absence of other evidence that the defendant knew its prod-
uct c,ontained a substantial risk of eye injury, the long period of safe 
use appears to justify the court's overruling of the punitive damages 
verdict. 
The last recent case to be considered is Scott v. Outboard 
Marine Corp.484 In June 1970 two persons were riding in a nine-
teen foot, 210 horsepower inboard-outboard boat built by the 
defendant when the steering mechanism suddenly failed. The boat 
482. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motions for Judgment 
N.O.V. or for a New Trial at 12, Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 
cited note 481 supra. 
483. Plaintifrs Memorandum of Law in Support of Claim for Punitive Damages 
at 2, Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., cited note 481 supra. 
484. Civil No. 71-1661 Civ JLK (S.D. Fla., filed Oct. 28, 1971~. 
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spun out of control, threw the riders into the water and then struck 
them, killing one and seriously injuring the other. The failure 
resulted from a design defect in the steering system that made it par-
ticularly susceptible to corrosion.485 A company report in 1965 first 
indicated steering system failures caused by corrosion, 486 and by 
early 1969 the company's main test facility was reporting similar fail-
ures with some frequency. For example, there were steering system 
failures in seven of seventeen boats of a particular model tested over 
an eighteen-month period. Other reports stressed both the serious-
ness of -the danger and the need for an immediate remedy.481 One 
memorandum, prepared shortly after the steering on the boat of the 
chairman of the defendant's Board of Directors had failed in April 
1969, stated prophetically: "One of these days, someone's going to 
get hurt-hope it isn't me."488 
Recognizing the emergency nature of this problem, the defend-
ant's engineering change committee in July 1969 ordered a simple 
design change: the substitution of a stainless steel retaining ring for 
the bronze one that had been causing the corrosion problems. The 
company decided the following month that the problem was serious 
enough to make the change on all boats held by the company and 
its distributors, generally wholly owned subsidiaries, but ·that the sub-
stitution, estimated to cost five dollars per boat for both materials 
and labor, should stop at that level. Thus, the defendant deliber-
ately kept its dealers and existing owners ignorant of both the hazard 
and the simple, inexpensive means to eliminate it.489 The plaintiffs 
contended that the manufacturer's decision, probably made to protect 
its reputation and to save the relatively small expense involved in 
informing retailers and owners, manifested a conscious and flagrant 
indifference to the public safety.490 
After thirty days of trial, the jury awarded the plaintiffs compen-
485. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judg-
ment on the Claim for Punitive Damages at 4, Scott v. Outboard Marine Corp., 
cited note 484 supra. 
486. Supplemental Documents Filed in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judg-
ment on the Issue of Punitive Damages, Scott v. Outboard Marine Corp., cited note 
484 supra, OMC "Progress Report" No. 9, Sept. 22, 1965. 
487. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the Issue of Punitive Damages at 22-25, Scott v. Outboard Marine Corp., cited 
note 484 supra. One test report issued in 1969 indicated: ''This creates a very dan-
gerous condition . . . . Boat is thrown into severe port turn when this failure oc-
curs." Another report stated that "[a] very serious problem with corrosion caused 
by dissimilar metals which must be remedied immediately." Id. at 23. 
488. Id. at 22. 
489. Id. at 25. 
490. Id. 
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satory damages but denied them punitive damages. 491 Since the 
defendant was fully aware of many dangerous failures in boats 
already sold and thus consciously chose to ignore this risk of injury,402 
the jury would probably have been justified in awarding the plaintiffs 
punitive damages. Nevertheless, the jury was also probably acting 
within its sound discretion in refusing to award such damages. It 
may have concluded that the defendant's actions were not so cul-
pable as to merit punishment because Outboard Marine, even though 
it knew of steering failures in its boats, had no notice the boats were 
actually causing injury. 
The determinative factors in awarding punitive damages for post-
marketing misconduct of manufacturers are largely the same as 
those in the other categories of marketing misconduct previously 
analyzed. The distinguishing feature of the post-marketing cases is 
that the results of the ultimate test of a product's safety-its per-
formance during use by consumers-can be ascertained to help 
determine whether the product is in fact excessively dangerous. If 
its products are failing in a manner likely to produce severe injury, 
as in Scott, a manufacturer should seriously consider correcting the 
hazard. When defects are in fact causing injury, as in Gillham, 493 
the failure of the manufacturer to act promptly and decisively to 
reduce the danger is strong evidence that the manufacturer has little 
concern for consumer safety. But sending warning letters and 
recalling products are expensive procedures.494 Thus, before puni-
491. During the closing argument, counsel settled the claims for compensatory 
damages for a total of $900,000: $250,000 on the death claim and $650,000 for 
the loss of leg injury claim. Upon agreement of counsel, the amounts of the com-
pensatory damages verdicts returned by the jury were not revealed. Questionnaire 
returned from Jon E. Krupnick to David G. Owen, Aug. 1975. 
492. However, the company finally sent recall notices to all known boat owners 
by certified mail three weeks prior to trial in 1972. Id. 
493. See notes 474-80 supra and accompanying text. 
494. The Minutes of a Product Safety meeting held at Outboard Marine Corp. 
on August 10, 1970 reflected the company's estimate that "it would cost between 
$75,000 to $100,000 for a field fix." Plaintifrs Exhibit 26, Feb. 1, 1972, Scott v. 
Outboard Marine Corp., cited note 484 supra. The cost of a hypothetical automobile 
recall has been set at $570,000. See Stone, Allocation of Risk for Product Recall 
Expenditures: A Legislative Proposal, 1915 U. DET. L.J. 24-25. The estimate may 
be unrealistically low. In a suit brought by Ford Motor Co. challenging an order 
of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to recall some 600,000 auto-
mobiles containing defective seat back pivot pins (to which 15-20 minor injuries had 
been attributed), Ford asserted that the cost of merely giving notice of the defect 
to all present owners would exceed $500,000 and that the replacement of the seat 
pins would cost the company approximately $31 per car or $19 million in total. See 
Ford Motor Co. v. Coleman, 402 F. Supp. 475, 491, 494 (D.D.C. 1975) (three-
judge court) (Hart, J., dissenting), affd. without opinion, 44 U.S.L.W. 3592 (U.S. 
April 19, 1976); 3 BNA PRoD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 816 (191S). Moreover, an 
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tive damages will be appropriate in a post-marketing case, the 
probable reduction in the risk of harm from such remedial measures 
should clearly outweigh the cost to the manufacturer. 
When a manufacturer learns of serious failures in the field, it is 
usually less costly to correct the defects in similar products not yet 
marketed than to recall products already on the market. Thus, the 
failure to remedy a known defect in products not yet marketed is par-
ticularly blameworthy. However, culpability will be less clear when 
the plaintiff is injured by a hazard not discovered by the manufac-
turer until after the particular product causing the injury has left its 
hands. The appropriateness of punitive damages in cases of this 
type will depend on the manufacturer's knowledge that its product 
is failing, the seriousness of the danger caused by the failures, and 
the practical and economic feasibility of remedying the defect. 
Punitive damages will be appropriate when a consideration of these 
factors demonstrates that the manufacturer's failure to take remedial 
action under all the circumstances was in flagrant disregard of -the 
public safety. 
B. Toward a Standard of Responsibility 
The foregoing cases reveal varying degrees of manufacturer 
misbehavior in differing marketing contexts. In each case in which 
punitive damages were properly assessed, the manufacturer was 
shown to have grossly. abused the power flowing fro~ its position 
of control over product safety information in one of three ways: (1) 
by failing to acquire sufficient product safety information through 
tests, inspections or post-marketing safety monitoring; (2) by failing 
to remedy an excessively dangerous condition known to exist in a 
product by altering its design, adding warnings or instructions, or re-
calling the product for repair; or (3) by knowlingly misleading the 
public concerning the product's safety. 
Since the third form of misconduct is characterized by an intent 
to deceive and thus is akin to fraud, it cries out for punitive damages 
liability. However, the first two as described above are similar ·to 
mere negligence and thus are not always appropriate for such lia-
bility. Indeed, misbehavior akin to negligence and misbehavior 
indirect but very real additional cost to the manufacturer will be the damage to the 
product image caused by the recall. 
Professor Stone points out that the obligation of a manufacturer to recall its de-
fective products should have some positive effects on product safety: "[I]f a person 
distributing unsafe goods has a financial accountability for recalling such goods, it 
will act as a deterrent to further producing unsafe products." Stone, supra, at 17 
(emphasis in original). This is very probable in view of the magnitude of the poten-
tial liability. 
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deserving of punitive damages are similar in products liability cases 
in that both expose consumers to unreasonable risks of harm. 
Two additional elements are necessary, however, before a manu-
facturer's exposure of consumers to such risks may appropriately 
be punished by a punitive damages award. First, the manufacturer 
must be either aware of or culpably indifferent to an unnecessary 
risk of injury.495 Second, knowing that its product is or might be 
excessively dangerous, the manufacturer must intransigently refuse 
either to determine the seriousness of the danger or to reduce it to 
an acceptable level."96 
This institutional "state of mind" is the key factor in assessing 
a manufacturer's culpability and hence in determining whether puni-
tive damages are appropriate. When a manufacturer intentionally 
misleads consumers into believing that its product is safer than it 
actually is, punitive damages will almost always be in order.407 More 
difficult are the cases in which a manufacturer merely fails to dis-
cover possible product hazards, since the requisite state of mind 
generally exists only when it is known that the product is likely 
to cause serious harm if defective and when the means for discover-
ing excessive dangers are inexpensive and readily available. 408 
Finally, there are the cases in which a manufacturer is aware of 
a particular danger yet fails to act affirmatively to reduce it.400 
Punitive damages should be assessed in these situations only when 
it is further shown that the manufacturer was at least construe-
495. Manufacturing enterprises have awareness of product safety problems only 
through their employees. Awareness should be imputed to such an enterprise to the 
extent that it is possessed by an employee whose general responsibilities might fairly 
require him to act in response to the acquired information. In some situations in 
which the employee's responsibilities do not involve product safety, the proper re• 
sponse might be merely to relay the information to someone within the institution 
who is more directly concerned with such matters. In any enterprise, each member 
of upper management, the great majority of middle management, and selected mem-
bers of the rank and file will have at least this type of general responsibility for 
passing along apparently significant information on product dangers. See notes 205-
38 supra and accompanying text. 
496. See Boehm v. Fox, 473 F.2d 445, 447 (10th Cir. 1973) ("Wantonness is 
characterized by a realization of the imminence of damage to others and a restraint 
from doing what is necessary to prevent the damage because of indifference to 
whether it occurs"). 
497. The MER/29 cases are of course the classic example. See notes 336-51 
supra and accompanying text. 
498. See, e.g., Domich v. Jee's Juvenile Shop, No. 225,782 (Super. Ct. Sacramento 
County, Cal., filed Aug. 28, 1972). See notes 407-10 supra and accompanying text. 
The Dalkon Shield cases may develop into the prototype for this class of misbehavior. 
See notes 395-97 supra and accompanying text. 
499. Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
424 U.S. 913 (1976), is perhaps the best example of this form of misconduct, 
See notes 474-80 & 493 supra and accompanying text. 
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tively aware that the product was exposing customers to-an unneces-
sarily high risk of harm in view of the relatively small cost of sub-
stantially reducing the risk. Thus, proof that the manufacturer was 
probably aware that its product might be defective often will include 
(1) the manufacturer's awareness that the product was inflicting, or 
was likely to inflict, substantial injury upon ti'le public; and (2) the 
clear feasibility of substantially reducing the risk by adding a warn-
ing or changing the product's design. However, the plaintiff should 
not be obligated to establish the manufacturer's actual knowledge of 
this feasibility since a manufacturer completely indifferent to con-
sumer safety may well have no idea how practical a risk-reduction 
program might be. Moreover, a manufacturer may fairly be pre-
sumed to have expert knowledge in its particular field and thus to 
be aware of the feasibility of reducing a particular danger, especially 
when the feasibility is clear. 
Sanctions against manufacturers are appropriate in ·these situa-
tions because of the deliberate or reckless nature of the manufac-
turer's disregard of the welfare, indeed the rights, 500 of the consum-
ing public. 501 It is true that a manufacturer rarely consciously 
weighs its interest in marketing a product in a particular condition 
against the interests of consumers and then makes a deliberate deci-
sion to sacrifice the greater consumer good for its own lesser interest. 
Indeed, even the most extreme forms of manufacturer misbehavior 
ordinarily are more accurately classified as reckless than as intentional. 
Nevertheless, the reckless failure to .test or to inspect a potentially 
hazardous product, to warn consumers of a hidden product danger, 
or to recall and to repair a product known to be dangerously de-
fective, all amount to the same form of gross and deliberate disregard 
for the interests of others that should be sanctioned and deterred. 502 
500. See notes 169-71 supra and accompanying text. 
501. More specifically, what deserves to be punished and needs to be deterred 
is the conscious or reckless and excessive sacrifice of the public's interest in remain-
ing free of unnecessary personal injury for the manufacturer's interest in enhancing 
its profits. 
502. Punitive damages generally are awardable in most jurisdictions upon a show-
ing of either conscious,or reckless misconduct. "Reckless indifference to the rights 
of others, and conscious action in deliberate disregard of them . . . may provide 
the necessary state of mind to justify punitive damages." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 908, Comment b at 80 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). The difference 
between the notions of "conscious" and "reckless"-or "willful" and ''wanton"-disre-
gard for the interests of others is practicably indiscemable in many contexts. This 
is especially true in the products liability cases involving gross forms of marketing 
misbehavior. Accordingly, no sound basis will ordinarily exist for distinguishing 
among these concepts in products liability litigation where the recurring forms of 
misconduct can be characterized with equal accuracy as either conscious or reckless. 
This will not be true, of course, if a court gives an unduly restrictive interpretation 
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The variety of situations in which manufacturer misconduct may 
arise makes it particularly important that a standard be formulated 
so that courts and juries can identify cases in which punitive damages 
should be awarded. Most products liability cases articulating such 
a standard have adopted traditional punitive damages phraseology, 
such as "wilful and wanton,"503 "malice, oppression, or gross negli-
gence, "50-4 or "ill will, ... actual malice, or ... under circumstan-
ces amounting to fraud or oppression."505 But these traditional tests 
to the notions of the consciousness or deliberateness of the manufacturer's misbehav-
ior. ''The requisite intent that must be shown . . . is that the defendant deliberately 
injured the plaintiff or that the defendant deliberately performed an act which he 
knew to be substantially certain to result in injury to the public." Rosendin v. Avco 
Lycoming Div., Cal. Ct. App., 1st App. Dist., Div. 3 at 66 (unpublished opinion 
filed Feb. 24, 1976); see G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 
29-30, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 222-23 (1975); Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. 
Supp. 1081, 1097 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (punitive damages liability requires showing 
of defendant's "'[a]ctual or express malice [which] has been defined as that state 
of mind under which a person's conduct is characterized by hatred or ill will, a spirit 
of revenge, retaliation, or a determination to vent his feelings upon other persons'"). 
Narrowly defining the standard of liability in this manner renders the punitive dam-
ages remedy unavailable for use in products liability litigation as a practical matter 
and consequently frustrates the achievement of the underlying goals of the doctrine. 
503. Moore v. Jewel] Tea Co., 116 Il1. App. 2d 109, 135, 253 N.E.2d 636, 648 
(1969), affd., 46 III. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970). "The question of willful and 
wanton conduct is essential1y whether the failure to exercise care is so gross that 
it shows a lack of regard for the safety of others." 116 Ill. App. 2d at 136, 253 
N.E.2d at 649. 
504. Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348, 1352 n.13 (D. Hawaii 1975), 
SOS. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 711, 60 Cal. Rptr. 
398, 414 (1967). The California punitive damages statute applied by the court in 
Toole allows such damages where the defendant is guilty of "oppression, fraud, or 
malice." The word "malice" in the statute has been interpreted to mean "malice 
in fact." The Toole court interpreted the malice in fact requirement broadly, hold-
ing that it "may be established by a showing that the defendant's wrongful conduct 
was wilful, intentional, and done in reckless disregard of its possible results. Where, 
as here, there is evidence that the conduct in question is taken recklessly and without 
regard to its injurious consequences, the jury may find malice in fact." 251 Cal. 
App. 2d at 715, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416. The court concluded that the evidence was 
sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant had "acted recklessly and in 
wanton disregard of possible harm to others in marketing, promoting, selling and 
maintaining [the product] on the market in view of its knowledge" of its harmful 
effects. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 715, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416. However, this liberal inter-
pretation of the "malice in fact" requirement in the products liability context was 
rejected by another California court in G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. 
App. 3d 22, 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 224 (1975). 
Other standards of punitive damages liability articulated in the products liability 
cases include the following: GiUham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976) ("so intentional, reckless, wanton, will-
ful, or gross that an inference of malice could be drawn," 523 F.2d at 109; 
"reckless indifference to the safety of others," 523 F.2d at 109 n.4): Hoffman 
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973) ("reckless indifference to the 
public's safety," 485 F.2d at 146; "reckless disregard of the public's health," 485 F.2d 
at 147); Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089, 1097 (5th Cir. 1973) ("con-
scious indifference toward the public which generally typifies gross negligence"); 
Boehm v. Fox, 473 F.2d 445, 447 (10th Cir. 1973) ("malice, fraud, or a willful 
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of liability were originally designed to cover interpersonal intentional 
torts or oppressive misconduct by government officials exhibiting 
personal hostility or a callous abuse of power. 5°6 In each of the cases 
examined above in which the manufacturer's marketing behavior was 
sufficiently culpable to deserve the sanction of punitive damages, the 
particular misconduct could fairly be characterized as "wanton" or 
"oppressive."507 Yet a more comprehensive and more clearly 
defined standard is needed in the products liability context. 
Several courts have attempted to refine these tests by defining 
the proscribed marketing behavior. as conduct that is in "conscious" or 
"reckless" disregard of the public safety. 508 This standard appro-
priately identifies the "public safety" as the particular interest 
invaded by the defendant in a products liability case and the requisite 
and wanton disregard of the rights of others"); Thomas v. American Cystoscope 
Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-1780, 3d 
Cir., June 21, 1976 ("recklessness" defined as "a readily perceptible danger and 
a conscious choice on the part of the alleged wrongdoer to act despite clear knowl-
edge of a highly probable risk of serious harm," 414 F. Supp. at 266; "outrageous 
conduct," 414 F. Supp. at 267); Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081, 
1098 (N.D. Ohio 1975) ("willful or wanton"; but see note 502 supra); Hoffman 
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 856 n.4 (M.D. Pa. 1974) ("wanton disre-
gard for safety"); Drake v. Wham-O Mfg. Co., 373 F. Supp. 608, 610 (E.D. Wis. 
1974) (" 'wanton, willful or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights'"); G.D. Searle 
& Co. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 33, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 225 (1975) 
("conscious disregard of the safety of others" (emphasis omitted)); Pease v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 465-66, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 426 (1974) ("will-
ful and wanton indifference to the safety of persons who might use the [product]"); 
Fleet v. Hollenkemp, 52 Ky. 175, 180, 13 B. Mon. 219, 226 (1852) (exemplary 
damages should depend on the "nature and extent of the injury done and the manner 
in which it was inflicted, whether by negligence, wantonness, or with or without 
malice"); Hawes v. General Motors Corp., No. 76 CP 2551 (C.P. Hampton County, 
S.C., filed March 12, 1976) ("so gross as to amount to recklessness or wantonness") 
(unpublished Order at 7, June 10, 1976). 
506. See 1 T. SEDGWICK, supra note 16, at 687-94: 
507. Perhaps the principal characteristic of oppression is the abuse of power over 
the welfare of others. This was indeed the hallmark of the misconduct for which 
punitive damages were allowed in the first case in Anglo-American law expressly 
allowing such damages. Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205 (K.B. 1763). This is also 
the fundamental characteristic of the grosser forms of marketing misconduct by man-
ufacturers. The power abused in cases of this type is that which the manufacturer 
holds by virtue of its near-monopolistic control over the means for gathering and 
applying information concerning product dangers. See note 69 supra. Gross abuse 
of the control over information vital to the well-being of others is oppressive misbe-
havior; flagrant marketing misbehavior by a manufacturer thus quite cleanly falls 
within the scope of the phrase "oppression, fraud, or malice" used to describe the 
standard of liability in the punitive damages statutes of California and several other 
states. See notes 23, 443 supra. Moreover, such conduct might even loosely be 
properly characterized as "public fraud,". see Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. 
App. 3d 450, 465, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 426 (1974) ("fraud upon the public"), or 
perhaps as "social malice." Social malice of this type is most certainly classifiable 
as malice in fact. See Hopkins v. The Railroad, 36 N.H. 9, 19 (1857) ("Gross 
carelessness, where duty to the public requires the utmost care . • • has certainly 
a strong character of cruelty and moral turpitude"). 
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state of mind accompanying the invasion as "conscious" or "reck-
less." But the phrase "conscious disregard"1500 is too restrictive, for 
it implies a subjective test of deliberateness of wrongdoing that is 
too narrow in scope and too difficult to prove. Such a standard 
would permit manufacturers to escape punitive damages liability in 
many cases of egregious misbehavior. Moreover, the phrase "con-
scious disregard" suggests an institutional decision or attitude 
adopted by the managerial officers of the enterprise, a notion at odds 
with the broader and more appropriate vicarious liability rule. 1110 
"Reckless disregard," on the other hand, is arguably too easily con-
fused with truly inadvertent conduct511 and for this reason is in some 
jurisdictions rejected as the basis for punitive damages Iiability.1112 
Other language that more precisely identifies the nature of the 
proscribed conduct is available. It is helpful in formulating such a 
standard to refer to the two predominant characteristics of the mis-
behavior revealed in the cases studied above in which punitive dam-
ages were most appropriate. The first is the manufacturer's lack 
of concern for the public safety, a spirit of utter indifference to 
whether the product might cause unnecessary injuries. The second 
characteristic is the flagrancy of this indifference as reflected by the 
extent of the manufacturer's awareness of the danger and its ex-
cessiveness, the over-all magnitude of the danger to the public, the 
ease of reducing the risk, and the motives and other circumstances 
attending the manufacturer's failure to reduce the risk.1118 These 
508. See notes 503-05 supra and accompanying text. 
509. The most carefully considered products liability opinion adopting a conscious 
disregard standard is G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 
Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975). But see note S05 supra. 
510. The vicarious liability rule is proposed above as the appropriate rule of en-
terprise responsibility in products liability cases. See notes 205-38 supra and accom-
panying text & note 495 supra. 
511. The court in G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 31, 
122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 224 (1975), noted 
the synonymity sometimes ascribed to nonsynonymous terms. Typical is Toole 
v. Richardson-Merrell, supra. There the court declared that malice may be es-
tablished by evidence of conduct which is "wilful, intentional, and done in reck-
less disregard of its possible results." According to dictionary definitions, will-
fulness and intent denote deliberation or design; recklessness, in contrast con-
notes action which is insensate, heedless or negligent. To apply these adjec-
tives conjunctively to a single course of conduct is self-contradictory. "If con-
duct is negligent, it is not willful; if it is willful, it is not negligent." (Footnotes 
omitted.) 
But see Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 578, 106 S.E.2d 258, 264 
(1958) (no "real difference" between "gross disregard" and "conscious indiffer-
ence"). See generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (196S) (reckless-
ness involves risk that is "substantially greater than that which is necessary to make 
[the] conduct negligent"). 
512. See note 30 supra. 
513. See note 516 infra. 
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two characteristics-the manufacturer's indifference and its flagrancy 
-can form a standard of punitive damages liability tailored to fit 
the specific needs of products liability litigation: Punitive damages 
may be assessed against the manufacturer of a product injuring the 
plaintiff if the injury is attributable to conduct that reflects a fla-
grant indifference to the public safety. 
Several aspects of this proposed standard should be noted. First, 
the standard does not expressly require that the product causing the 
injury be "defective." While most cases giving rise to punitive dam-
ages liability under the standard will involve a product that is legally 
defective, 514 the standard is designed specifically to include cases of 
fraudulent-type misbehavior that do not always fit comfortably into 
the defectiveness mold. 5rn Moreover, much of the defectiveness 
notion is implicitly subsumed within the core idea of "flagrant indif-
ference."616 Finally, "defectiveness" is often a complex and confus-
ing issue that will already have been determined favorably to the 
plaintiff before any consideration of punitive damages liability. 
Thus, while a product's defectiveness will in a sense be an implicit 
prerequisite to liability under the standard,517 the omission of an 
explicit reference should facilitate a clearer analysis of the other 
issues more germane to determining punitive damages. 
Also important to the standard are its two causation require-
ments. First, plaintiffs seeking punitive damages must have been 
persons injured by the product. This approach is consistent with the 
general punitive damages rule in most jurisdictions under which a 
plaintiff must establish his right to compensatory damages as a con-
dition to recovering punitive damages. 518 Second, plaintiffs must 
further establish some causal connection between the alleged mar-
keting misconduct and the injury. The phrase "attributable to" 
rather than the phrase "caused by" is used to describe this causal 
514. But cf. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 274 S.2d 898 (Ct App. Fla. 
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974). See notes 352-69 supra and accompany-
ing text. 
515. See note 335 supra and accompanying text & note 443 supra. 
516. Marketing misconduct that reflects a flagrant indifference to the public 
safety will usually embrace the factors used to determine defectiveness under the 
cost-benefit method, specifically, the magnitude of the public danger and the cost 
of reducing the risk. See note 3 supra. A product would very probably be classified 
as defective under the other theories of defectiveness in a case properly giving rise 
to a punitive damages assessment under the standard proposed above. 
517. Since punitive damages cannot be awarded at all without some form of lia-
bility having been established against the defendant, see D. DOBBS, supra note 16, 
at 208-10, the plaintiff seeking punitive damages in a products liability case will in 
most cases have to establish the "defectiveness" of the product in any event. 
518. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 16, at § 83. But see, e.g., Gill v. Manuel, 
488 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir. 1973). 
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requirement and to emphasize that a punitive damages claim should 
not be rejected when the plaintiff has difficulty proving causation 
under the strict common-law principles applicable to compensatory 
claims but can nevertheless show a real and substantial connection 
between the misconduct and the injury. 519 The stretching of the 
normal rules of causation in cases of aggravated misconduct has long 
been recognized as appropriate and is properly included in a stand-
ard for punitive damages liability. 520 
Central to the standard is the imposition of punitive damages 
liability for marketing conduct "reflecting a flagrant indifference to 
the public safety." This phrase can best be analyzed by consider-
ing separately the terms "reflecting," "indifference" and "flagrant." 
The word "reflecting" calls for an objective determination of the 
manufacturer's apparent attitude rather than a subjective determina-
tion of the manufacturer's actual state of mind. G21 This is appro-
priate for three reasons. First, a manufacturer's "state of mind" is an 
ethereal concept that is difficult to prove. ll22 Second, it is quite un-
likely that a manufacturer can ever be acting in good faith when it 
seriously endangers the public through grossly irresponsible con-
duct. r;23 Third, the manufacturer's subjective state of mind is largely 
irrelevant to the basic question of whether there is a social need to 
deter such misbehavior.ll24 
"Indifference" to the public safetyr;2r; conveys the idea that the 
manufacturer simply does not care whether or to what extent the 
public safety may be endangered by its product despite the avail-
ability of feasible means to reduce the danger substantially. It 
implies a basic disrespect and consequent disregard for the interests 
of others. 
The word "flagrant" describes the final key concept in the stand-
ard526 and serves principally to limit its scope. The word connotes 
519. This problem is present in some cases of the fraudulent-type misconduct. 
See note 443 supra. 
520. See note 42 supra. 
521. But see Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255, 
267 (E.D. Pa. 1976) appeal docketed, No. 76-1830, 3d Cir., June 21, 1976 ("[T]hat 
subjective kind of awareness ..• is the distinguishing element of reckless conduct"). 
522. See text at note 521 infra. 
523. See note 501 supra. 
524. See notes 129-51 supra and accompanying text. 
525. The word "indifference" conveys essentially the same idea as "disre.1mrd" 
as applied to the public safety. However, it is arguable that the word "indifference" 
more clearly underscores the generalized nature of the defendant's lack of concern 
for the consequences of its marketing activity, as exemplified by cases involving reck-
less failure to discover product dangers. 
526. Surprisingly, the word flagrant is used infrequently in the punitive damages 
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misconduct significantly more serious than inadvertent negligence 
and thus assures that only the most egregious misbehavior is 
punished. Yet it does not call for proof of a subjective awareness 
of wrongdoing that the word "conscious" implicitly requires. 527 
Instead, the word imputes such awareness to the manufacturer when 
its conduct is obviously and seriously wrong. Additionally, the word 
"flagrant" is not burdened with the emotional overtones of the more 
generally accepted word "outrageous."528 Finally, a standard 
based on "flagrant" misconduct appears at once to be sufficiently 
flexible to fit varying factual contexts yet definite enough to provide 
reasonable predictability. 
As is frequently true whenever a complex balancing of social 
interests is reduced to a one-sentence test, the proposed standard will 
be better administered if its elements are isolated. Thus, the follow-
ing factors may properly be considered to determine whether a 
manufacturer's conduct reflects a flagrant indifference to the public 
safety:529 
(1) the existence and magnitude in the product of a danger 
to the public; 
(2) the cost and feasibility of reducing the danger to an 
acceptable level; 
(3) the manufacturer's awareness of the danger, of the magni-
tude of the danger, and of the availability of a feasible 
remedy; 
(4) the nature and duration of, and the reasons for, the manu-
facturer's failure to act appropriately to discover or to 
reduce the danger; and 
(5) the extent to which the manufacturer purposefully created 
the danger. 
Each factor will be discussed briefly. First, a manufacturer's fault 
in failing to deal with a product hazard increases with the magnitude 
of the resulting potential for harm to the public.1130 Second, as the 
cases. When it does appear, it is usually used as merely one of two or more modi-
fiers for the described misconduct. See, e.g., Certified Laboratories of Texas, Inc. 
v. Robinson, 303 F. Supp. 1014, 1028-29 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Ingram v. Pettit, 303 
S.2d 703, 704 (Fla. App. 1974); Soucy v. Greyhound Corp., 27 App. Div. 2d 112, 
113, 276 N.Y.S.2d 173, 175 (1967). See also UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST Acr § 
8(b) (1973) (treble damages for "flagrant" violations). 
521. See notes 522-2-4 supra and accompanying text. 
528. See note 304 supra. 
529. The factors relevant to the basic determination of whether punitive damages 
should be assessed at all in products liability cases reflect many of the considerations 
pertinent to the measurement of such awards. See notes 281-99 supra and accom-
panying text. 
530. See notes 286 and 291 supra and accompanying text. Except for Hafner 
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costs of reducing such a hazard to an acceptable level diminish, so 
also does the credibility of excuses for failing to do so. Third, as 
the manufacturer's awareness of the existence, magnitude, and means 
to reduce a product hazard increases, so too does its duty to address 
the problem and its culpability for failing to do so. asi Fourth, the 
nature and duration of a manufacturer's failure to respond appro-
priately to a product hazard, its reasons for not responding more ap-
propropriately, and the nature and extent of any measures actually 
taken, all shed light on the extent to which the enterprise values prof-
its over safety, and, accordingly, on its culpability. Finally, if the 
manufacturer created the danger deliberately, as by knowingly de-
ceiving the public about the product's safety, it will usually be es-
pecially blameworthy and deserving of punishment. a32 
The determination of whether the marketing conduct of the 
manufacturer in any particular case reflected a flagrant indifference 
v. Guerlain, Inc., 34 App. Div. 2d 162, 310 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Sup. Ct. 1970), in which 
the punitive damages verdict for the plaintiff was reversed on appeal, no cases have 
been located assessing punitive damages against a manufacturer where the plaintiff 
received only minor injuries. However, cases of consumers regularly receiving small 
injuries from a product, such as cuts from sharp or raw edges, involve an aggregate 
harm to the public far exceeding the small injuries to the individual consumers. If 
a manufacturer were aware of such a tendency in its product and failed to take step9 
to reduce the hazard, the inaction might well reflect a flagrant indifference to the 
public safety for which a punitive damages assessment against the manufacturer 
would be appropriate. Furthermore, punitive damages assessments are probably the 
only effective means to deter such misconduct because of the economic infeasibility 
of litigating cases of this type for compensatory damages alone. See notes 150-5 J, 
178-80 supra and accompanying text. 
531. An enterprise will be put on notice of a product danger upon receipt of 
a complaint of injury or near-injury from a single consumer. The more complaints 
received by the manufacturer concerning a specific danger, the greater will be its 
awareness of the existence, magnitude, and possible excessiveness of the hazard. Fail-
ing to maintain a complaint file or otherwise acting irresponsibly would itself be 
evidence of a manufacturer's indifference to the public safety. See note 470 supra. 
A rule has been proposed by the Consumer Product Safety Commission under 
§ 16(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2065(b) (Supp. IV 1974), 
requiring manufacturers to maintain files of consumer complaints. 39 Fed. Reg. 
31,916 (1974); CCH CoNs. PROD. SAFETY GumE 11 40,118. Unfortunately, the pro-
posed rule has not been adopted. But see Consumer Product Safety Commission 
Improvements Act of 1976 § 13(a)(l), Puhl. L. No. 94-284 (May 11, 1976), amend-
ing Consumer Product Safety Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1970), making 
it a "prohibited act" to "fail or refuse to establish or maintain records." 
Additionally, section 15(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (Supp. IV 1974), 
requires product sellers immediately to inform the Commission upon receipt of infor-
mation concerning a substantial product hazard. The Commission requires notice 
"within 24 hours after a reporting company has obtained information which reason-
ably supports the conclusion that the product could create a substantial hazard." 3 
BNA PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 692 (1975). "Section 15(b) notifications are rou-
tinely made available to the public ••.• " 41 Fed. Reg. 16,514 (1976). See 4 
BNA PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 338 (1976). 
532. Plaintiffs will not be able nor of course should they be required to establish 
deliberate misconduct of this type in all cases in which punitive damages will be 
appropriate. See text at note 527 supra. 
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to the public safety will often be difficult, but the task should be 
facilitated by examining the facts of each case within the framework 
outlined above. The guiding factors that have been proposed should 
help determine the appropriateness of punitive damages in a 
products liability case. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Modem products liability theory requires manufacturers to pay 
for injuries caused by defects in their products. The threat of 
liability and an interest in preserving their good reputation often 
induce manufacturers to guard against marketing products that are 
apt to be defective. But occasionally manufacturers fail to take even 
the most basic steps to discover hazards. In other instances manu-
facturers actually aware of serious product hazards refuse to adopt 
feasible and inexpensive corrective measures plainly called for in 
light of the substantial risk of harm presented. And on rare occa-
sions manufacturers deliberately conceal substantial dangers to 
enhance the marketability of their products. These types of market-
ing behavior reflect a flagrant indifference to the public safety that 
should be punished and deterred. 
While the criminal law has thus far left this type of marketing 
misconduct virtually untouched, the punitive damages remedy has 
lately begun to fill the void by undercutting the profitability of mar-
keting misbehavior. By making the flagrant disregard of the public 
safety costly, the punitive damages remedy converts the profit motive 
into a positive force for the promotion of optimal product safety. 
The assimilation of the punitive damages remedy into the field 
of products liability has just begun. This blending of distinct 
doctrines with separate functions cannot be expected to occur with-
out producing a few rough edges. But time and experience will 
demonstrate that the union is sound. 
